THE EVOLVING CONSENSUS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. CHINA POLICY BETWEEN 1959 AND 1972 AND THE DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON IT

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DECLARATION

I am happy to state that the work contained herein is all of my own and that any sources used are indicated. I would like to draw attention to my unpublished Masters Thesis, which I have used as the basis of some of my thinking on the Nixon period and is reflected in Chapter Eight. My Masters was a study of Nixon's policy towards East Asia and attempted to marry and explain policy towards China, Vietnam and Japan as part of a revised regional approach on the part of the President. My understanding of Nixon's strategy of extricating the US from the Vietnam War grew out of the Masters and elements of my understanding of Nixon's China policy also is based upon ideas I first explored in my Masters Thesis. Where that influence is present it has been fully recorded in the footnotes.

ABSTRACT:

This thesis is a study of the domestic influences that led to President Nixon's decision to seek a new US relationship with the People's Republic of China. In particular, it concentrates on the role of academics in forcing a policy debate on China policy and the crucial role that they played in creating the environment that led to eventual change. The thesis argues that during the 1960s a climate was created that made it necessary for Nixon to change policy and that traditional accounts of the subject have failed to fully appreciate the role of domestic factors in forcing a change of policy.

This thesis throws light on three areas. Firstly, the development of US China policy in the post-war years leading up to 1971 and in particular the domestic influences placed on it. A notable argument of the piece is that many of the policies later adopted by Nixon were discussed and promoted during the Presidency of John F. Kennedy and that in the last year of his life active consideration was given to changing policy.

Secondly, it is a study of Sino-American relations in the 1960s, which shows the extent to which it was subject to domestic politics. Finally, it is an exploration of the role of interested academics and the way that they were able to influence US policy in such a sensitive area and the different methods that they used to affect and alter policy.

The study has made use of a number of primary archival source holdings in the United States as well as the transcripts of Congressional hearings and studies commissioned by the US Government during the period that informed its China policy. Also, it has made full use of the secondary sources available on Sino-American relations.

INTRODUCTION: "THIS SHIFT OF VIEW".

On 24 February 1972 as President Richard Nixon enjoyed the hospitality of the leaders of the People's Republic of China, the famous Harvard based China scholar John King Fairbank wrote in the *New York Review of Books* that:

> A residual ambivalence underlies our post-cold-war view of China. How come these same Chinese could be such bad guys in the 1950s and such good guys today? This shift of view springs partly from our own capacity to spring from one to another interpretation of foreign reality. Our grip on reality in distant places beyond direct observation is of course weakened by the way we feel. At any given time the 'truth' about China is in our heads, a notoriously unsafe repository for so valuable a commodity.[1]

The nature of this shift in view is the topic of this thesis. The main focus of the work will be the slow shift in US policy towards China between 1960 and the election of President John F. Kennedy and February 1972. However, the thesis will also concern itself with the domestic determinants that brought about this change in policy. Consideration must and will be given to those individuals and groups who attempted to influence policy in the sixties and the extent to which their voices were heard. The conventional view of the famous 'China Opening' carried out by Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger places the focus on the years after Nixon's election. However, this dissertation will try to show the more subtle relationships that existed between government, academia, and other actors and how they affected the

change of policy that became so apparent during 1971. The structure of the dissertation will be to look at Sino- American relations between 1945 and 1972 although the work will focus on the period after 1960. This will allow a thorough understanding of the basis of the early attitudes of the US towards the newly created PRC in the 1950s and the manner in which the hostile policy of that time became established against so much potential opposition. The thesis will then show how that policy was slowly undermined and ultimately swept away. In short, it will show how those bad guys in Beijing became the good guys of 1972. Finally, the thesis will show how this process took place against a backdrop of major international events such as the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution.

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND: US CHINA POLICY UNTIL 1960.

(i) Background.

Contact between the United States and China during the nineteenth century was infrequent and associated with the conduct of the European powers that were in the process of opening up the ancient empire for trading purposes. The Chinese, with considerable justification, saw this process as exploitation. America shared the trading interests of the Europeans as well as their desire to bring Christianity to the "Middle Kingdom". China was seen as simultaneously a gigantic potential market for American products as well as a repository of US romanticism and religious zeal. American traders created commercial bases in the great port cities of the decaying Chinese empire while American Christian missionaries tried to bring the dominant western religion to the indifferent and sometimes hostile mass of ordinary Chinese. These factors would remain throughout the twentieth century. For example, in 1940 the Republican Senator from Nebraska, Kenneth Wherry could proclaim that: "With God's help, we will lift Shanghai up and up, ever up, until it is just like Kansas City". [1]

China became a concern in US foreign policy in the last years of the nineteenth century as the US began to develop a global role in line with its growing industrial power. Secretary of State John Hay developed a policy in 1900 known as the "Open Door". This was based on the belief that China should be held together politically as a means of creating social stability and avoiding conflicts amongst the competing European powers there. This meant that the US was able to maximise its trading

interests in the area while restraining the ambitions of potential rivals. The US was also aware of the growing strength of a new regional power Japan who had adopted many western practices including imperialist expansion. The open door was predicated on the reality that the US did not have the means to maintain unilaterally its interests in the region.

Whereas the "Open Door" concept defined the economic attitude of the US, it was President Theodore Roosevelt who defined its political approach to the region. This approach would predominate until the 1940s. Roosevelt, a keen believer in power politics, understood that Japan had vital interests in the region and that the US did not have the power or will to prevent her from pursuing them. Alternatively, the US had only peripheral interests, which focussed mainly on the Philippines. The 1908 Root-Takahira Agreement accepted that Japan should be the dominant power of the region including the northeast of China and Manchuria provided it accepted the US dominance of the Philippines. By that time Japan had seized both Taiwan and Korea and had successfully defeated Russia at war. Roosevelt saw little alternative but to seek a surrogate in the region.

As in so much else, Woodrow Wilson adopted a more moralistic tone in his Asian policy, but beyond verbal condemnation, he did not challenge the growing Japanese domination of China. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Chinese aspirations rested on the return of the German zone of influence around Shantung. The Japanese, who had seized Shantung from the Germans, also laid claim to it. They demanded it as the price of their participation in the Peace Conference and Wilson gave it to them to

the disgust of many Chinese and some Americans including Secretary of State Robert Lansing.

This policy was continued unchallenged throughout the 1920s and even into the 1930s as Japan became more openly expansionistic. In 1931, when Japan formally took over Manchuria setting up the Puppet State of Manchukuo, the US adopted a policy of non-recognition, which in reality meant accepting Japanese aggression. Only as the Japanese became allied to the Fascist European powers, Germany and Italy, did US attitudes change. For the first time, China became a major consideration in US policy. Assistance was given to the Chinese in their war effort against the Japanese and the US cemented an alliance with the Guomindang government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). In fact, Franklin Delano Roosevelt envisaged Jiang's China playing a key role as the major regional power in a post-war world divided up into political spheres of influence. In short, China would replace Japan as the key US ally in the region.

The core problem with FDR's strategy was the inability of the Guomindang to play such a role. The Guomindang were weak, corrupt and locked in a civil war with the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). Little effort was made by them to fight the Japanese, as Jiang preferred to hold the best troops back for the likely resumption of the civil war with the communists. The State, War and Treasury Departments were amongst those who condemned the Chinese performance. By 1945, FDR had come to accept that Jiang could not play the regional role set out for him and US policy makers were once

again forced to look to the defeated Japanese.[2]

The final players to be considered were the CCP. Up until the 1940s they did not play a major part in US thinking being regarded amongst other things as bandits calling themselves communists.[3] During the war, as the US became increasingly exasperated with the failings of the Nationalists, pressure to develop contacts with the communists emerged. This culminated with the Yenan Mission of 1944 when Foreign Service Officers went to the Communist stronghold in the north of the country. In February 1945, these officers sent a memo to the State Department that bypassed the Pro-Jiang views of FDR's special envoy to China Patrick Hurley. They argued for a tolerant US view of the Communists based on their ability and willingness to fight the Japanese. FDR ignored their pleas and maintained support for Hurley and the existing pro-Jiang policy. Hurley's bias towards the nationalists hampered any US efforts to negotiate any peace between the two sides on the ground and in November 1945 in a dramatic move, Hurley resigned alleging that the China specialists he had worked with had undermined his preferred policy by siding with the communists. These allegations would later effectively destroy the careers of these officers. Amongst those Hurley accused were John Paton Davies and John Stewart Service who were both in China at the time and John Carter Vincent who was the Director of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs at the State Department in Washington.[4]

The defeat of the Japanese merely acted to re-ignite the Chinese Civil War. FDR's successor in the White House Harry S. Truman, in a move to stabilise the situation, sent FDR's Chief of Staff George Marshall to China

to try to broker an agreement between the two warring sides. Marshall achieved little success and in October 1946 he decided with the agreement of the Ambassador to China John Leighton Stuart that the situation was hopeless. It was now clear that the Chinese Civil War would be fought to the death and it was also highly likely that the Communists would emerge victorious.

(ii) Truman, Acheson, and the 'Fall' of China.

By this time the US had little remaining confidence in Jiang and his Nationalist government. It was viewed as corrupt, hopeless and generally incapable of resisting the more organised communists. In fact, as they came closer to defeat, Guomindang officials became even more corrupt in a desperate attempt to protect themselves and provide for their families. Successive Secretaries of State George Marshall and Dean Acheson, and the influential head of the Policy Planning Staff George Frost Kennan, all believed that the Nationalists were not worth defending and that the Communists, once in power, would be too weak and inward looking to represent any major threat to US strategic interests. Instead they preferred to concentrate on the threats posed by the Soviet Union and economic instability in Western Europe which they felt were far more real. Truman said of Jiang's government that it "was one of the most corrupt and inefficient that ever made an attempt to govern a country".[5] From 1947 onwards policy was to be seen to be giving financial aid and general support to Jiang while ensuring that he took the blame for the demise of his government.[6] The official administration view of the

collapse of the nationalists in 1949 was the China White Paper released by the State Department in August of that year. In the letter of transmittal that was released with the paper Secretary of State Acheson wrote:

> The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.[7]

Less than two months later on October 1st, Mao declared the formation of the People's Republic of China and the remnants of the Nationalists fled to the island of Formosa to the south of China. Acheson anticipated that the Nationalists would be beaten on Formosa (Taiwan) as well and that after an initial furore the US would recognise the new Communist government. In fact, he showed more than a passing interest in the Formosan Independence movement who were pledged to keeping both the Communists and Nationalists out.[8] The US Government also anticipated that the People's Republic of China would be an independent Communist regime rather than a mere satellite of the Soviet Union. As Philip Sprouse, who in 1949 was Director of the Office of Chinese affairs at the State Department, later recalled:

> the U.S. was engaged (at this time) in what could be described as a withdrawing and disengaging operation with the prospect that by

> early 1951, with the Communists in possession of Formosa and the National Government no longer in existence (at least on Chinese territory), the U.S. Government could seriously consider the question of recognition.[9]

This quotation leaves us in little doubt that elements within the Administration gave serious consideration to developing reasonable relations with the new government. Even as pressure mounted, the Administration stuck to its existing position. On 5 January 1950, Truman told a Press Conference, that the US would not intervene in the Chinese Civil war, even to save Jiang on Formosa, beyond giving the Guomindang economic aid. Seven days later, Acheson went even further in a famous speech to the National Press Club. He outlined where he believed US interests in Asia lay which were Japan, the Philippines and the Aleutian Islands and went on to say that Communist China and the Soviet Union had divergent interests which would eventually lead to a split between the two.[10] By the end of 1950, policy and US attitudes towards the People's Republic of China had changed dramatically.

The Republican opposition had never shared this policy of disengagement and disillusionment with the Chinese Nationalists. Instead they looked to the report that General Wedemeyer had made after a visit to China in the summer of 1947. Wedemeyer, who had succeeded General Joseph Stilwell as Jiang's Chief of Staff, advocated a large scale US military and economic aid package for Jiang that would be dependent on him introducing a package of reforms. Administration figures were appalled at this report believing that the Nationalists had

shown over the previous twenty years that they were incapable of reform. The Republicans in Congress who saw an issue with which they could distinguish themselves from the Democrats in an election year took up the cry for assistance. The Administration who saw no benefit in denying funds to Jiang agreed $275m in economic aid and another $125m in military aid that would be paid directly to the Guomindang. Jiang, believing that the Republicans were likely to win the 1948 Presidential Election, was happy to rely on the US. When he did flee the mainland for Formosa, the Republicans began to bitterly condemn the Administration for failing to protect a US ally against a communist onslaught. The fall of China, combined with the explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949 and the revelation of Soviet spies in the US, all combined to weaken fatally the position of the Truman Administration and led to the excesses of the McCarthy years.[11]

(iii) The Development of a "China Lobby".

These Republican attacks on the Truman Administration were fuelled by the activities of a China Lobby which actively promoted the interests of the Jiang regime and virulently condemned anybody who was perceived to be unsympathetic to those interests. Ross Koen, who has written a major study on the Lobby and their activities, describes:

> a well-orchestrated dovetailing of the interests of the China lobby inner core with the political and social interests of domestic groups in America ... the basic fear of communism, abroad and at home, enabled Chiang's agents and their American friends to exploit

> issues and events to marshall support for Chiang Kai-shek and attack those critical of his regime.[12]

Max Ascoli who wrote a two-part report on the lobby for *The Reporter* magazine published in April and June 1952 concluded that:

> The fall of China invigorated ... a partnership between Chinese and American factions eagerly involved in the internal politics of each other's country. The Chinese partners are the agents of a government that can rule China again only if the United States destroys Mao's forces in all-out war. The American partners are an ill-assorted lot - honest men deeply concerned with the plight of the Chinese people and of Chiang Kai-shek; fanatics possessed by the nightmare of a Communist conspiracy centering on some of America's highest leaders; and politicians who will stop at nothing in their hunt for power.[13]

The roots of the lobby can be traced back to 1940 when Jiang's notorious brother-in-law T.V. Soong arrived in Washington to set up a network of contacts that would maximise Nationalist influence in the United States. Amongst those who came into contact with Soong was FDR's confidante Harry Hopkins. As the war ended and the Guomindang were increasingly under threat from the communists, the activities of the lobby became more pronounced. Their attacks focussed on the lack of aid being given to the Nationalists, which they claimed was responsible for their poor performance and the Wedemeyer Report, which they claimed, was being suppressed. They also joined the increasing attacks on the Yalta Agreement where it was claimed that the US had made irresponsible

concessions to the Soviet Union. The 1948 election result, the State Department White Paper, the conviction of Alger Hiss, the demise of the Nationalists in China and the reticence of the Administration to back Jiang all fuelled these attacks. The main thrust of these attacks came from Congress where Senators such as Owen Brewster of Maine, William Knowland of California and Congressman William Judd of Minnesota (who was a former Christian missionary in China) led the attacks on the Administration. On 9 February 1950, in a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, Senator Joseph McCarthy went further when he alleged that there were 205 known communists in the State Department who were involved in setting policy. A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee chaired by Millard Tydings investigated these claims and McCarthy's figures, which tended to vary. The subcommittee concluded that they were "a fraud and a hoax perpetuated on the Senate of the United States and the American people".[14] As a consequence of this, Tydings was roundly abused and McCarthyite attacks cost him his seat in the midterm elections of November 1950. The intervention of McCarthy and the outbreak of the war in Korea seemed to legitimise the more extreme attacks on the Administration and all of those associated with China policy. Typical of these attacks was a pamphlet entitled *China: Key to the Orient* by Reverend William R. Johnson, which was published in August 1950 and distributed by the American China Policy Association. Using evidence primarily from the White Paper, Johnson argued that:

> There are those who brief presidents, vice-presidents, presidential representatives, ambassadors and Congressmen relative to the

> Far East; who are determined that China go Communist. Among these, as their records and their published writings show are Dean Acheson, Owen Lattimore, Alger Hiss, John Carter Vincent, Laughlin Currie, John Service, and many others.[15]

Johnson typified the Lobby's indiscriminate attack on State Department Officers like Acheson, Service and Carter Vincent; academics like Lattimore and ex-government employees like Hiss who had virtually no ties with China policy. By 1950 the main intention of the China Lobby and their supporters was to ensure that the US did not recognise the new Chinese government and blocked its entry into the United Nations. Moreover they seemed intent on destroying the careers of the China specialists who had been critical of Jiang and unwilling to back him against Mao's communists.[16]

(iv) 1950: A Key Year.

The activities of the China Lobby combined with the actions of the Chinese Communists pushed the Administration and especially Truman towards a more hard-line policy. In January 1950, the Chinese Communists seized US diplomatic buildings and a month later they signed a far-reaching pact with the Soviet Union. The image of the PRC as an independent communist nation, along the lines of Tito's Yugoslavia began to seem less plausible. However, it was the outbreak of the conflict in Korea and especially the Chinese entry into it in the autumn of 1950 that confirmed the hardening of views. On the night of 25 June 1950, the North Koreans began a concerted attempt to reunify the Korean

peninsula by destroying the South Korean government of Syngman Rhee. Korea, an ancient and homogenous nation for over four thousand years, had been divided along the Thirty-eighth parallel in 1945 between Soviet and US backed governments. Truman and Acheson saw the attack as an attempt by the Soviet Union to use one of its satellites to alter the balance of the Cold War in East Asia and threaten the key US ally in the region Japan. Truman's reaction was to militarise the Cold War. The document NSC (National Security Council) Sixty-eight, which called for a vast increase in the US military budget was approved as official policy. Moreover, Truman now decided to protect Jiang on Formosa by moving the Seventh fleet to the Taiwan Straits that separated the island from the Chinese mainland. In short this would mean that any Chinese attack across the Straits would encounter US resistance. Finally, the US decided to intervene under the auspices of the UN (United Nations) to save South Korea. The Communists immediately condemned this provocation and especially the US support for Jiang.[17]

At first it seemed possible that the North Koreans would defeat the UN troops as well but a daring landing by the UN at the port of Inchon on the west coast of Korea in September 1950 altered the balance of the war. Suddenly, the option of eradicating a communist state presented itself. The Administration gave the Commander on the ground, General Douglas MacArthur, orders to invade North Korea provided he did not encounter either Soviet or Chinese intervention. MacArthur, who needed little encouragement to go north, started to move his troops with the intention of reaching the Yalu River that separated China from North

Korea. This UN march north brought about a massive Chinese intervention which became apparent in late November and began a bitter three-year conflict between the two countries. Traditionally, historians have argued that the Chinese intervened because they believed that the US actions threatened their security. However, Chen Jian in a recent seminal work argues convincingly that Mao saw Korea as an opportunity to challenge US influence in the region and affirm the new power and revolutionary spirit of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese attack shocked the US and in December Truman declared a state of emergency. US policy to China became implacably hostile with the US refusing to officially recognise the existence of the PRC and allowing a Chinese Nationalist delegate to represent China in the United Nations. Also, the US declared a total economic embargo and in 1951 introduced restrictions on US allies trading with China. Finally, the Korean War altered the dynamics of US-Japanese relations. A Peace Treaty was signed between the two in September 1951 and there can be little doubt that the war in Korea helped to revitalise the Japanese economy.[18]

Even though the policy became harsher, the view that China would be an independent power and have fundamentally different interests than the Soviet Union remained. The US State Department experts still believed that an eventual split was likely. The ferociously hostile policy towards the PRC, it was believed, would push the two communist giants together, with the eventual result that any tensions between the two that existed would rise more rapidly to the surface. The public face of this policy was to claim that the Chinese were little more than tools of Moscow.[19] This

view was famously put by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk in a speech before the China Institute on 18 May 1951 in New York. Rusk had been appointed to that position in March 1950 because of his pro-Jiang and anti-CCP credentials. It was felt that the China Lobby would find it more difficult to criticise him. In the speech, Rusk, talking to an audience presided over by *Life* magazine's Henry Luce, lambasted the PRC:

> We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping (Beijing) for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government - a slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese. It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations.[20]

This calculated insult would ensure that Rusk, who would later be Secretary of State under Kennedy and Johnson, would never be accused of being soft on Communism especially the Chinese variant. The reference to Manchukuo, the puppet government set up by the Japanese in Manchuria, was designed to inflame the Chinese Communists as was the suggestion that they were little more than a satellite of the Soviet Union. In reality, even then, Rusk knew that these allegations were untrue.

The combination of Truman's failure to find a resolution to the war in Korea and the onslaught of McCarthyite attacks on his administration took away any electoral hopes that he might have harboured in the presidential election of 1952. In March, he announced his intention not to

stand for re-election. The "fall" of China and its ramifications had effectively destroyed his Presidency and Sino-American relations had entered a new and difficult phase characterised by the conflict in Korea and a violent dislike for one another.

(v) Eisenhower and China.

In January 1953, the famous World War II General Dwight D. Eisenhower took office. As a Republican, he ended twenty years of Democratic control of the White House. He was a thoughtful and subtle man who often hid his intelligence behind a friendly exterior. His appointment as Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles, a dour man known for his fierce anticommunist views. Neither had any sympathy for the Chinese with whom they were locked in war with in Korea. In fact it quickly became clear that the new Administration was determined publicly at least to maintain the hostile approach towards the Chinese of their immediate predecessors. In February 1953, shortly after taking office, Eisenhower announced the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Straits claiming that he would no longer protect the Chinese mainland from attack by the Nationalists. Moreover to appease the right wing of the Republican Party, he appointed the ultra hard-liner Walter Robertson as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Robertson became the most vocal supporter of Jiang's interests in the Administration and an impediment to any change in policy.[21]

Eisenhower and Dulles were also prepared to threaten the Chinese with the use of nuclear weapons. Shortly after taking office, Eisenhower

began to let it be known that he was considering using nuclear weapons to break the impasse in Korea. These threats had little affect on the Chinese who knew that public opinion would never allow them to be carried out. In fact it was Stalin's death in March 1953, rather than Eisenhower's threats, which created the impetus for a resolution of the conflict. In 1955, the situation in Indochina and the Offshore Islands crisis brought forth more threats of nuclear attack. For example, Eisenhower at a press conference on March 16 declared that atomic bombs were no different from bullets and should be treated as such. The two Offshore Islands crises in 1954 and 1958, over two tiny islands Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), just off the coast of the mainland and controlled by the Nationalists, seemed to sum up for opponents of Eisenhower's China policy, the dangers that this sort of confrontation posed. The idea that the US might go to war over two virtually uninhabited little islands with no strategic importance was almost too much for many to contemplate. The hail of criticism was even more intense in 1958 during the second crisis when the US moved weapons into place to defend the islands. For example, the *Chicago Daily News* called the defence of Jinmen "an act of monumental madness".[22]

The Administration also developed strategic alliances with the non-communist countries of Asia. In particular, in September 1954, SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) was formed under US auspices and in December 1954 the US signed a security pact with the Nationalists. The terms of the pact meant that the US would defend Taiwan and the Pescadores in return for which Jiang agreed not to

launch any attack on the mainland without consulting the US first. It is not merely accidental that the developmental of this treaty structure coincided with the beginning of the Chinese shelling of Jinmen on September 3rd.[23]

Dulles became the public face of this harsh policy. In the spring of 1954, he attended the Geneva Conference called to try to resolve the question of Korea amongst others. Dulles made it clear he would not meet with the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai "unless our automobiles collide".[24] Rumours also abounded that Zhou had approached Dulles with his outstretched hand who had refused to shake it. This story became common knowledge to the extent that in February 1972 when Nixon arrived in China he made a big play of publicly shaking Zhou's hand. Dulles outlined the public face of the China policy in June 1957 when in a speech in San Francisco he stated that:

> We can confidently assume that international communism's rule of strict conformity is, in China as elsewhere, a passing and not a perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves, our allies, and the Chinese people to do all we can to contribute to that passing.[25]

It was statements like these that seemed to confirm that Eisenhower and Dulles were unwilling to ever consider any alternatives to the existing harsh policy. Only in recent years with the opening of the archives has it been realised that the administration was far subtler in its approach. Historians such as Gordon Chang, Warren Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker have all looked at Eisenhower's China policy and have concluded that he and Dulles were always more flexible and when pressed were

prepared to make concessions. Finally, they maintained the view that the best way to cause a rift in the Sino-Soviet relationship was to isolate the Chinese.

Even before taking office, Dulles at least, had shown a greater degree of flexibility towards the new communist government. In his 1950 book *War and Peace*, he wrote that: "If the Communist government of China in fact proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance, then it, too, should be admitted to the United Nations".[26] Once in office, he surrounded himself with advisers who shared his flexibility, whilst appointing hard-liners like Robertson to the public State Department positions that dealt with China affairs. This approach insured Dulles, who had originally been associated with the internationalist wing of the Republican Party, from attacks from the right. Amongst these more moderate figures was: Robert Bowie who became Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff; Livingston Merchant, who despite being Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs had an extensive background in Chinese affairs having served in Nanjing and U. Alexis Johnson who was chosen as the negotiator in the Geneva talks with the Chinese in 1955 in preference to the more hard-line State Department Officers who dealt with the day-to-day running of China policy. Furthermore, the former US negotiator in Korea and law partner of Dulles, Arthur Dean was a strong believer in the idea of two Chinas as he set out in 1955 in an article in *Foreign Affairs*.[27] The solution that Dulles came up with for China was the so-called "Two Chinas" approach of supporting and protecting Jiang on Taiwan as the Republic of China while cautiously developing contacts

with the mainland government as well. This two China policy could then be extended to accepting both governments as legitimate representatives of the Chinese nation. This solution, while totally unacceptable to both the PRC and Chinese Nationalists, would become the favoured policy of almost all those who wanted to see the policy of total isolation abandoned.

Within the development of policy this flexibility towards China was also apparent. As early as June 1953, serious consideration was given to adopting a policy of "Two Chinas". When asked about the possibility of a "Two Chinas" policy at a press conference on 19 January 1955, Eisenhower replied that it was "one of the possibilities that is constantly studied".[28] Moreover, he had a strong belief that the development of trading relations with the Communist bloc could facilitate an eventual thaw. For example, in April 1954, at a NSC meeting he suggested that trade was the key element in splitting the Soviet Union and the Chinese away from one another. The Vice-President Richard Nixon promptly agreed with this.[29] In April 1955, after an offer from Zhou En-lai, the US accepted the need for talks with Chinese representatives at Geneva. The Administration ignored criticism from the right wing of the Republican Party in developing these contacts. Instead both Eisenhower and Dulles accepted the need for them in light of the Offshore Islands crisis. The lack of genuine achievement at them would stem from the distance in attitudes between the two sides mainly on the issue of Taiwan, which the leaders in Beijing saw as a Chinese province that was being occupied by the United States. However, these talks at Geneva and Warsaw would

be the only formal contact between the two nations.[30]

The overall strategy remained one of fermenting a split between the Chinese and the Soviets by, as Dulles put it in November 1952, "keeping [Communist China] under pressure which would, in turn, keep the Communists pressuring Russia for more than Russia would give".[31] Both Eisenhower and Dulles disliked the British policy of moderation towards the Chinese, which the British believed would accelerate any likely split. A key event that US intelligence reports recorded was a meeting in Beijing at the height of the Offshore Islands crisis between Mao and Soviet Premier Khrushchev. At the meeting, Khrushchev urged the Chinese to moderate their stance towards the United States and Taiwan, offering them aid to do so. The hostile Chinese stance and the more conciliatory Soviet behaviour convinced the US Administration that it was right to see the Chinese as the more extreme power who should be isolated as well as showing emerging tensions between the two communist giants.[32]

This approach was also necessitated by the lack of a viable alternative. The other option was some form of contact with the Chinese Communists with whom officially at least the US was still at war. It was advised by some within and around the Administration. For example, an adviser in the State Department Charlton Ogburn, was a firm believer that the US should overhaul its China policy as a means of splitting the Chinese away from the Soviets.[33] It can be argued that in this climate such a policy option was politically impossible. Any approach to the Chinese would have brought down a range of criticism on the heads of

the Administration, that would have imperilled Eisenhower's re-election in 1956. It would also have led to a diplomatic crisis with Taiwan that would have had domestic ramifications for the Administration including possibly rehabilitating the career of Joseph McCarthy. When Arthur Dean did publicise his views about moderating China policy in early 1954 he was ferociously attacked by amongst others the Republican Senate Majority Leader William Knowland. Opinion polls, of the time, showed that the public supported this anti-Chinese stance. In July 1954, a poll showed that only seven per cent thought that the PRC should be allowed representation in the United Nations. Instead, seventy-eight per cent of Americans opposed such a move and in November 1954 another poll showed that only five per cent supported the recognition of the PRC against eighty-two per cent who opposed that.[34] It would take a brave or foolish politician to ignore such polling evidence and Eisenhower was neither. In short, if the US Administration was tied to a policy of rigidity towards the PRC that was partly due to public hostility towards the Chinese Communists. The strategy of making the PRC more and more reliant on the Soviet Union had one advantage over any other course of action: it was the only approach acceptable to the American public.

Even within this hostile climate pressure was placed on the Administration to modify its China policy especially in 1957 after Eisenhower's re-election. These pressures came mainly from allied governments who wished to develop trading relations with the Chinese Communists. In 1957, the US was forced to accept a decision by the British to open trading relations in non-strategic goods with the PRC and

in July the Japanese moved to full trading relations in non-strategic goods with their traditional trading partner.[35] The actions of the British and Japanese began to stir up domestic American politicians and businessmen. For example, US textile owners began to lean on the government and Southern Congressmen to support the redirecting of Japanese textile products to China instead of the United States. The Senate Majority Leader and presidential aspirant Lyndon Johnson of Texas was amongst the politicians who called on the Administration to reconsider its China policy and in January 1957 Henry Ford II called on the US to consider developing trading relations with the Chinese.[36] These statements received widespread coverage and support. Under this pressure Eisenhower took some slight steps to modify policy and to ensure that non-strategic trade with the PRC was not hindered. In 1957 he modified the most controversial sections of the Battle Act which paved the way for the Japanese and British decisions and in July 1958 he agreed to allow foreign subsidiaries of US companies to trade with the PRC. This move occurred after the Chinese had made an order to the Canadian subsidiary of Ford which both the company and the Canadian government was desperate to fulfil. The Chinese decision to renew their shelling of the Offshore Islands in August 1958 and the US decision to respond with a heavy military build-up in the area brought these gestures to a halt.[37]

Dwight Eisenhower left office in January 1961 with US policy towards the People's Republic of China virtually unchanged from the hostile policy that he had inherited. The PRC was still excluded from the United

Nations and the US Government publicly continued to recognise Jiang Jie-shi on Taiwan as the official leader of the Chinese mainland. Contemporary commentators have lambasted Eisenhower's China policy as intransigent, unimaginative and even at times dangerous. For example, Roger Hilsman, who later became Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under Kennedy and who would deal directly with China policy condemned Eisenhower's approach as "a policy stance composed more of myth and rigidity than of realism and flexibility".[38] Academics such as the distinguished political scientist Norman Graebner have concurred with this perspective.[39] Although, it is easy to be critical of Eisenhower's policy, it is important to take into account certain factors. Firstly, there was little alternative to a policy of hostility towards the PRC. A combination of domestic conservatives and the influence of Jiang on Taiwan and the China Lobby would have made any approaches to Beijing unsustainable. The political price of an alteration in China policy in the 1950s was simply not worth paying given the hostility of the Chinese Communists towards the United States. Leonard Kusnitz, who has studied the affects of public opinion on China policy argues that public opinion would have prevented any change in policy even if the Eisenhower Administration had been so disposed.[40] A second factor was the belief that the way to facilitate a Sino-Soviet split was to push the two nations together. The lack of viable alternatives at this stage obviously increased the attractiveness of the strategy and indeed the commitment of both Eisenhower and Dulles towards it. Finally, many of the critics of Eisenhower's China policy fail to see its subtlety. For

example, although the Administration did frequently refer to a Communist monolith, which supposedly emanated from Moscow, the reality was that they understood the differences of strategic interests that existed between the Soviet Union and the PRC. Commentators, at the time, failed to dig below the surface of Administration rhetoric and identify the real factors that stopped either Eisenhower or Dulles pursuing their preferred eventual option of "Two Chinas". It can be argued that some of the criticism of the Administration's policy is unfair and ignores the restrictions that they operated under. However, the key point that must be made about contemporary critics like Roger Hilsman and other members of the Kennedy Administration, who worked on China policy and condemned their predecessors, was that they started from the premise that Eisenhower had missed an opportunity to pursue a more moderate stance that might reap dividends. Over the years from 1961 until 1963 they would get the opportunity to put their alternative ideas forward.[41]

That is not to say that there were not some legitimate criticisms of the Eisenhower Administration in this area. The linking of the containment of China with the US commitment to Indochina inhibited the attempts of Eisenhower's successors to change China policy as well as being a factor in the disastrous US intervention in Vietnam. Also, the aggressive rhetoric of the Administration made it harder for them or their successors to begin the slow process of educating the public into accepting a softening of the American stance towards the Chinese. Another notable factor, as Gordon Chang has convincingly shown, was that the

Eisenhower Administration was shot through with a pervading racism that undoubtedly affected their China policy. This racial bias meant that the Administration were not dispassionate in their instinctive perceptions of the Chinese. "Signs of flexibility on China's part could easily be dismissed as Asian trickery," writes Chang, "On the other hand Chinese hostility seemed to confirm Asian fanaticism".[42] For example, in his memoirs, Eisenhower described the Chinese as variously "hysterical", "irrational" and "fanatical" while he wrote of the Soviet leaders that "no matter what differences in culture and tradition, values or language, the Russian leaders were human beings and they wanted to remain alive".[43] Eisenhower's need to state this works on the hidden assumption that there may be others in the world who may not want to remain alive. It is therefore not surprising given these racial assumptions that the Administration looked towards the Soviet Union as the more moderate power with whom one could negotiate. Finally, as in other areas such as Civil Rights for African-Americans in the United States and the emerging imbroglio in Vietnam, Dwight Eisenhower left office at just the right moment to allow his reputation to remain intact. The growing criticism of his China policy and the more aggressive stance of the Soviet Union under Khrushchev in the years from 1957 and the Soviet launch of the Sputnik rocket created a desire for the reconsideration of all areas of US policy especially concerning the so-called great powers. It would be left to Eisenhower's young and dynamic successor John Fitzgerald Kennedy to grapple with these problems.

(vi) Conclusion

During the course of the twentieth century, US policy towards China had gone through a number of changes. Up until the late 1930s, China had been a minor consideration of US policy makers who believed that the US did not possess the power or will to exert itself in the East Asian region beyond the Philippines. Instead, China was a preserve of adventurous missionaries and traders who travelled to a distant land. The Japanese invasion of the Chinese mainland and the Japanese alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy made China an important theatre in the global battle against the Axis powers. Jiang became a key US ally during World War II and Franklin Roosevelt even envisaged China becoming the major regional power in Asia in place of Japan. The reality of Jiang's weakness and the eventual collapse of his government on the Chinese mainland meant that the US was forced to look once again to the Japanese as the major regional power. Initially, the US had hoped to come to terms with the new Communist government but Chinese actions and domestic pressure at first delayed any US acceptance of the new government and the Korean War ensured that the US became deeply hostile to the PRC. Eisenhower inherited this policy of total isolation and made only minor adjustments including the development of pacts such as SEATO and a reliance on atomic diplomacy. His China policy was regarded as too conservative and in desperate need of change by many observers. By the end of his administration new influences were emerging on US policy towards China that during the 1960s would play a part in laying the foundation for Nixon's opening to China.

CHAPTER TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

(i) World War II

Just as the Second World War fundamentally altered US policy towards China, it also led to the development of a fully-fledged academic discipline in the United States. Before the war there had only been about fifty academics working in the field of Far Eastern or East Asian studies and many of those regarded themselves primarily as historians or linguists rather than area specialists. The war changed all of that. The war in Asia created a desperate need for government officers with language skills in Japanese and Chinese to teach others and to work on the ground in the battle theatre. Moreover, the war linked up government and academics and their institutions as all worked together in the national interest of winning the war in the Pacific. The war also created the opportunity and incentive for the elite universities to establish East Asian centres that would maintain this new and much in demand specialisation. This was not only the case with Asian specialists. For example, at the end of the war, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) scholars at the Russian desk left to found Harvard's Russian Research Center. This linkage also created the relationship between the discipline of area studies and its influence on foreign policy. These new area studies had been formed with US foreign policy in mind, especially ensuring that in the new internationalist era of the post war world, US leaders and advisers would not lack specialist advice. Anti-Communist military strategists would dominate the field of Russian studies. Asia specialists

were not as government orientated as their Russia counterparts with many of the most prominent of these scholars such as John King Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer being primarily historians whom events brought to the fore.[1]

John King Fairbank was to become the most famous China scholar. Originating from the mid west, he had spent his early graduate years in China during the 1930s where he had further developed his love and fascination for Chinese culture and history, as well as a dislike for the Guomindang government. During the war, he worked for the government spending a year each in Chungking and Nanking and working in the OSS Office in the FE section of the Office of War Information (OWI) under a fellow academic and rival George Taylor. The two men disagreed strongly on the merits of Jiang with Taylor being a strong supporter of the Generalissimo. At the end of the war, he returned to Harvard where in conjunction with Reischauer he set up a popular degree course in East Asian civilisation. He also assembled a research group who took a joint degree in History and Far Eastern languages. In 1955, all of this became the East Asian Research Center and in 1977, on Fairbank's retirement, it was renamed the John K. Fairbank Center for East Asia Research.[2] James Peck regards Fairbank and Reischauer as the two major figures in the development of this field: Fairbank as its founder and Reischauer as its chief populariser.[3] Reischauer wrote about his colleague thus:

> He (Fairbank) was an indefatigable writer, or rather dictator, of memoranda and letters, a skilled raiser of funds, and a wily academic politician, who was deeply entrenched in the Harvard

community and knowledgeable about the levers of power.[4]

The two men set about making Harvard the central institution for this new area attracting funding and top students who became the East Asia specialists of the next era. The growth of Harvard as the most important centre for East Asia studies was helped by the decline and crisis that befell the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).

Before World War II the main promoter of East Asia studies was the IPR which had been formed in Honolulu in 1925. It held conferences and sponsored publications whilst as an organisation maintaining a neutral political stance. The IPR had a Pacific Council that acted as its main international co-ordinator and issued the journal *Pacific Affairs*. There were also national chapters including an American one that published its own journal: *The Far Eastern Survey*. The IPR encouraged free thinking and an exchange of views between academics of different nationalities: a highly innovative approach that subsequently got them into trouble. The most famous academic associated with the organisation was Owen Lattimore, then based at Johns Hopkins University, who edited *Pacific Affairs* for much of the 1930s. Fairbank was a trustee of the American branch from 1946 until it disbanded and would continue to defend its work.[5] It can be suggested that even without the attentions of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the China Lobby the IPR would have declined anyway. As area studies in US universities grew, met governmental needs, maintained student's interest and attracted funds, establishments such as Harvard began to supplant the IPR as the main organising body of publications and conferences in the field. The development of another

organisation the Far Eastern Association (FEA) was indicative of the way in which the East Asian studies field was developing in the US.

In 1941, a non-membership group was formed with the sole aim of publishing the *Far Eastern Quarterly.* At the end of the war, the Committee on Far Eastern Studies supported by the American Council of Learned Societies and chaired by Knight Biggerstaff of Cornell University looked at ways in which the discipline could expand. One recommendation was the creation of an explicitly American orientated organisation that would deal solely with East Asia as opposed to the existing American Oriental Society (AOS) whose area of interest ranged primarily over the Middle East, although it also covered all of Asia. This led, in January 1948, to meetings held by Asia scholars with a view to forming their own membership-based organisation. Three months later, on April 2 1948, approximately two hundred members agreed to form the Far Eastern Association. Distinguished academics Arthur Hummel of the Library of Congress and Robert Hall of the University of Michigan were elected President and Vice-President respectively. Nine directors, including George Taylor now based at the University of Washington, were appointed with staggered terms. John King Fairbank became the editor of the monograph series associated with the FEA and his wife Wilma became its secretary.[6] The nascent organisation at this initial meeting set out its aims and objectives that included creating "a scholarly, nonpolitical, and nonprofit professional association of all persons interested in the study of the Far East".[7] The FEA would promote study of East Asia and publications and general research as well as dialogue

with other interested individuals in Canada and abroad. These aims reflected the growth of an explicitly US branch of East Asia studies that would lessen the need for the IPR to be active in the United States. Furthermore, the non-political nature of the FEA ensured that it rarely became involved in the battles that existed between members of the profession as McCarthyism wrenched it apart. Charles Hucker, who has written a study of the FEA, labels the period between 1949 and 1955 "the era of consolidation" for the organisation.[8] For example, in 1954, it formally joined the American Council of Learned Societies and membership continued to grow albeit slowly.[9]

(ii) The profession and McCarthyism.

It is impossible to understate the extent to which the onset of McCarthyism and the vendettas and bitterness that it unleashed tore apart this new academic discipline. As Paul Evans has written:

> the IPR hearings unleashed a storm of personal antagonisms far beyond the confines of normal academic discourse. Scholar criticized scholar in destructive fashion. Legitimate academic controversies were aired under conditions that sensationalized them, polarized the participants, and brought into question the loyalty, as well as the integrity, of many of those involved. An intellectual community previously characterized by cohesion, optimism, and pursuit of a common goal was savagely rent apart.[10]

The effect of this civil war within the profession was to warp the discipline

for a generation and to stifle the views of many of those who would have criticised the US policy of total isolation of China in its early years. Moreover, academics learned to modify their views to insure themselves from attack.

The roots of the split can be found in World War II and the assessment of the Guomindang government. In fact, most commentators divide the scholars into two main groups. Ben Lee Martin terms them the "Liberals" and "Conservatives".[11] The main group was the Liberals associated primarily with Harvard and including Fairbank and Reischauer. Other notable academics that can be categorised broadly as belonging to the Liberal school included Owen Lattimore and Benjamin Schwartz of Harvard. These academics felt very little sympathy for the plight of the Guomindang and saw no reason for US intervention to prop up his ailing administration. They saw Jiang and his immediate circle as being corrupt and incompetent. They also thought that it was unlikely that the US could affect the outcome of the civil war. Finally, they believed that any new Chinese communist government would almost certainly be independent of Moscow. In short, these academics believed that left to its own devices the Guomindang Government would collapse and that there was little that the US could or should do to try to prevent this outcome.[12] John King Fairbank's views were typical of this liberal perspective. Even during the war, he had been deeply critical of the Generalissimo labelling his government "proto-fascist" and critically translating Jiang's book *China's Destiny* and describing it as "a pernicious use of history for political purposes".[13] In his memoirs, he recalled the development of his

thinking:

> Ever since 1943 I had believed revolution was probably unavoidable in China. The collapsing urban economy and the KMT (KuoMinTang) corruption and repression visible in 1945-6 confirmed me in this view. When the Marshall mediation began to collapse too, it became urgent to warn the American public not to back CKS (Chiang Kai-Shek) and his right-KMT, who were so busily digging their own graves and trying to pull us in with them.[14]

In 1946, he wrote that Jiang's "brand of democracy is not ours, any more than is Mao Tse-tung's".[15] In June 1946, with his wife, he visited the communists' temporary capital at the time, Kalgan, to assist in the selection of four communist academics that were to visit the United States. Whilst there, he maintained friendly relations with the communist functionaries he encountered, who joked with him that the US should send its: "Lincolns and Washingtons rather than its Wedemeyers and Hurleys" to China.[16] They also made it clear to him that they would like to develop cultural relations with the United States.[17] Fairbank remembered this and the development of cultural relations between the two nations remained a central tenet of his later attempts to influence government policy. Back in the United States, Fairbank became even more outspoken in his condemnation of Jiang. In November 1948, in the *Foreign Policy Association Bulletin*, he wrote:

> The Chinese Communist program may indeed be cynically ruthless, economically unsound, swayed by Moscow, and feared by many Chinese. Compared with the overall Kuomintang

> program, it remains preferable from the point of view of the great majority of poor peasants ... The demoralization of Kuomintang China is likely to become accelerated. Material aid from the United States cannot stop this process. Foreign arms and food for the police will not maintain a Chinese regime once it has clearly lost the tacit acquiescence of the population - in old parlance, the Mandate of Heaven. The fact is that Chiang Kai-shek has had twenty years in which to compete with communism for the support of the Chinese peasantry, and he has lost.[18]

Privately, he was even more scathing. In 1949 he wrote that:

> I think the Communist regime holds more promise for the Chinese people than any continuation of the present Nationalist regime would ... Since the Chinese Communists have doctrines very similar to those of communists elsewhere, this indicates what an extremely bad government the recent one finally degenerated into before its collapse.[19]

In support of these views, Fairbank wrote dozens of articles and reviews and maintained correspondence in and with the *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *New York Herald Tribune* who all took an editorial line that shared his scepticism towards the Jiang regime.[20] The consistent theme of these pieces, as well as the failure of the Guomindang, was the indigenous roots of the CCP and the social revolution that he believed was taking place in China at the time. Central to this revolution, as far as he was concerned, was the need for the modernisation of China from a bureaucratic and conservative state that it

had historically been, into a more modern and dynamic society. Fairbank believed that the CCP might be the agents of this modernisation, which meant that their advent to power was not so disastrous after all. Furthermore, he believed and emphasised in his writings, that liberal Americans had no Chinese counterparts. Neither the Guomindang nor the CCP were liberal in their philosophy or conduct of power and that it was worthless hoping that Jiang might become more liberal in time.[21] He was quick to place all of this in a Chinese setting. Fairbank professed no sympathy with communism in America regarding himself as a liberal Democrat. To that end, he actively supported and worked with Arthur Schlesinger Jr's Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). In fact, he emphasised his anti-Communism, rationalising that this would protect him when expressing his more controversial views on China.[22]

The second and smaller group, who can more accurately be termed as the "Conservatives", were often associated with the University of Washington and their main spokesman was George Taylor. These academics were altogether more hostile to the events unfolding in China and the Communists. They believed that a failure of US policy had caused this Communist success. They also argued that the civil war in China was crucial in the global struggle between capitalism and communism. In short, Jiang's defeat would affect the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. Aside from Taylor, other China academics that can be characterised as conservatives included David Nelson Rowe and Richard Walker of Yale, Karl Wittfogel at Washington and William McGovern and Kenneth Colegrove both based at

Northwestern University.[23] Their view in the early years was not heard in comparison to the liberal perspective in public, in governmental circles or even within academia. Up until approximately 1949, most of the academic commentaries on the Civil War recommended that the US stay out and leave Jiang to his fate. This enraged the China Lobby who identified the academic profession as one of its chief targets. This attention from the Lobby dovetailed with the growing rage of these conservative academics that felt that the majority of their colleagues were unfairly maligning Jiang. Furthermore, they began to question the motives of colleagues whom they saw empathising with the CCP and condemning Jiang. They were especially suspicious of Owen Lattimore.[24] This dispute within the profession had been held over from the war where government service had necessitated unity. By 1948 that unity had broken down as Jiang's position had deteriorated rapidly and the academics were dispersed to their own institutions.[25] Finally, it should be noted that the views and actions of these groups of academics shared the views of the political establishment. The liberal perspective was consistent with the Truman Administration's view of the China Revolution, as expressed in the White Paper of August 1949, whilst the conservative perspective converged with the Republican criticisms of the Administration.

As early as June 1944, the magazine *The China Monthly*, which acted as a mouthpiece for pro-Guomindang views, attacked a "group of Harvard professors" whom it saw as being associated with the CCP.[26] Also in 1944, Alfred Kohlberg, a businessman and fierce anti-Communist, began

to target the IPR of which he was an active member. For example, he would later claim that "the lies about the Chinese Government and Army were Communist propaganda; and that the main source for spreading them in the country was the Institute of Pacific Relations".[27] Kohlberg's activities fuelled the China Lobby by providing them with an identifiable target. He would remain a member of the IPR until 1947 when he failed in an attempt to get a committee set up to investigate his allegations of procommunist bias.[28] As early as November 1945, Senator Wherry accused Lattimore during a speech in the Senate of being a communist.[29] This was only the beginning of a sustained onslaught led by *The China Monthly* on publications and individuals that were anti-Jiang. Over the next few years, books critical of the Guomindang received hostile reviews and a series of books and pamphlets were published rebutting the views of men like Fairbank and Edgar Snow who were particularly targeted along with Lattimore. Amongst the journals attacked for their viewpoint were *Collier's*, *The Saturday Evening Post*, *Harper's*, *Atlantic Monthly*, *The Saturday Review*, the *Nation*, the *New Republic* and the review sections of the *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune*.[30] Senator Owen Brewster later claimed that from about 1945 onwards reviews in the *Herald Tribune* and *Times* were openly pro-Communist.[31] To counter this supposed communist bias a new organisation; the American China Policy Association was set up that was ardently pro-Jiang.[32] When Kohlberg left the IPR he promptly joined this new organisation. Freda Utley succinctly put the view of the conservatives and their allies in the China Lobby in her 1951 book *The*

China Story:

> Most newspapers, and nearly all other media of public information, so far as China was concerned, were firmly in the hands of a minority of writers, professors, and lecturers representing the pro-Chinese Communist views of the State Department.[33]

This quotation neatly emphasises one of the central tenets and questions of the Lobby/Conservative argument with the prevailing Liberal view. Given the dominance of the view that the Nationalists were incompetent and corrupt and that little could or should be done to save them, both within the US Government and academic communities, then how could so many people be so wrong? The answer had to lie in their motives. They would be portrayed as either communists themselves or stooges of communists. It took the intervention of Joseph McCarthy to bring this line of attack to the mass of ordinary Americans.[34]

After his Wheeling speech, McCarthy discovered that he had few concrete names within the State Department that he could openly accuse of being communist. The person that he decided to focus on was Owen Lattimore. On March 30 1950, he named Lattimore on the Senate floor and subsequently Lattimore became the star witness before the Tydings Committee set up to investigate McCarthy's allegations.[35] The Committee concluded that: "There is no legal evidence before us whatever to support this charge and the weight of all other information indicates that it is not true".[36] This did not stop McCarthy and members of the lobby from repeating the charges and focusing on Lattimore and the IPR. The accusations against Lattimore and other academics and

writers was often not that they were agents of the Soviet Union or the American Communist Party but that they took a communist line in their writing and made policy pronouncements that aided the CCP. Consequently, it was not enough not to be an agent or member of the American Communist Party. The view of one's loyalty depended on their writing and particularly their view of Jiang and the Guomindang. After all, so this view went, any criticism of Jiang and his government, would give succour to the CCP. Moreover, if your view had helped to shape US policy or had even dovetailed with it then you shared responsibility in the CCP success.[37] Whereas the Democrat majority in the Senate protected these writers in 1950, as evidenced from the findings of the Tydings Committee, after November 1950 and the election of a Republican majority in the Senate, they were exposed to the full vengeance of the China Lobby. On February 8 1951 the IPR had its files seized. On July 25 1951, the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee under the Chairmanship of Senator Pat McCarran, a Democrat from Nevada but a hard-line McCarthyite nonetheless, began a new investigation that focused on the IPR and Lattimore.[38] The McCarran hearings followed the model of the more famous McCarthy hearings where witnesses were berated and an atmosphere of accusation and incrimination prevailed. Eight former Communists and three so-called former Soviet officials were amongst those accusing the IPR, Lattimore and others of communist leanings. No major figures from within the Truman Administration were called to testify on the extent of the supposed influence that men like Lattimore had had on policy. The

academics who appeared before the Committee to condemn the IPR and their colleagues were McGovern, Colegrove, Rowe, Taylor and Wittfogel.[39] John Thomas who has written a major study of the IPR wrote:

> In one sense their testimony was a reflection of the deep divisions among Asian specialists which were finally breaking into the open after years of surface calm. But the method in which the divisions were expressed was an indication of the bitterness that had gradually infected the East Asian scholars since the development of the Cold War and the establishment of a Communist China.[40]

Again Lattimore was the star witness. He appeared before the Committee for thirteen days and was fiercely critical of it and its methods. For its part, the Committee's members accused him of being procommunist and having played a major part in influencing the Truman Administration's decision not to give more support to Jiang.[41] Fairbank was fervent in his support for his colleague's integrity although at times he questioned his judgement. In August 1951, he issued a statement to the Committee defending Lattimore and took time out of his academic work to help with the latter's defence.[42]

Fairbank himself was attacked by Louis Budenz. Budenz was a former communist who took a major part in the hearings. He claimed that Fairbank was a former Communist party officer. David Rowe waded in by claiming that Fairbank had "unquestioned sympathy" for the CCP and Colegrove and Wittfogel were also critical of the most famous member of the so-called liberal school.[43] Colegrove focused on a round table

discussion of twenty-four academics organised by the State Department in October 1949 to discuss the CCP victory, which recommended early recognition of the new government. Colegrove recalled that the group could be sub-divided into two factions: those who were pro-American, such as himself and those who were pro-Communist including Fairbank.[44] To clear his name, Fairbank attended a special session of the Committee on March 12 1952, where a virtuoso performance notable for its accommodationist attitude, ensured that the Committee cleared him of all the charges.[45] He was not so conciliatory towards Colegrove. He wrote to an old friend Payson Wild, who was then a Vice-President at Northwestern University, bringing to his attention Colegrove's association with the Japanese scholar and known communist Ikuo Oyama.[46] Such was the acrimony to which the profession had descended. Another academic Harold Isaacs said that conferences at this time resembled the Protestant-Catholic debates of the sixteenth century.[47] The final report issued by the McCarran Committee on July 2 1952 was deeply critical of the IPR and Lattimore and was almost indiscriminate in naming academics who it felt had not been impartial in their treatment of China. The IPR was condemned as an instrument of Moscow that had been critical in changing US policy towards China to the benefit of the CCP. The report claimed that Lattimore was a "conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy" and that he was "influential in bringing about a change in United States policy in 1945 favorable to the Chinese Communists". It also claimed that he had "knowingly and deliberately used the language of books and articles ... In an attempt to influence the

American public by means of pro-Communist or pro-Soviet content of such writings".[48] The full Senate as well as the McCarran Committee recommended to the Justice Department that Lattimore be prosecuted for perjury. He was later indicted before a grand jury on five counts of perjury but never tried. Three years later the Department decided to dismiss the case. Lattimore's career was ruined and he left the United States to take up a post at the University of Leeds in Britain.[49] For the Canadian scholar E. Herbert Norman the price was even greater. A socialist, he "was hounded into committing suicide" according to Reischauer.[50] For Fairbank and others the price was not so heavy. The offers of book reviews stopped as did the contacts with government. Academics learnt to avoid writing about the current state of Sino-American relations. Fairbank, who fervently believed that China scholars should make the area a major focus of concern, only published seventy-five pages on the subject between 1952 and 1960.[51] Moreover writing was often warped to protect the author. As Fairbank recalled in his memoirs: "It became second nature to indicate at the beginning of an article, by some word or phrase that one was safely anticommunist".[52] This split between China academics would never heal and would be exposed again during the 1960s.

The IPR, as a consequence of the McCarran hearings, went into terminal decline. Between 1925 and 1950 it had a total net income of $2,536,000 of which 50 per cent came from foundations, 33 per cent from industrial and corporate contributions, 12 per cent from publications sales and 5 per cent classed as other sources. In 1951, funds given to the IPR

totalled $30,000 and a year later the total funds were $15,000. Thereafter, foundations such as the Foreign Policy Association, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and Ford Foundation that had been so generous in the past stopped giving any funds to the IPR.[53] This switch partly reflected the growth of East Asian centres at top US universities but primarily it had to do with the notoriety attached to the IPR. In 1951 the net income of the IPR was $77,000, by 1956 that had dropped to $13,000. Its membership declined in the same period from 933 to 341.[54] Consequently, the IPR was disbanded in 1961 with *Pacific Affairs* being purchased by the University of British Columbia and *The Far Eastern Survey* by the University of California in Berkeley.[55]

The FEA was more fortunate. It was attacked by Kohlberg, who had attended its organisational meeting in April 1948, and Rowe who claimed that it was little more than a front for the IPR, and that it was run by an interlocking directorate of people involved with both organisations.[56] However, its neutrality ensured that the McCarran Committee did not overtly attack it and it survived the McCarthyite experience virtually unscathed. More importantly, the FEA remained dominated by the "Liberal" perspective. For example, no scholar from the University of Washington was ever elected President of the organisation compared to both Fairbank and Reischauer from Harvard.[57] However as Richard Kagan writes, Asia scholars were forced to become what he calls "apolitical-objective", avoiding contentious issues or expressing controversial opinions.[58] This would later make it harder for these scholars to question the US action in Vietnam and to work more

surreptitiously in attacking the prevailing US China policy.

The next strategy, orchestrated by the Congress, was to attack the sources of funding of the IPR and the discipline, namely the foundations. A House Committee under Congressman Reece looked into the activities of the foundations and reached a number of ominous conclusions. The Reece Committee did not just criticise the IPR and Asia scholars but also the whole basis of academic study in the United States and the concept of internationalism, which they believed was being promoted by the foundations.

> "However well-meaning the advocates of complete internationalism may be," concluded the Committee, "they often play into the hands of the Communists. Communists recognize that a breakdown of nationalism is a prerequisite to the introduction of Communism.[59]

The report also concluded that:

> Alertness on the part of the Rockefeller and Carnegie trustees, and expenditure of the time necessary to see to the use made of the public's money by IPR might have saved China from the Communists and prevented the war in Korea.[60]

The Committee was critical by name of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment, Ford Foundation, Marshall Field Foundation, Garland Fund, John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, Heckscher Foundation, Robert Marshall Foundation, the Rosenwald Fund and the Phelps Stokes Fund. The Committee Report also attacked what it saw as the co-ordinating organisations of this funding and internationalism. The organisations criticised included the American Council of Learned

Societies, Social Science Research Council, the American Council on Education as well as the hapless IPR. Finally, the Committee attacked the elite foreign policy organisations that it believed were supporting this internationalism. Amongst those attacked were the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the American Friends Service Committee and even the British Royal Institute of International Affairs.[61] The most interesting facet of the report must be this naming of the foreign policy establishment and its intellectual networks. It can be suggested that this was not just an attack on China policy but the whole political establishment that had been responsible for the internationalism pursued by the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. The report reflected the right wing nationalistic opposition to US foreign policy, as it had been constituted since the Second World War. Not surprisingly, this report was resisted more vigorously with a minority report being published by members of the Committee condemning its conclusions.[62] By December 1954, and the report's publication, McCarthyism was on the wane with the Senator himself having been censured by the Senate and his practices widely discredited. In short, the attacks on the Asia area studies profession had now reached and passed its peak.

All of this took place within the context of the wider McCarthyite attacks on government officers and people within the entertainment industry. Those involved in the making of China policy in the 1940s were now exposed to the full force of the China Lobby. On December 12 1951, the State Department Loyalty Review Board expressed "reasonable doubt" about the loyalty of John Service who was subsequently dismissed

by the government.[63] Although, Service was able to overturn this decision in the courts eight years later, it ruined his diplomatic career.[64] For the China Lobby, this was their first great success as well as firm evidence that disloyalty existed within the State Department. Next up was O. Edmund Clubb who was cleared by the Board after the personal intervention of Dean Acheson but was forced into immediate retirement.[65] In December 1952, the Board concluded that reasonable doubt also existed as to the loyalty of John Carter Vincent. The new Secretary of State Dulles cleared him but also forced him into retirement.[66] The final victim was John Paton Davies who had somehow managed to survive these repeated loyalty hearings. On May 27 1953, a new Executive Order No 10450 changed the criteria of the Board's evaluation to speculating on an individual's reliability and trustworthiness. In August 1954, Davies failed this new test and the State Department Loyalty Board recommended his dismissal.[67] None of these people had ever been proven communists, instead they had merely been critical of Jiang and the Guomindang and in the era of the early 1950s such criticisms of the Chinese Nationalists called into question one's loyalty. The removal of these men also affected the conduct of US policy towards China. Hard-line supporters of Jiang replaced the most knowledgeable men on the subject and few State Department officers would be willing to challenge the existing ethos. John King Fairbank concludes that these events had a far more unhappy result in the longer term. In his memoirs he writes that:

> If any one of these three (Service, Clubb or Davies) had been

> assistant secretary of State for East Asia in place of officials without much Asian background at the time President Johnson was getting us mired in Vietnam, the fate of the American people might have been far happier.[68]

It must be said that if that were the case then the fate of the Vietnamese people would have been happier still. In conclusion, by the mid-1950s, the most ferocious affects of the China Lobby and McCarthyism had been spent but it would still be a long while before these China scholars would begin to speak out on the subject that most vexed them: Sino-American relations.

(iii) The Eisenhower Years

Although on the surface the discipline suffered as a result of McCarthyism, underneath the growth continued unabated. Despite the attack from the Reece Report, the foundations continued to provide more funds to projects involving the study of East Asia. A.T. Steele, who published his book *The American People and China* in 1966, researched the funding given by the various foundations to the academic discipline. He estimated that between 1952 and Steele's time of writing the foundations increased their funding to non-western area studies especially East Asia projects. Specifically, for this period, he estimated that the Ford Foundation gave seventy million dollars to area studies; the Rockefeller Foundation five million dollars and the Carnegie Corporation four million.[69] Fairbank in his memoirs estimated that between the mid-1950s and 1970 the Ford Foundation gave thirty million dollars towards

China studies with Harvard receiving about five and a half million of that. A million of that went into establishing four professorships while the rest went straight into research projects.[70] In total, Fairbank estimated that about forty million dollars was put into China studies between 1958 and 1970.[71] This money was used by Harvard and elsewhere to aid graduate students to conduct research and for academics to engage in their own research and develop courses and to help students get the funding necessary to take those courses. Moreover, these grants aided recruitment to government agencies of area specialists whom it was hoped might be able to influence government policy. Examples of individual grants include $420,000 that was given to Columbia University for research work on the political evolution of modern China. Harvard received $277,000 for research into the state of the Chinese economy and aided the East Asia Center to appoint the notable economist who specialised on the Chinese economy Alexander Eckstein and $910,000 which went to the Social Science Research Council to encourage research on the Chinese economy.[72] All of this helped expand the area while ensuring that its prestige and influence increased.

Underpinning this was the growth of the departments themselves. By the late 1950s, John King Fairbank was at the peak of its influence and the Harvard East Asia Center was famous for its reputation. As well as his own academic work, he was able to facilitate and encourage research whilst helping to get his students academic posts and maintaining approximately a hundred doctoral students of his own. Fairbank's concentration on his academic work partly reflected his isolation from

government and his inability to influence US policy towards China at that time.[73] This growth also tended to ensure that the "liberal" perspective remained dominant as other academics such as A. Doak Barnett came more to the fore. These academics maintained contact with each other through obvious informal networks such as friendships and the healthy interest that academics have in each other's research. This informal network complemented the more formal network associated with conferences, journals and publications and helped reinforce the views of the academics on various matters concerning the profession including their view on China policy. Fairbank, through natural inquisitiveness as much as academic necessity, wanted to know what every China expert in the world was working upon.[74] They also of course were involved in the developing FEA.

Although the decline of the IPR continued unabated throughout the 1950s, the FEA survived the shocks of the decade and after 1955 began to grow in line with the discipline as a whole. Charles Hucker wrote that,

> by 1955 the Association had survived these difficult times without incurring any stigma as an organization but that some of its members survived with scars, antagonisms, or fears and the Association's leadership on the whole was increasingly dedicated to keeping the Association unambiguously out of politics.[75]

This nonpolitical stance had helped it survive the torrents of the early 1950s and in the later parts of the decade made it especially attractive to foundations and academics. Just as Hucker calls the period between 1948 and 1955 the "era of consolidation" he terms the period between

1956 and 1968 the "era of growth and expansion".[76] In 1956 the organisation changed its name to the Association of Asian Studies (AAS) and the title of its journal to the Journal of Asian Studies (JAS). The organisation also decided to broaden its scope to include South Asia within its geographical area of interest.[77] Evidence of this expansion abounds. In 1956 there were 903 members of the AAS by 1968 the figure had risen to 3,752. In the same period non-membership income rose from $13m to $78m. The circulation of the JAS also increased from a figure of 1,954 in 1958 to 6,022 in 1968.[78] Solid funding from foundations backed up this expansion. For example, between 1961 and 1971 the Ford Foundation gave the AAS $345m and individual AAS projects on South and Southeast Asia received funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and Asia Society.[79] These contributions are indicative of the benevolent attitude towards this expansion shown by both the foundations themselves as well as ultimately the US Government. This expansion was also reflected in the growth of the AAS annual conferences. In 1955 the conference had had twenty-two panels with about 500 attending whilst by 1968 there were forty-four panels with 1,800 in attendance.[80] As well as the annual conferences, regional groups of the AAS were set up in New York, New England, on the Pacific Coast and one representing the Midwest. These regional groupings were indicative of the dynamism of the discipline as well as its diversity and the simmering antagonisms that remained especially between the East Coast associated with Harvard and the Pacific Coast associated with the University of Washington.[81] Although the competition remained there

can be little doubting the extent to which the organisation was dominated by the "liberal" perspective and the East Coast Ivy League universities. As Hucker has written "it would seem fair to say that ... its affairs were dominated by members from major graduate centers, especially those of the central and northern East Coast area, and most particularly those of the ivy league".[82] This dominance helped men like Fairbank in the 1960s as they tried to influence policy. Another key factor in the development of East Asia studies was the passage of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958.[83] The Act came into being partly as a response to the successful Soviet launch of Sputnik the year before. One of its chief areas of concern was to encourage the development of linguistic skills amongst young Americans from school through to university. By 1964 fifty-five language and area centres were receiving federal support under the terms of the act including eleven that were concerned solely with the study of East Asia. Two-thirds of the area centres in existence in 1964 came into being after 1958 and the passage of the Act. This federal money was vital in their growth. In the same period enrolment in Chinese language classes quadrupled. The Act was clearly helping to ensure that young Americans developed these linguistic skills. The Act, supported by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation, gave funds to schools to develop language training for children.[84] An example, of how the NDEA aided pre-university language training was its support for the Thayer Academy in the Boston area. The Academy, in association with Harvard and Yale, introduced the teaching of Chinese to schoolchildren in and around Boston. Therefore, as a

consequence of this teaching, by the time they went to university the students would be more proficient in the Chinese language.[85] Furthermore, their initial interest in China and elsewhere would be encouraged by this training. As well as language training, the NDEA provided federal government funds for fellowships, other instructional programmes, the expansion of libraries, summer institutions and workshops and research projects.[86] All of this aided the expansion of the East Asian field and the AAS who did not receive money directly from the NDEA.

A final major development was the setting up of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China (JCCC). The JCCC was set up at a conference held in June 1959 at Gould House, a property owned by New York University. Some of the top academics in the field and representatives of the RAND Corporation, the Department of State and the Ford Foundation attended the conference. The JCCC would act as a co-ordinator for research into Communist China. Its organising Committee was made up of Fairbank, Martin Wilbur of Columbia and Arthur Steiner of University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Although the group voted for membership of the AAS this did not come about and instead the new organisation came to function under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS).[87] A complimentary organisation, the Committee on Studies of Chinese Civilisation was also set up shortly after and the two held their first joint meeting in August 1960 with George Taylor as Chairman. Central to the development of the JCCC was its relationship

with the US Government.[88] As Taylor, who was very involved with its growth and organisation, wrote in 1961:

> It is very important for the Government to know that it can turn to a responsible group representing the interests of American scholars for some indication of how they feel ... I think that a process of political education has gone on in the Committee which I trust is deep enough to prevent ill-considered political statements being made by American scholars who are interested in getting into China.[89]

Although it must be remembered that Taylor represented the "conservative" end of the profession it seems that for him at least the JCCC was a means of excluding academics who did not share mainstream views as well as co-ordinating research projects that might be of interest to the government. The involvement of the State Department, Ford Foundation and RAND Corporation in the formation of the JCCC was indicative of the elite nature of the organisation and the deep-rooted ties that were developing between the discipline and the government.

By the late 1950s the profession had recovered its vitality. Although, the bitterness of the McCarthyite attacks remained, the discipline was now growing rapidly aided by copious funds from foundations and a renewed relationship with government. John Lindbeck, who wrote a study of the profession during the 1960s, described the period as "the developmental decade".[90] As the academics faced the new decade one area concerned them more than anything, which was the state of Sino-

American relations. In March 1959, a phlegmatic and concerned Fairbank in his term as President of the AAS, told the organisation during a speech:

> When attacked for having influenced policy ... Asian specialists usually deny it with vigor and justice ... (But) ... If we Asia specialists have indeed influenced American policy, why is it so inadequate? If we have no influence, on the other hand, what use are we?[91]

In the 1960s, Fairbank and his colleagues would come to address their problem as the sands began to shift beneath the policy of total isolation of the Chinese Communists.

(iv) The Early Challenges to the Prevailing Policy.

The scholars felt unable to challenge openly the policy of total isolation. However, that does not mean that there were no signs of their opposition to the prevailing mood or that they stopped discussing and reflecting on the matter in private. Edwin Reischauer made the most public challenge in his book *Wanted: An Asian Policy* published in January 1955. Reischauer had emerged from the McCarthyite era virtually untouched due to his specialisation in Japan.[92] Scholars specialising in Japan were less likely to be attacked given the lack of controversy over US Japan policy and the involvement of General Douglas MacArthur who was an ally of the China Lobby.[93] Moreover, Reischauer was a well known advocate of a special relationship between Japan and the United States, which would involve the latter building up the former as the major regional

power. For Reischauer, and others who shared his views, the Japanese imperialism of the 1930s and 40s had been an aberration in a country that was likely to develop into a liberal democracy. Ironically, others who shared this view were often known conservatives like the former Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, whilst Reischauer in his own words was "a lifelong liberal".[94] Nevertheless, these views protected him in the early 1950s to the extent whereby he could publish a book fiercely critical of the Asia policies of the Eisenhower Administration and John Foster Dulles in particular whom he held primarily responsible for them. In the book, Reischauer argued that the Administration was concentrating too much energy and resources on military alliances and tactics in place of any attempt to win the ideological battle for democracy. "SEATO was a fraud fooling only the American people, because its only reality was the American commitment to the defense of a curious assortment of weak Southeast Asian states".[95] As a consequence, the US was becoming allied to a number of unstable and unpopular governments, when alternatively by emphasising the political desirability of democracy and the potential economic benefits of capitalism, the US could make a far greater and more potent appeal. Later, in his memoirs, he wrote that:

> My chief argument in the book was that economic support for the countries of Asia and the championing of our own ideals of self-determination and national independence were far more important than alliances or military defense. Nationalism was a much greater force than communism or socialism or any other set of ideas from the West. We could rely on it to keep the countries of Asia free of

> control by either Moscow or Peking (Beijing). We were selling nationalism short, I felt, and also the appeal of democracy. Back of all these problems, I maintained was our dangerous ignorance of Asia. We desperately needed to know more about this half of the world so that we could pursue a wiser course in our relations with its diverse lands.[96]

He was concerned about the attitude of the Administration towards those Asians, who while being anticommunist, nevertheless wanted to remain independent of US influence and didn't want to be involved in the alliance structure being set up. He termed this attitude as representing a "Them v Us" syndrome which he surmised lay at the heart of Dulles' outlook on the world.[97] As Reischauer admits in his memoirs, the book made little impact at the time and it is unlikely that it had any influence on the conduct of policy:

> *Wanted: An Asian Policy*, despite favorable reviews, dropped into the pool of public opinion without raising a ripple. The nation, under Dulles's unwise leadership, was headed determinedly in the opposite direction. Of course, I have had the satisfaction of seeing us slowly change course since then, until three decades later American policy in Asia is much closer to what I advocated back in 1955. But this is small comfort in the face of the national tragedies and appalling waste mistaken policies have caused in the meantime.[98]

In reality, the book was indicative of the lack of influence of the liberal school of thought in the mid-1950s. However, many of Reischauer's

observations were to prove to be accurate and he had the bravery to put them into print.

Another example, of the "Liberals" continued interest in the state of Sino-American relations was Fairbank's correspondence with Chester Bowles over the China section of his book *The New Dimensions of Peace*. Bowles had been Governor of Connecticut between 1949 and 1951 and Ambassador to India between 1951 and 53, as well as being a well known ally and friend of Adlai Stevenson, the liberal standard bearer in the 1950s and the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for President in 1952 and 56.[99] The most controversial views in the book were about the failings of Jiang and the successes of the new Communist government. "The Communist regime" wrote Bowles in the book published in 1956, "is providing the first unified and efficient government in modern Chinese history".[100] Bowles went on to detail CCP successes in the fields of education, industrialisation, military organisation and governmental control. This view was certainly different than the view peddled by Dulles and others that communism in China was merely "a passing and not a perpetual phase".[101] In May 1955, Bowles sent a draft copy of the chapter from the book to Fairbank for consideration. Fairbank recommended some changes which Bowles carried out as well as recommending that he read *Wanted: An Asian Policy* which shows Reischauer's "interest in this problem" and that he becomes acquainted with the ideas of Benjamin Schwartz "who is most conversant locally with the Peking (Beijing) Line".[102] Overall, though Fairbank was positive about the work indicating his own support and the difficulties faced by

academics that would like to express similar opinions. "None of us" he wrote "has a prospect of getting this view into print ourselves, and I am sure we would like to give full support to your doing so".[103] A couple of weeks later, Fairbank again expressed his support to Bowles: "It is in the main, I think, the story that our public needs to know ... and I appreciate the opportunity to assist".[104]

In 1956, A. Doak Barnett then head of the Department of Foreign Area Studies of the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department and later of Columbia University, led discussions on China policy at a conference arranged by the American Assembly. The Assembly, which had been formed by Eisenhower in his time as President of Columbia, brought together sixty Asia specialists, corporate executives and former government officers with the purpose of discussing US policy towards the region. Barnett made a series of far reaching recommendations. They included the US ending its trade embargo against the mainland. It also called for negotiation with the PRC with a view of allowing the Chinese into the United Nations. Barnett also felt that the Nationalists should be forced to withdraw from the Offshore Islands and Jiang should be encouraged to abandon his dreams of returning to the mainland and instead build up the Guomindang as a "stable, local regime ruling Taiwan and the Pescadores".[105] Although the wider group didn't accept all of Barnett's recommendations they did call on the Administration to pursue negotiations with the PRC.[106] The conference was another example of the emergence of Barnett as a key player in the attempts by the liberal academics to influence government policy.

After Eisenhower's re-election and as a consequence of the other pressures emerging on the existing policy, the academics began to regain some of their confidence in their ability to challenge the ethos of the Administration. In April 1957, Fairbank published an article entitled "China: Time for a Policy" in *Atlantic* magazine and Barnett published a pamphlet entitled "Should the United States Deal with Red China" for the Foreign Policy Association.[107] These academics also became involved in the questioning of existing policies that was growing as policy makers and others with an interest in the workings of government prepared for Eisenhower's retirement in 1960.

(v) 1958-1960: A Period of Reflection.

The last two years of the 1950s saw major discussions of China policy taking place and an attempt to analyse what approach Eisenhower's successor might and should adopt. Moreover, as ambitious politicians manoeuvred for the Democratic nomination for 1960, they began to express their differences with the existing policy. The elderly Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Walter George and his successor in that post J. William Fulbright were both critical of the intransigence of existing policy as were Presidential hopefuls, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson. The Democrats increasingly favoured negotiation of some shape or form.[108] These calls reflected both a change in national mood as well as a shift in the dynamics of the international environment. The Sputnik launch had set off a round of soul searching amongst the US political classes as

Senators like Johnson and Kennedy talked of a "missile gap" developing between the two superpowers in favour of the USSR.[109] Moreover, the first signs of a split between the Soviet Union and the Chinese were emerging as a consequence of the lukewarm support offered by the Soviets to the Chinese during the second Offshore Islands crisis of 1958. To the Administration it confirmed their view that the Soviets were the more moderate power that should be weaned away from the extremism of the Chinese. Eisenhower tried to convince Khrushchev of the wisdom of this view during the latter's visit to the United States in 1959.[110] Finally, the discussions on China policy were aided by a slight softening of the domestic view of the Chinese and a weakening of the strength of the China Lobby. Christian Herter, who succeeded Dulles in 1959 as Secretary of State after his death, was more moderate in his attitude to the Chinese government and during his tenure agreed to validate the passports of thirty-three journalists who wanted to visit the mainland. He was helped by the results of the 1958-midterm elections that saw the defeat and retirement of notable supporters of the China Lobby as well as a heavy swing to the Democrats. The most notable victim of this swing was the Senate Minority Leader William Knowland, who gave up his Senate seat to run unsuccessfully for the Governorship of California.[111]

A Democrat Clair Engle who quickly came to champion the arguments for a change in China policy replaced Knowland in the Senate. On May 21 1959, Engle made a Senate speech on the subject stating that: "I am convinced that our China policy needs a critical reexamination".[112] He believed that the US should change policy to place trade with the Chinese

on the same basis as that with the Soviet Union. In other words, there should be trade but not in materials that might aid Chinese military development and deployment. Furthermore, Engle argued that the US should explicitly tell the Nationalists that they would not support any military operations by them against the mainland. Finally, he called for high level negotiations between the two sides.[113] The speech was praised by many including *The Economist* magazine and fellow Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut who was a well-known supporter of the China Lobby.[114] The next day Chester Bowles wrote to Engle:

> Congratulations ... on both the insight and the courage you showed on the floor yesterday. I think your efforts may well serve to break the ice and to bring a subject which too many people have been sweeping under the rug out into the open, where we can see it and examine it. You have made a great contribution.[115]

A year later Bowles wrote to him again stating that: "I am sure the record will be clear that yours was the first voice of any really prominent person raised in protest against the drift of the last few years".[116] On June 4, Congressman Charles Porter of Oregon who became the most outspoken advocate of a full reconciliation between the two countries called for a trade delegation to be sent to the mainland.[117] Even so in August the House passed a resolution that reaffirmed Congressional opposition to any softening of the US refusal to allow the Chinese into the United Nations.[118]

Alongside that outright desire to change policy lay a desire to analyse and reflect on it. An example of this was the actions of Senator

Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, who was the senior Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On January 28 1959, he told his colleagues that he had asked the Legislative Reference Service and the staff attached to the Committee "to undertake an examination of tensions in Communist China". Wiley believed that the Study would look at not only domestic tensions but also "the extent of divergence and cleavage between China, the Soviet Union, and the European satellites".[119] The report was completed in September and was entitled *Tensions in Communist China*. It argued that the CCP were unlikely to be replaced as the rulers of the mainland and that China under them would become "one of the great powers".[120] It believed that US policy towards China should be flexible. More important was the so-called Conlon Report. On February 16 1959, a contract was agreed between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Conlon Associates, a San Francisco based research firm, for a major study of US policy towards Asia. The study was one of a series of studies made on aspects of US foreign policy. Robert Scalapino of Berkeley wrote the section on East Asia. In it, he reiterated the view that the CCP were now well established on the mainland, "most indications are that this is the strongest, most unified government that modern China has ever had, and that the Communist Party is able to enforce its authority effectively at all levels".[121] Scalapino went on to predict that:

> Communist China is very likely to emerge as one of the major world powers of the late 20th century. The future of China hinges upon many imponderables, of course, but almost all signs point to

the rapid increase of state power - economic, military, and political - under the Communists.[122]

He felt that China's air and naval power precluded it from being ranked as an advanced military power. Regarding the relationship with the Soviet Union, he predicted that increasing strains would emerge between the two but did not foresee the open split that was to occur. On the subject of Taiwan, he noted a process of what he called "Taiwanization" whereby the indigenous majority absorbs the mainland refugees to the point whereby a new unified national identity is created. This process would eventually create a logical outcome to the dispute over the island.[123]

In the concluding section of his report, Scalapino turned to the subject of Sino-American relations. He was deeply critical of Eisenhower's policies of containment and isolation. He argued that keeping the Chinese outside of the UN meant that half of all Asians were not represented within the organisation and that it helped retain the fiction that the Guomindang remained the government of China. Scalapino also felt that to be an effective organisation the UN needed to have universal membership.[124] On the lack of contact with the Chinese, he felt that this aided the Chinese Government to portray the United States in a poor light, "this policy will merely supplement the tensions and fears concerning us that their government is seeking to establish".[125] Scalapino was also critical of the concept of using a harsh policy towards the Chinese as a means of forcing them to rely more heavily on the Soviet Union thus accelerating a split between the two. He believed that Soviet aid cost the Soviets little with far greater relative rewards and that

more contact with the west would create new options for the Chinese and new tensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship:

> Greater international involvement for Communist China might provide new sources of influence, both upon the people and the regime. Out of a variety of contacts, flow a variety of ideas and stimuli, and Chinese Communist propaganda to their own people might have to adjust to this type of competition in a manner not now necessary. Isolation always serves totalitarianism. At the government level, moreover, heavier world involvement would naturally provide the need for more varied and complex decisions, more careful adjustment to national interests held by foreign states. It would increase opportunities for policy discussion from and difference with the Soviet Union; almost certainly the decisionmaking process of the Sino-Soviet alliance would become more complicated and be subject to greater strains. That alliance might even be affected by any increased world attention given Communist China and its national decisions; outlets for Chinese nationalism of this type could increase Soviet anxieties.[126]

Scalapino also made the point that the policy of isolation meant that the US did not know whether or not the Chinese might be prepared to negotiate. In conclusion, he argued for a policy of "exploration and negotiation" that would begin with simple contacts leading onto mutual exchanges involving journalists, businessmen and other commercial representatives and academics.[127] Then, if that went smoothly, the Administration could send someone prominent to negotiate with the

Chinese who was not tied directly to the Executive branch. Then, trade could be moved onto the same basis as that with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China could be recognised and allowed into the United Nations with Taiwan being eventually recognised as an independent entity. The report argued that this course of action would test the Chinese willingness to "coexist" with the US. For the US it would create a more flexible policy on the US side. Finally it would lay the foundation for a more unified policy amongst the western nations including Japan, which by that point had adopted a policy based on mercantilism towards both the PRC and the Nationalists on Taiwan.[128]

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee released this report, which is remarkable for its recommendations that are not that far from the eventual policies pursued by Richard Nixon, to the public on October 31 1959. Senator Fulbright, now Chairman of the Committee, found the report "very provocative" but warned against the immediate US recognition of the PRC.[129] The Report was bitterly denounced by the major US based supporter of Jiangs, the Committee of One Million, which noted that the Report had not consulted the US public, or US allies in Asia such as Jiang.[130] Despite this, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was favourable and hoped to use the Report as the basis for fully fledged Senate hearings on the subject. The State Department made it clear that it would refuse to co-operate with any hearings of this nature including refusing to allow Department officers to appear before it and the Foreign Relations Committee decided, as a consequence of this hostility, to abandon the exercise.[131] The Conlon Report was a

remarkable document in that it showed the re-emergence of a voice amongst the China scholars prepared to challenge policy and to work with sections of that government to influence it. In many ways, it preordained much of the manoeuvres of the 1960s as well as reflected the thinking of the "Liberal" academics. Finally, the Report was the first of other reports at the time of a similar nature such as a Rockefeller Brothers Fund project published in December 1959 which also recommended a change in policy. Dean Rusk chaired the project.[132] Equally intriguing was a Council on Foreign Relations study by Barnett published in 1960.

Woodrow Wilson's close friend and confidante Colonel House set up the CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) at the end of the First World War. Its aim was to ensure dialogue and discussion amongst the elites of the United States to ensure that policy would be made with the maximum amount of information and consensus. As Judith Coburn has written, "the most important function of CFR is producing a consensus among scholars, foundation officials, businessmen, and policy-makers on American foreign policy".[133] Not surprisingly, the CFR regularly considered the state of US relations with the giants of the Communist world. In late 1954 and early 1955, they prepared a report on US China policy that concluded that despite its limitations the policy being pursued by the Eisenhower Administration was better than any other on offer.

> We find that despite all the controversy surrounding United States China Policy we are actually faced with a fairly narrow range of actions ... Indeed, the present situation, for all its ambiguities, may

> for that reason be prolonged indefinitely as the only workable solution in the absence of profound changes in China. We might go farther and say that recognition and UN representation would not, by themselves, greatly alter things for good or ill.[134]

Later in the decade they returned to the subject of US relations with the PRC. In 1958, the Council set up a Study Group on Communist China and United States Policy in Asia. Their reports and papers formed the basis of a book *Communist China and Asia* by Barnett that looked at all the possible avenues open for the US. The discussion on China policy, which takes place in the last two chapters of the book fourteen and fifteen, was remarkably cautious given Barnett's views and the book was as much an attempt to provoke thought as to try to alter policy.[135] The key point about the study was the actual selection of Barnett as the Co-ordinator given his views on policy.

In April 1960, Chester Bowles now a Congressman in Connecticut as well as an adviser to Kennedy published a controversial article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "The China Problem Reconsidered". *Foreign Affairs* which is the journal of the Council on Foreign Affairs is where ambitious politicians and academics attempt to circulate their work and influence each other's thinking. In the article, Bowles argued for a policy of creating an independent state on Taiwan that would abandon any plans to retake the mainland.

> The Native Formosans (Taiwanese), the Nationalist Chinese and the world generally must be convinced that our objective is not to create a military base for the invasion of the mainland but to

encourage the orderly growth of a new, independent nation.[136]

He also believed that this new state should achieve membership of the United Nations as a separate entity from the Chinese mainland. He went on to argue that he believed that the Sino-Soviet alliance was unstable and that the Chinese were not natural allies of their Soviet neighbours.[137] He particularly noted the potential power of Chinese nationalism.

> No outsider can be sure of the present nature or future development of the Sino-Soviet alliance, but certainly it is an infinitely complex and delicate arrangement. The assumption that it is rigid, monolithic and unchangeable is out of date ... Let us realize that Communist alliances as well as Communist nations are subject to the eroding effects of economics, nationalism and history.[138]

He concluded that: "It seems to me that today we should be striving by all reasonable means to establish people-to-people contacts with mainland China".[139] This article set off a storm of protest and even the British noted it due mainly to Bowles's relationship with the Democratic contender for the White House. In his memoirs, *Promises to Keep*, Bowles stated that he cleared the article with Kennedy and at this point in time their views on China were not all that different.[140]

(vi) Conclusions

In the period after 1945, Area Studies such as East Asia, became an important part of the university curriculum attracting young scholars and

government and foundation funding. The attentions of the McCarthyite era warped the actual growth of the subject briefly and individual academics of a "liberal" persuasion were less likely to talk out on the issue of Sino-American relations. By the late 1950s, they were beginning to regain their voice and participate in Foundation studies and other means to try to influence China policy, which they felt under Eisenhower, was sterile. They hoped to influence his successor and in the new era they saw their discipline grow dramatically. Their relationship with government suffered in the 1950s. It was to be seen how that would develop in the 1960s. Then, the US commitment and view of Asia changed dramatically as a consequence of the events in China, the growth of Japan into a major economic competitor of the United States and most importantly the US commitment to defend South Vietnam.

CHAPTER THREE: A NEW BEGINNING; JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(i) Introduction

The task of reassessing China policy fell to John Kennedy, the youngest man ever elected to the White House and a scion of the East Coast establishment. Kennedy hailed from a wealthy Boston family and had attended Harvard before personal heroics in the Pacific Theatre during World War II. He returned to be elected to the House of Representatives in 1946 and the Senate six years later. In attaining the Democratic nomination in 1960 he outmanoeuvred amongst others Lyndon Johnson who became his Vice-President. He won one of the closest presidential contests of all time by less than 1 per cent of the vote against his Republican opponent Richard Nixon. The size of his victory was to play a part in the cautious approach he took to many issues on coming to office. His caution also reflected his pragmatic nature which was at odds with the dynamic image that he sought to promote that reached almost mythic proportions with his inauguration address on January 20 1961 when he promised to "bear any burden".[1]

In constructing his cabinet, Kennedy displayed that pragmatism by choosing appointees of ability but without any possibility for controversy. Kennedy did not want to get into an early conflict with Congress by selecting well-known liberals for high profile posts. For example, as Secretary of Defense he chose the dynamic young President of Ford Motors and Republican Robert McNamara. As Secretary of State, Kennedy appointed Dean Rusk. A southern Democrat, Rusk had served

under Truman as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. During the Eisenhower years, he was President of the Rockefeller Foundation from where Kennedy appointed him.[2]

(ii) 1961: Setting Down a Marker.

Before 1961 both Kennedy and Rusk had been notable supporters of the traditional policy towards the People's Republic of China of containment and isolation. Rusk had made his famous speech in May 1951 describing the CCP government as "a slavic Manchukuo".[3] Kennedy had flirted with the China Lobby and had been the only Democrat in 1954 not to vote for the censure motion denouncing Joseph McCarthy.[4] On coming to office, Kennedy was left under little doubt that any change in China policy would encounter the opposition of, amongst others, Eisenhower and Nixon. It was not surprising that Kennedy decided to steer clear of any early changes. In short, he decided to bed himself into office and adapt to circumstances as they developed. Moreover he had more pressing demands such as relations with the Soviet Union and what to do about the new revolutionary government established on Cuba by Fidel Castro. Finally, public opinion remained adamantly opposed to any alterations.[5]

Early indications in fact pointed to a hardening of policy by the Administration. In February, Kennedy rejected a proposal, supported by both the State and Treasury Departments, that US oil companies be allowed to bunker ships carrying food from, amongst others, Canada and Australia, to help ease the famine that was occurring in China at the time.

Although the request was minor and made on a combination of humanitarian grounds and the practical fact that the Chinese would simply buy the oil elsewhere, nevertheless Kennedy decided to go against these recommendations and refuse it.[6] Later that same month, Rusk weighed in by encouraging an exhibition of Chinese art taken from the National Palace Museum in Beijing and the National Central Museum in Nanking. "In the Department's view" wrote Rusk to the President, "this exhibition would be most useful in helping to identify the Government of the Republic of China as the custodian of China's great cultural heritage".[7] Rusk went on to recommend that Kennedy and his wife Jackie along with the Generalissimo and Madame Jiang be appointed patrons of the exhibition.[8]

The one change from that early pattern was the consideration given by the US to extending diplomatic recognition to Outer Mongolia. The proposal was put forward in a February 4, 1961 discussion paper. The whole exercise from the beginning was seen mainly in terms of China policy. Those like Chester Bowles who were favourable towards it saw it as a first tentative step towards reviewing policy, as did the China Lobby who saw it as evidence of an ultimate change in the stance towards Mongolia's southern neighbour. It was the efforts of the Lobby that ensured that the initiative would fail as Kennedy drew back from even that minor change.[9]

This early caution remained tinged by an unwillingness to challenge Jiang who threatened to use the Nationalists' place on the Security Council to veto any membership application from Outer Mongolia. In the

summer of 1961, the Administration began to discuss what to do about the PRC's application to join the United Nations. It was clear that support for PRC entry into the UN was growing amongst independent states that felt that their entry into the organisation merely reflected the reality of their control over the mainland.[10] In a memo written in May, Rusk had recommended that the Administration take a stance that would allow the PRC into the United Nations so long as they agreed to abide by the UN charter.[11] Rusk was adamant though that the US should be prepared to defend Jiang's position. He succinctly expressed his view during bilateral talks with the British in March 1961 when he stated that: "It is fundamental to the United States that Formosa retain a seat in the United Nations. If this is unacceptable to Peiping (Beijing) then they are at fault".[12]

During Kennedy's talks with Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna on June 3, the Soviet Premier made clear that the Chinese would never enter the UN whilst Jiang remained there.[13] At a meeting on July 28th, Kennedy made clear his absolute opposition to allowing the Chinese Communists into the organisation and his opinion that the idea of recognising Outer Mongolia be dropped.[14] The China Lobby got wind that the matter was under consideration and launched a publicity campaign aimed at keeping the PRC out. Their supporters in Congress ensured that both Houses passed resolutions condemning any attempts at allowing the PRC in. The vote on September 1 in the House of Representatives was 395 for the motion without a single vote against, which is indicative of the national mood on the matter at the time.[15]

Kennedy acted within that national mood when he decided to come down firmly in keeping the Communists out and he went further by giving private assurances to Jiang that the US would use its veto against any Chinese attempts to enter.[16] In the autumn session of the United Nations, held in New York, a vote was passed by sixty-one votes to thirty-four to make the issue of Chinese entry "an important question" and a Soviet resolution to seat the Chinese was defeated by forty-eight votes to thirty-seven with nineteen abstentions.[17] The US had ensured that China was not allowed into the UN in 1961 and that if it was ever to enter then it would have to acquire two-thirds support within the organisation. Moreover, Kennedy had pledged that the US would veto any Chinese entry. He had created a situation whereby the Chinese would not be able to enter without US support, which seemed extremely unlikely. Kennedy had made it harder for his successors to change this stance as well as moving his administration firmly into a position of maintaining Eisenhower's policy.

If the actions of the administration seemed to confirm a policy of hostility that showed continuity with the Eisenhower Administration, then what were the motivations behind it? In May 1961, Kennedy and Rusk had a long meeting, where according to the latter's memoirs, the President outlined his views on China policy and the motives:

> Not surprisingly, Kennedy ruled out changes in our China policy. With his razor-thin victory in the November elections ... he felt he lacked a strong mandate from the American people. Consequently, he was very cautious about selecting issues on

> which to do battle. And any change in China would have been one hell of a battle.[18]

Therefore, clear motivations were the closeness of the election result; the national mood against changing policy towards China; and the likely opposition from amongst others Dwight Eisenhower, Congress, the Republican Party and the China Lobby. Kennedy, whom one can see from other issues such as civil rights was naturally cautious, was disinclined from attempting to change policy against such overwhelming opposition both from the political classes and the general population. Dean Rusk's account of that May meeting continues:

> Also, such contacts as we had with Peking were not promising. Simply put, the Chinese Communists didn't seem interested in improving U.S.-Chinese relations. As far as Kennedy was concerned, then, adopting a more realistic China policy became a future task, not a present one. Fearing the issue might divide Congress and the American people, he decided the potential benefits of a more realistic China policy didn't warrant risking a severe political confrontation.[19]

This fascinating quotation cuts to the internal problem that Kennedy faced. On the one hand he could see the arguments for a reform of policy towards China, but on the other he recognised the drawbacks, especially with regard to public opinion but also the attitude of the Chinese. If Rusk's memory is accurate, and we have no other account of this meeting, then both the President and himself had accepted the logic of the argument that the current policy was at the very least not "realistic".

The realistic policy, according to Rusk, was a policy of Two-Chinas. However as we have seen the PRC and the Nationalists were not prepared to accept it. If this policy was to be introduced it would have to await a better domestic political climate as well as a change in stance from the Chinese. In conclusion, Kennedy and Rusk were in many ways prisoners of the national mood and Leonard Kusnitz is correct in asserting that a key determinant on China policy at this time was public opinion.[20] The President can be characterised in his early handling of China policy as a pragmatist aware of its limitations but unprepared to challenge the existing ethos. It should also be pointed out that Kennedy faced a number of foreign policy crises in his early days in the White House. These included the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the stormy Vienna meeting with Khrushchev, conflicts in Laos and dispute with the Soviets over Berlin. These occupied his attention and made him less likely to make dramatic changes elsewhere. Finally, Kennedy was aware that the Administration contained people who would be pushing for a change in policy as well as others he knew could be trusted when and if the time came to reassess the existing policy and create the impetus for any change. In the short term however, Kennedy was determined to keep a lid on the activities of men like Chester Bowles who was already using his position to argue for a policy of two-Chinas. Rusk makes this clear at the end of his account of the May meeting:

> I agreed with Kennedy's reasoning and his conclusions, and I told him so. But as I was leaving the Oval Office, he called, "And what's more, Mr. Secretary, I don't want to read in the *Washington*

> *Post* or the *New York Times* that the State Department is thinking about a change in our China policy!" I went back to the department, and when Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, and others would drop by to talk about China and especially their hopes for a two-China policy at the UN, I stonewalled them and played the role of the "village idiot". I didn't tell them about my talk with the president because I would have read about *that* in the *Washington Post* or the *New York Times*. Nor did I initiate any new studies on China policy; in that leaky Kennedy administration even that would have gotten to the press.[21]

This account is a valid and plausible assessment of Rusk's role in the early China policy. However, his later hostility to any change especially under Lyndon Johnson, indicates that he was more ideological in his views than he suggests here and that he was trying to find a way to explain his earlier position. What wasn't in doubt was his loyalty to Kennedy and it is likely that he accepted and carried out the instructions from a man who very much saw himself as Secretary of State as well as President. Above all, this meeting and Rusk's account of it explain the factors that underpin Kennedy's early China policy.

Although at the highest levels of the Administration caution was the watchword, elsewhere a desire to challenge the existing policy was becoming apparent. The people associated with this stance included the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Chester Bowles and his young assistant James Thomson Jr. Also, the Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson; John Kenneth Galbraith newly appointed as Ambassador to

India and a university tutor at Harvard to the young Kennedy; and Reischauer who had become Ambassador to Japan at Bowles's behest. Connected to this grouping, although more complex and opportunistic was Averell Harriman the former Governor of New York who in December 1961 became Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. In the earliest phase of the Administration it was Bowles and Thomson who would be the main proponents of change.[22]

Bowles had developed his view of the PRC during his stint as Ambassador to India in the early 50s when he fell under the beguiling influence of Nehru. Like Nehru, he came to believe that a basic incompatibility existed between the strategic interests of the Soviet Union and the PRC, which would eventually lead to a split between the two. Consequently, the public belief by Eisenhower and Dulles of a Soviet-dominated monolith was both wrong headed and likely to lead to major policy errors. After returning from India, Bowles set up home in Essex, Connecticut where he wrote two books, *Ambassador's Report* and *The New Dimensions of Peace*. He retained contact with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party especially Adlai Stevenson and liberal academics including Fairbank. In these two books he developed his basic liberal orientated internationalist philosophy. He believed that the US should act as a beacon aiding third world countries to develop pluralist and modern political and economic societies. This meant that the US should not be over-reliant on conservative forces and be willing to accept and promote reformist movements and even at times revolutionary ones. His hostility to right wing governments propped up by the US stemmed from the fact

that he felt that they were not representative of their people and by their actions damaged the legitimacy not only of themselves but the US. Moreover, he claimed that the Third World was the key battleground between the US and the Soviet Union. He suggested that the situation in Europe had stabilised and that Asia in particular should be the major focus of American attention. He also stated that the US should come to accept the views of the non-aligned countries that attempted to retain a distance from both the major world blocs. He developed this view whilst in India which took a neutral stance. Finally, he believed that the values that he saw as essentially American such as liberal democracy, free market economics tinged with social welfare and a belief in personal freedom were so personally attractive as to engender support throughout the world, especially when contrasted with the beliefs of the Soviet bloc.[23] In *The New Dimensions of Peace*, he wrote that:

> I am deeply convinced, that the American Revolution, refreshed and strengthened and for the first time focused on world affairs, can become a powerful political, social, and economic force affecting the lives of every man, woman, and child in the world.[24]

In a speech to the Cleveland Council of World Affairs on April 18, 1956 he called on the US to strike:

> a balance between ideas and defense; on the one hand, the bringing together under the banner of a militant new freedom of those people on the earth - and today they are by far the majority - who seek the goals we seek, self determination, human dignity, and expanding opportunities, and, on the other hand the power of a

> massive competent defense to provide a screen behind which those goals can be vigorously pursued.[25]

In short Bowles believed in the innate attractiveness of American values; the importance of the Third World; a dislike for US support for conservatives in these countries and opposition to the perceived simplicities of the Eisenhower Administration. These views linked Bowles to academics like Reischauer and Fairbank in a common liberal internationalist project and set of beliefs. They also formed a body of opinion that had a substantial degree of support within the Democratic Party in the 50s including Adlai Stevenson. However, others in the Democratic Party such as Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, did not agree and saw men like Bowles underestimating the Soviet threat and the importance of Western Europe in the Cold War. These two groupings would clash repeatedly in the 50s and take their battles into the Kennedy Administration where Rusk became the major spokesman for the Acheson/Nitze view. In February 1960, Kennedy asked Bowles to be the Chairman of the party's Platform Committee and he played a substantial role in drafting the election platform on which Kennedy stood for election. Therefore, it was not surprising that Bowles was offered a job within the Administration although not the position of Secretary of State, which he had hankered after. He was probably regarded as too outspoken and liberal and likely to engender opposition from Congress for such a cautious president. Instead he got the post of Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs which left him in charge of administration.[26]

With him to the Administration came James Thomson Jr. Thomson

was the son of missionaries who had been based in China. He shared their love of China and the Chinese. He had met Bowles whilst at Yale and a friendship had developed between the two. He worked for him during the 1956 presidential election and became his assistant when Bowles became a member of the House of Representatives. He followed him to the State Department. Thomson had also received a doctorate from Harvard where his supervisor had been Fairbank and his subject the activities of Americans in Chinese cities during the 1930s.[27] From the beginning of his time in government his primary interest was China policy. As he recalled later: "I made it a clear contract with all of these people who knew my background and interests that I would have an overriding interest in China and China policy".[28] His other area of specialisation was what he called "the waifs and strays" by which he meant amongst others Cambodia, Burma and Indonesia.[29]

On taking office, Bowles quickly decided that China Policy would be one of his main areas of focus. As early as March 17 1961, in a memo to Rusk, he outlined his support for the principle of two Chinas in the UN. In the same memo he expressed the view that Jiang should be forced to withdraw from the offshore Islands or at the very least the US should quietly disengage from the commitment to defend them.[30] Bowles also sent repeated memos to Kennedy where repeatedly emphasised the importance of the famine in China and how that created an opportunity for the US to develop links with the PRC and possibly even bring it into the world system. He also believed that by encouraging the concept of two independent states of China and Taiwan the US could lay the basis for an

eventual two nations policy. Finally, he was a strong supporter of the recognition of Outer Mongolia.[31]

As well as promoting these policy changes, Bowles used his position as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs to appoint people whom he knew shared his views and rid the Administration of hard-line supporters of what he termed the "Old Dulles types" and "the Chiang Kai-shek group".[32] For example, Reischauer was appointed Ambassador to Japan at his behest and J. Graham Parsons the then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs was transferred to become Ambassador to Sweden.[33]

In these attempts, Bowles was hamstrung by Kennedy's cautiousness. According to his memoirs, he believed that before taking office Kennedy had become convinced of the need for change in China policy. However, once elected he became more cautious. The reason for this new cautiousness, according to Bowles, was the political environment and the size of his election victory. Bowles writes that:

> Although I was still convinced ... that the President was anxious to breathe new life into our China policy, it was apparent that any significant relaxation in our policy would have to await a resounding Kennedy re-election victory in 1964.[34]

Bowles finds it hard to match the Kennedy who approved the publication of the *Foreign Affairs* article with the one who now stalled on implementing the policy changes that he had originally supported. The answer had to lie in political realities and a natural pragmatism in the man occupying the White House.

A far greater problem for Chester Bowles was his growing unpopularity in the White House and his increasing isolation from the President himself.[35] Within the State Department he quickly fell out with Rusk. He was regarded as inept at bureaucratic management and liasing with the rest of the Department. For example, he chaired meetings poorly and never made any effort to create a network of allies beyond his immediate staff like Thomson, who although loyal, was inexperienced in the ways the American government worked at a practical level. His preference for longer term thinking and planning over immediate solutions to short term problems earned him scorn both within the State Department and White House. His long-winded memos with which he bombarded both the President and the Secretary of State failed to earn him respect and often were unread. One State Department Officer described them as a "fog ... proposing long-term solutions ... many regarded as ridiculous and unrealistic".[36] Bowles also failed to develop any relationship with the new White House. A puritanical man he did not fit in with the gaiety of the Kennedy set and his philosophical mode of thinking was strikingly out of tune with the dynamism that the President liked to encourage in the men around him. Possibly, as his biographer Howard Schaffer has argued, there was a generational difference between the President and his immediate advisers and the old style New Deal Democrat Bowles.[37] He belonged in the liberal era of Stevenson rather than the subtle combination of caution and dynamism that the new young president prized. In practical policy terms, Bowles disliked the emphasis placed by the Kennedy men on military solutions and

counterinsurgency. As we have seen, it was alien to his liberal internationalist reformist instincts.[38]

However, it was his lack of loyalty, which really finished him in the eyes of Kennedy and his immediate circle.[39] Questions had been raised about his loyalty during the election campaign when he refused to campaign for Kennedy against his long-time friend Hubert Humphrey in the Wisconsin primary. It was his opposition to the Bay of Pigs that sealed his fate. The disastrous US-backed invasion of Cuba by exiled Cuban military forces in April 1961 embarrassed the Administration and the new President who had authorised it. At a time when the members of the Administration were expected to pull together Bowles made it clear that he had never supported the operation. By doing this, he made a ferocious enemy in Kennedy's brother Robert who was Attorney General and set himself up as the fall guy when an angry Kennedy set about dealing with the defects of a State Department that had not adequately advised him on the invasion.[40] Given that sacking Rusk was out of the question, as that would call into question the original appointment, Kennedy turned to the next in command Bowles who was now widely detested within the White House. As one White House staff member recalled: "Bowles was a bellyacher and also was trying to better his position in the (State) Department".[41] The latter accusation was untrue. He opposed the invasion on principle, but these principles and the unwise desire to express them at a time of great stress destroyed him within the Administration.

The first attempt to get rid of Bowles occurred in July 1961. Rumours

began to circulate to the effect that he was likely to be leaving the Administration due to his incompetence.[42] He immediately demanded to see the President who while regretting the news stories suggested that he might like to become an Ambassador again. After a meeting on July 17 between the two men it was agreed that he would remain in office and a public statement would be put out stating this. The statement caused even more outrage and rumour when it merely stated that Bowles's resignation was not "currently expected".[43] Only after the next day when he threatened to resign was the statement amended and an expression of support for him given. The President decided to wait quietly for a more opportune moment. It was in November 1961, in what has been called the Thanksgiving Massacre, after the American holiday of the name that occurs at the end of the month, when Kennedy finally brought about the changes to the State Department that he hoped for. Bowles was removed and became the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs and an Ambassador at large. It quickly became clear that this positional change was simply an attempt to marginalise him. George Ball, who had been Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs and was respected in the Administration took over Bowles's duties and became the chief Undersecretary of State. Kennedy also packed off the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter McConaughy and replaced him with Averell Harriman who was more trusted to produce reasoned and politically astute recommendations on China. Thomson remained his patron's assistant in a job that he hoped would leave Bowles more scope for long-range

studies and policy pronouncements. There can be little doubt that the personal antipathy towards Bowles both within the State Department and White House combined with his own limitations helped to stymie the arguments for any change in 1961 to China policy.[44]

A final problem that Bowles and Thomson had faced in 1961 was the adamant opposition of the Far Eastern section of the State Department, which remained staffed by men wedded to the policy of containment and isolation. Successively, Walter Robertson, J. Graham Parsons and Walter McConaughy had acted as a dead hand on those like Bowles and Thomson who saw China policy as ripe for review.[45] Furthermore, these men sympathised with the Nationalists and Jiang, which naturally coloured their view of the PRC. An example of their thinking in 1961 was a memo sent by Parsons to the new Secretary of State. In it, he argued that:

> The Chinese Communists have given no indication whatsoever of a desire on their part for rapprochement with the United States ... Peiping has demonstrated its deep-seated hatred for the United States, as the only major obstacle in its path, and its determination either to destroy us or as a minimum to confine us to the other side of the world in isolation.[46]

The conclusions in the paper were that Chinese hostility and the effects of any changes of policy on US allies in Asia necessitated sticking rigidly to the existing policy. In March 1961, Walter McConaughy, who had been Ambassador to South Korea, replaced Parsons. In December, Harriman replaced McConaughy. Kennedy had in effect quietly reformed

the area of the State Department covering China removing both the intransigent old guard and the liberal reformist Bowles. However the currents for changing policy in 1961 continued to swirl, if not in the Far Eastern Affairs section of the State Department, and were most convincingly put in a State Department Policy Planning Council study written by the veteran Foreign Service officer and China specialist Edward Rice.[47]

The study, dated 26 October 1961, represented a relatively comprehensive assessment of the strategic problems facing the Administration in dealing with the People's Republic of China. It did not take into consideration the domestic political environment but was concerned with the longer-term development of policy.[48] It started from the premise that the existing policy had failed:

> apparent progress toward achieving both long-range and shorter-term objectives has been lacking. We have made no perceptible progress toward a Communist China with which we can live. Communist China has grown greatly in industrial and military strength; it has been playing an increasing role on the world scene; and its continued exclusion from the UN now looks problematical[49]

The document then went on to assess the likely growth of the PRC in the years ahead:

> Looking ahead, we estimate that Communist China probably will in the next decade greatly strengthen its position as a major power center; attain a population of over 850 millions from which it can maintain the world's largest standing army and military reserve; be

> among the top three producers of coal, steel and electric power; possess a larger fleet of submarines and more powerful air force; have a modest stockpile of domestically-produced nuclear weapons; and be producing short and perhaps medium-range missiles. We think mainland China will probably continue under control of a ruthless, determined and unified Communist leadership which remains hostile to the US, but that the greatest test it will have to pass will be to increase agricultural production at a faster rate than population growth.[50]

These two statements made it clear that US policy was failing and that the PRC was growing, thus presenting a greater challenge to the US as the decade wore on. If the Administration were to avoid addressing what to do about this new giant in 1961, the study argued, then it would certainly have to have made some sort of changes by 1971.

Rice outlined three broad options open to the United States. The first was to continue the current hard-line approach and maybe put some more pressure on the PRC. He believed that this would lead to some retardation in PRC development. However, in the longer term that growth would continue unimpeded. He argued that some elements of the current policy were effective and appropriate but concluded that "the small returns to be expected for incurring increased risks and costs make the hard line approach unattractive".[51] The second option was accommodation with the PRC on something approaching what he perceived to be their terms. He believed that this approach would set off a chain of events in East and Southeast Asia which would see much of

the region fall into communist hands, and even Japan becoming more "pliable" towards the PRC.[52] The answer then, suggested Rice, was clearly a middle way looking at all policy options in isolation and choosing those that would best serve US interests. He believed that amongst the essential goals of such a policy would be to retain allied support, put the onus on the Chinese for the continued hostile relationship, and adapt to the reality of the growing strength of the PRC.[53] Rice argued for a basic strategy that:

> We should pursue toward mainland China the general policy of seeking: (a) to hold ajar the door to a more satisfactory relationship with the US, (b) to mute our shared hostility, (c) to transfer to Communist China the onus for it, and (d) at the same time to build more effective barriers to the expansion in Asia of the Sino-Soviet bloc.[54]

Among the specific unilateral steps to be taken, argued Rice, were the lifting of the embargo on the export of food grains and medicines, and consideration to putting China's trading status on a par with that of the Soviet Union. Such a move would also make sense in that it would bring the US into line with international law. This would also lead to sharing information with the PRC on medical advances and weather developments including typhoon warnings.[55] Moreover, he recommended that the US attempt to stop the Nationalists from carrying out attacks on the mainland.[56] Rice believed that the policy of non-recognition and exclusion from the UN should continue. However, he also called for studies to be made to decide on what terms the US should

seek to recognise China, and how and when the US should adapt to the reality that at some point the PRC would attain UN membership.[57] Finally, he suggested negotiations with the Chinese about disarmament and their eventual participation in a nuclear test ban treaty.[58]

Rice was explicitly critical of Jiang and the Republic of China. He claimed that they had engaged in "political warfare" against the United States and that the US could apply pressure on Jiang over this.[59] He also argued that the US should encourage the evacuation of the offshore Islands and promote "the timely emergence there of government based on popular consent and minimizing our over-identification with the GRC (Government of the Republic of China) as it is now constituted and motivated".[60] It is clear that Rice believed that the US should move beyond the open support and silent toleration of the Jiang regime that constricted Kennedy's policy, and the US should begin its quiet disengagement from its long-standing and troublesome ally. Since the 1940s, one of the central tenets of the liberal view was that the US was ill served in an alliance with Jiang. Therefore, if a new policy and relationship with the PRC became apparent then Jiang would have to accept that the US would never back Guomindang hopes of reclaiming the mainland. This view, however, never extended to allowing the PRC to seize Taiwan, which was regarded as unacceptable both politically and strategically.[61]

The final area of interest in Rice's study were his recommendations that the non-communist countries of the region should be brought together in an alliance structure that would aid collective economic

development and help contain the Chinese. This alliance structure was something that also greatly concerned Bowles who hoped to encourage an arc that would lock together Japan, Indonesia and India. More specifically, for Southeast Asia, it would defend the region against communist insurgency and sow the seeds of rapid economic growth. Southeast Asia, which had been a key economic prize since World War II and essential to Japanese economic revival, would always be related to US China policy in the eyes of policy thinkers like Bowles, Rice and later Richard Nixon. A final point must be that this build-up of an anti-PRC alliance on the southern periphery of the Chinese mainland was in some ways a direct contradiction of the main recommendation of the study, which was to improve relations between the US and the PRC.[62]

A further point should be made about the context of the study. It represented a convergence of the views expressed by men like A. Doak Barnett and especially Robert Scalapino in the Conlon Report. This study represented a merging of academic and government views and it set the stall for the rest of the Kennedy Administration and later the policies pursued by Nixon. The specific recommendations made by Barnett, Scalapino and Rice and the use of an "onion skin" approach of a number of small unilateral steps by the US to entice the Chinese into dialogue, became standard fare. Again, this was the approach pursued by Nixon.

In December 1961, Rice was appointed as Harriman's deputy at Far Eastern Affairs, partly recommended by Bowles and Thomson because of his October study. The other two names put forward by Thomson for consideration for the post in a December memo were Scalapino and

Barnett, which was indicative of Thomson's desire to promote China academics that believed in reform of policy.[63] Another appointment was that of Robert Barnett, elder brother of Doak, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. Barnett supported Rice's recommendations and came to be the key player in the State Department's consideration of the economic development of the region.[64] Moreover, early in 1962, Harriman split the China section of the Far Eastern desk into two separate units that would deal independently with the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. This move gave the mainland specialists more independence as well as representing a further weakening of the importance of Jiang in the role of policy making towards the PRC. It also of course represented another subtle step towards a policy of two nations.[65]

In conclusion, by the close of 1961, although Kennedy had remained cautious and opposed to any overt changes, he had set in motion a process, which might allow policy to be re-considered and altered later on. The old hard-line supporters of the Eisenhower policy had been removed and replaced with a trusted aide: Harriman. Bowles remained within the State Department but not in a position of great influence. In short, Kennedy had put the machinery in place to change policy, if need be, when the time was ripe, although it is clear he did not view that time as being in 1961. However, four factors were converging that would begin to push Kennedy away from his cautious approach. These were: the famine on the mainland; the Sino-Soviet split; the development of a Chinese nuclear programme and the desire of the Nationalists on Taiwan

to launch attacks on the mainland, preferably with US backing. It was the events of October 1962 though which really began to spur him towards action.

(iii) 1962: A Year of Decisions.

In January 1962, Bowles outlined to his assistants where he wanted to concentrate his energies in his new post. For Jim Thomson, the concentration was to be on Mainland China. The task would include a long range study of China and the implications of its development for all of the countries of East and Southeast Asia and: "In the meantime" wrote Bowles "we should have a special paper on the food situation in China and our possible response to it".[66] Bowles believed that the food crisis in China gave the US a unique opportunity to show the world its generosity of spirit as well as to offer the Chinese a hand of friendship. In a memo to Kennedy in February, he set out his views on the issue.[67] Over the coming months he was to express the same thoughts repeatedly. He believed that the famine represented a "semi-permanent condition of crisis that can be expected to worsen during the decade ahead".[68] He believed that all of the internal options open to the CCP leadership in dealing with this crisis were "demonstrably inadequate".[69] Therefore, the crisis would force the leadership to alter its foreign policy in some way. Bowles hypothesised what these changes might be. Bowles believed that there were few options open to the Chinese government. Firstly, it could attempt to resettle thousands or even millions of Chinese in the harsh and underpopulated eastern regions of the Soviet Union. However,

Bowles believed that this was politically impossible given the Sino-Soviet split. Another option was a major military invasion of the countries of Southeast Asia in a desperate move to get hold of the huge rice supplies in this area. Lastly, the CCP could make a major effort to develop trading relations with countries outside the communist bloc such as Australia and Canada, which were likely to sell them the vast amounts of grain needed to meet their food demands.[70] He argued that the US had a clear interest in pushing the Chinese towards the last of these options. The US should, he recommended, use the Burmese Prime Minister U Nu as an intermediary between the US and the mainland on this issue. It could be made clear to the CCP leadership that the US was prepared to sell the Chinese grain to alleviate their problems.[71] Bowles concluded the memo with a personal offer to act as a presidential envoy to U Nu and a ringing endorsement of the opportunity that he believed that the food crisis presented for American diplomacy:

> In conclusion, I must stress my conviction that it would be a serious mistake for our government not to make some attempt to probe the impasse with Communist China at this critical moment when China's needs are so great, when our advantage is so clear, and particularly when we have so much at stake in Southeast Asia.[72]

As well as memos to the President, Bowles and Thomson set about building a coalition of support for the idea both within and outside the government. Amongst those approached with the idea included: Harriman; Robert Barnett and George McGhee in the State Department; and Olsen and Spurlock from the Department of Agriculture. The

Department of Agriculture warned them that the farmers of the US were deeply split on the merits of selling grain to China.[73] Outside the government, the main supporters of selling grain to the Chinese on humanitarian grounds were the Quakers.[74] On 26 January, the issue was discussed at a NSC Standing Group meeting, where it was agreed that the State Department should be allowed to submit recommendations on the issue including allowing the sale of medicines. This would allow the Commerce Department to approve private gifts of food and grain from the American public to the PRC. Also, it allowed consultations to take place with other governments including the French, Canadians and Australians about whether or not the selling or giving of grain to the mainland might allow the west to exact political leverage in their diplomatic relations with the PRC.[75] After receiving Bowles' memo and giving it consideration, Kennedy decided to allow Bowles to make an approach to U Nu whilst in Asia in March. On February 6, the President met Bowles and they discussed the matter in depth. As the latter recalled later in an oral history interview:

> I said, "Do you want me to say that I am speaking for you, that I am speaking purely on my own, or something in between"? He said, "something in between. I would suggest that you say that you had discussed the subject with me, I am in general agreement with your ideas, but I am not a party to the specific suggestions and precise concepts that you may advance".[76]

It was typical of Bowles' luck in the Kennedy Administration that the day before he was due to fly from New Delhi to the Burmese capital of

Rangoon, U Nu was overthrown in an internal coup. A disappointed Bowles returned to Washington where he recommended that a direct approach be made to the Chinese through the Warsaw channel. Kennedy was less interested in this approach since before making any concrete offer he wanted to be certain that the Chinese would not turn it down flat and publicise the offer, thus causing a storm in the US domestic arena.[77]

The issue rumbled on in the months ahead as it became clear that the Chinese were unable to feed their population. In April, it rose to the surface again as a major issue when Averell Harriman entered the fray in favour of extending an offer to the Chinese of food at the Warsaw talks. On April 3, Harriman recommended that once it became clear that the Chinese could not purchase the grain necessary to feed their population from other sources, then the US should let them know that they would be prepared to step in. In response to this, three days later, the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson wrote a memo opposing any offers to the Chinese whatsoever. This brought about a lengthy response from Harriman on April 13 when he outlined the arguments for making an offer.[78] Central to his thinking were the humanitarian aspects and the belief that a moderation in the US stance might affect any internal battle that could be taking place within the Chinese leadership. He hoped an offer of aid would strengthen the hand of any moderate Chinese leaders. Harriman also placed an offer of food in a longer-term perspective regarding the development of China policy as the decade wore on.

> I am not impressed by the argument that we should, "at least for the time being, not make any overtures of our own". If we are ever to make these, we can do so more gracefully now then, say, after the Chinese Communists have exploded a nuclear device -- when overtures might be interpreted as motivated by apprehension ... The move we suggest is a small one, but our choice seems to be between immobility and steps which are few and small. I cannot believe that a policy of immobility can serve us well in a world where changes is the rule.[79]

This statement alone puts Harriman in the liberal camp, although as has been previously noted he was determined to maintain a good working relationship with the President that was developing by that point. Unlike Bowles, for example, he understood the need for caution and the possibility that a harsher policy might have to be followed if the Chinese were determined to stick to a rigid position. Moreover, Harriman understood the growing fears within the Administration about the developing Chinese nuclear programme and how that was driving policy makers away from the stance of temporising into taking action. However, like Bowles, he had identified the food crisis in China as an issue, which created the opportunity for the United States to seize the initiative. At the bottom of the April 13 memo, Harriman added in his own handwriting on Rusk's copy: "Personal for the Secretary. I feel strongly about this and if need be wish to have a chance to discuss it with you. It's my hunch that it would be what the President wants".[80] Four days later, the two men had their meeting where Harriman put forward his views. Afterwards, he

asked for another meeting with the Secretary of State stating that: "I certainly don't want to see the rigid policies of the past foisted on the President. I think he is strongly for the less rigid attitude as far as the grain issue is concerned".[81] This pressure succeeded in moving Kennedy from his instinctive cautiousness. On May 23, at a press conference, he was asked whether or not the US would give food to China. He replied merely that the US had not been asked. Bowles had hoped that the President might use the occasion to make a ringing declaration of American willingness to sell grain to the Chinese.[82] A few weeks later the Chinese let it be known that they were uninterested in buying or even receiving grain free from the United States. This move pulled the rug from underneath Bowles, who continued without success to argue for US initiatives in this area.[83] Others were fiercely critical of Bowles' views. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research was especially scathing. For example, on June 27th, A. L. Peaslee reviewing his arguments wrote that:

> While Mr. Bowles assumes there can be no internal solution to China's food problem, it becomes clear from the inadequacy of his suggested solutions that an internal solution (or rather resolution) is the only realistic alternative.[84]

Roger Hilsman, who was the Director of the Bureau, and who had a keen interest in China policy concluded from the food episode that individual efforts could achieve little whilst the Chinese were unwilling to react positively to even the smallest initiatives. He concluded that it showed that when China policy was looked at it should be looked at in its

entirety.[85] However, for others including the President, it was almost certainly another example of Chinese intransigence showing that it was almost impossible for the United States to build a better relationship with them.

The second factor that began to play a major part in US thinking in 1962 was the Sino-Soviet split. The split had its roots in the Chinese Civil war where Stalin had repeatedly urged Mao's communists to seek a united front and an alliance with the Guomindang. The Sino-Soviet pact signed in February 1950 was extremely favourable to the Soviets who were allowed to maintain their interests in the Middle Kingdom including their right to mine minerals in the Sinkiang region. By 1954, Khrushchev had concluded in his memoirs that, "conflict with China is inevitable".[86] The denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party by Khrushchev upset the Chinese leaders who did not believe that dead communist leaders should be criticised. Mao hoped to replicate the leadership cult, which Stalin had built around himself, and that Khrushchev was now so critical of. The Chinese leaders were especially critical of Khrushchev whom they viewed as an upstart. While Stalin had been alive the Chinese leaders, despite their differences with him, were prepared to accept his pre-eminence within the world communist movement because of his revolutionary experiences and the longevity of his rule. They felt no such respect for Khrushchev and believed that Mao should now hold that pre-eminent status. The Offshore Islands crisis of 1958 proved to be another pressure point in the rapidly deteriorating relationship between the two, as the Soviets refused to support Chinese

attempts to retake the islands. In 1959, the split became apparent as Moscow encouraged the visiting Defense Minister Peng Dehuai to plot against Mao. Then in June the Soviets cancelled the 1957 pact between the two for New Technology and National Defense, which had given the Chinese access to information about developing a nuclear capability. This meant Soviet scientists and other advisers began to leave China and return to Moscow. The Chinese responded by labelling the Soviet leaders and Khrushchev especially as "Revisionists" and "Hegemonists".[87]

A growing ideological split exacerbated these differences. The Soviet revolution of 1917 had been a more traditional revolution as forecasted by Marx with urban workers rallying together led by intellectuals such as Lenin and Trotsky. However, in China, the revolution had originated in the countryside amongst the peasantry and had subsequently been carried into the cities. The Chinese saw this model of revolution as being more relevant to other Third World countries especially in Asia and most notably in Vietnam. This ideological dispute fuelled the growing battle for leadership within the communist world. In November 1960, eighty-one communist parties assembled in Moscow to discuss these ideological differences. Khrushchev argued for peaceful competition between the two global blocs, whilst the Chinese favoured a far more aggressive approach. Khrushchev labelled Mao "an ultra-leftist, an ultra-dogmatist, and a left revisionist".[88] This fuelled the American view that the Chinese represented the more virulent strain of communist revolution, and that if the US was to work with one of the communist giants then that was

always more likely to be the Soviets.[89]

Another underlying factor in the dispute between the two were the Chinese claims to land that the Russians had taken from them as part of the unequal treaties. The Russians had taken land from the Chinese in the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and Kiakhta in 1727. In the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 the Chinese had lost 185,000 miles of territory in the Amur River valley which became the Russian province of Amursky. Two years later in the Treaty of Beijing the Russians took 133,000 miles east of the Ussuri River, which became the Maritime province. Finally, the Treaty of St Petersburg in 1881 also saw the Chinese cede land to the Russians. All of these treaties were etched in the minds of the Chinese leaders who felt that the Soviets had failed to correct historical injustices done to them by the Tsars. As well as these disputes, throughout the 20th Century, the two had been quarrelling over the fate of Outer Mongolia, which the Soviets had made independent from the Chinese in 1921. In March 1963, Beijing published a list of lost territories including part of South Siberia, the Maritime province and approximately 500,000 square miles of Russian Central Asia. This dispute would rumble on throughout the 1960s and would explode into violence in 1969.[90]

Events in 1962 were to widen the split. Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October enraged the Chinese who saw the Soviets acting without consulting them, and then having to capitulate to US demands embarrassing themselves and the communist movement in general. Chinese public criticism of the Soviet handling of the crisis upset not only the Soviets at whom it was aimed, but also the Americans who

saw more evidence of extremism on the part of Mao and his colleagues. The subsequent Nuclear Test Ban Treaty agreed between the Soviet Union and the US also annoyed the Chinese who again were not consulted. Finally, the Soviets refused to support the Chinese in their border war with India, which occurred in October.[91]

The United States Government, despite the original views of men like Dean Acheson, was slow to come to terms with the implications and extent of the divergence between the two communist giants. The thinking in the first year of the Kennedy Administration was that the split was not irreparable and that both feared the US more than they feared and disliked one another. It was at a State Department Policy Planning Council meeting in January 1962 that the Administration really began to think about the possibilities opened up by the Sino-Soviet split. Thomson later recalled it thus in a letter to Roger Hilsman:

> (A)ll the powers of (the) State (Department) appeared to focus for the first time on the reality of a permanent Sino-Soviet split. The impact on the minds around the table that morning was dramatic, and you could hear the ice of 12 years begin to snap and crackle as an intellectual thaw set in. I kept careful notes on that meeting and regard it as something of a turning point. One after another State's operators and planners toyed with the new world of possibilities that non-monolithic communism might offer to US policies.[92]

Although it is questionable whether this meeting can be regarded as a turning point, given that it took the US another seven years to fully exploit

the split, it nevertheless meant that the US began to think, once again, seriously about communist divisions as a major factor in US diplomacy. Rusk decided as a consequence of the issues raised to have an outside organisation, which was to be the Council on Foreign Relations, look at US-China relations as part of a wider exercise of grasping the meaning of the split.[93] A major report on the matter was prepared for April 1962 by a group of government officers from both its policy making and intelligence wings. The group consulted outside experts on the Soviet Union and China and the contents of the paper were discussed and revised extensively. However, a wide divergence of opinion remained amongst those involved. This special study group held two special meetings in February under the auspices of the CFR and another in March under the government's auspices involving other senior government officers.[94] The conclusions of this group in a thirty-five page report was that the split was fundamental, and that it was believed that it would serve the interests of the US. In fact, the report described it as "the most promising development that has taken place since the inception of the cold war".[95] The report also concluded that the Soviet Union had the more acceptable view as far as the United States was concerned and it recommended that Kennedy seek a meeting with Khrushchev as soon as is practicable.[96] A draft Policy Planning Council paper prepared for the State Department at about the same time reached the same conclusions:

> It is here estimated that, short of a direct military threat to one or the other of the communists strongholds or a sudden wave of new communist successes, no improvement in the situation is likely to

> take place in either the near or long term. Differences rather than diminishing will fester and grow. The polarization process already so definitely underway will continue. The odds would seem to favor continuation on to the point of no return, on until the "single world camp of socialism" will cease in fact to be ... This estimate derives in part from the fact that the dispute involves a large number of elements that by their very nature do not seem reconcilable. It derives even more from the fact that neither the Soviet leadership nor the Chinese leadership can make necessary modifications in its position without surrendering its control over matters affecting the basic national interests of the state for which it is responsible.[97]

The paper, like its later version, regarded all this as beneficial to the US. "In general a process would be begun that would make it increasingly possible for the United States and others to deal with Russia as Russia and China as China". [98] This suggestion has all the hallmark of a *Realpolitik* viewpoint of the two powers putting strategic and national interests before ideological factors. This view was held by Nixon and Kissinger but was at odds with documents like NSC 68, which had emphasised the revolutionary aspects of world communism. Kennedy had an instinctive dislike of communism and both the Communist superpowers. It was not until the apparition of world destruction opened up by the Cuban Missile crisis that he came to appreciate fully that the superpowers shared common aims such as national survival. The rhetoric of his inaugural address could not be carried out in direct conflict

with the Soviet Union. Kennedy's response to the split once again seemed to be governed by caution. There were no major initiatives towards either the Soviets or the Chinese before October. Kennedy shared his advisers' preference for the Soviets and his belief that they represented the more moderate power.

The third factor in 1962 that affected US policy was the growing fear of the inevitable moment when the Chinese would acquire a nuclear capability. During the summer of 1962, the President began to worry seriously about such a development, fearing its impact on the balance of power, and the possibility that the Chinese might use these weapons to threaten international equilibrium in pursuit of their revolutionary aims.[99] As the date of a successful Chinese test drew nearer, (it took place in the autumn of 1964), the Administration began to concern itself more extensively over what action to take. In 1962, it was enough that the fear was felt, as well as the clear lack, from an American perspective, of a solution on what to do about this major new force in the world. What seemed certain, however, was that it began to push Kennedy away from his temporising regarding China policy. The Chinese and the issue of a coherent new policy would only be able to wait so long, otherwise the changing world situation and the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons would force the US into an unwise position or drastic action. In short, Kennedy now began to appreciate that the policy he had followed for his first eighteen months in office would not be viable in his hoped-for second term and may have to be abandoned earlier. William Bundy, in a chapter on China in the draft book that is deposited in the Lyndon Johnson

Library, captured the problem neatly when he wrote of the eventual test that:

> there could be no question that the Chinese test signalled an important and basic change in the power status of mainland China in the post-war world ... China had not only acquired a new form of military capacity which, however small, would grow over time. It had shown the capacity to achieve this without more than initial Soviet help, and it had signalled its independence of "world opinion" as expressed in the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Since all of this had been anticipated, its immediate impact on American official thinking was not sharp or great. But in the gradual sense, over the many years it had been in process, the event of nuclear testing was a crucial part of the overall evaluation of China as a terribly important and formidable element in East Asia and in the world balance of power.[100]

Although the impact on US thinking was greater, even in the short term than Bundy acknowledges, he is right to emphasise the gradual affect it had on US policy. In effect, it was another factor in pushing an alteration in the structure of international relations between the US and the communist superpowers. Kennedy's initial reaction to a Chinese nuclear breakthrough was to try to prevent it happening. This would lead in 1963 to the US reaching out to the Soviets for a joint arrangement, possibly even a joint military operation, against the Chinese to prevent them acquiring a nuclear capability.[101]

The final factor that needs mentioning was the decision by Kennedy to

allow the Nationalists to launch commando raids against the Chinese mainland in 1962. Jiang had for a number of years been pushing for US support in his hopes to attack the mainland and try to recapture it, possibly forcing the United States to intervene to aid him. The Eisenhower Administration had been sceptical about his ideas and had tried to stymie his ambitions.[102] In July 1961 a "US intragovernmental committee" which was a special group involving the President agreed US support and provision for six 20 man teams to be airdropped into South China. The Nationalists had originally requested 200-300 men teams with a greater degree of US involvement especially air support. Kennedy, not surprisingly given infamous Guomindang incompetence, was unwilling to go along with this. Once the preparations were complete the Nationalists refused to carry out the operations arguing that 20 man teams were insufficient to be of any use. Everett Drumright, the pro-Jiang ambassador to the Republic of China, suggested further debate between Washington and Jiang on this matter. On March 31st 1962, a discussion about the proposals took place amongst policy makers. Rusk was highly sceptical but Kennedy, Hilsman and Harriman wanted to "temporise" rather than directly refuse the requests. The conclusion of the meeting was to support a larger airdrop but as surreptitiously as possible. This decision was relayed in an unsigned memo, although the memo was clearly authorised by the President, to Ray Cline who was the Chief of the CIA station in Taipei. It stated that:

> You are ... authorized to maintain close liaison with GOC (Government of China) on planning and preparation for larger scale

> clandestine operations on a contingent basis involving up to a maximum of 200 men in a single airdrop, but it is essential that all responsibility for the preparation and execution of such operations rest with the GOC. The United States will, concurrently with such planning, prepare two C-123 aircraft in the United States and train the Chinese crews in this country ... It must be understood that we are preparing the capability for this operation - but have made no decision at this time to proceed with it.[103]

This development would ultimately come to nothing. In June 1962, the Chinese began to mass their troops along the coast in a defensive formation as a warning both to the Guomindang and the United States. The appointment of Alan Kirk, an amphibious war expert, as Ambassador to Taiwan combined with the increased nationalist military activity had clearly played a part in heightening Chinese concerns.[104] Equally important, as far as the Administration was concerned, was the absolute failure of the teams that were launched against the mainland. They were all quickly captured by the mainland authorities. This convinced the US Government even more that Jiang had no chance of retaking the island.[105] From then on Kennedy ensured that he gave no US support to attacks on the mainland. By September 1963 the Chinese Nationalists had begun to emphasise that they were prepared to wait before taking the mainland - in other words they were coming to accept their inability to affect developments in, and control of, China.[106] It is surprising, given Kennedy's cautious approach, that he was prepared to support Jiang's ambitions to such an extent. The most logical conclusion was that he

anticipated the failure of the mission and didn't feel it would ultimately affect the already poor relationship with the PRC. However, refusal to support Jiang might set off a string of attacks from the China Lobby within the domestic US arena. It seems inconceivable that Kennedy genuinely believed that the attacks could succeed.

US fears about the Chinese Communists hardened as a consequence of the events of October 1962. Although the Chinese had no involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis their subsequent attacks on the Soviet Union over its capitulation hardened US Governmental feeling towards them. Furthermore, when Kennedy began to rethink his policy towards the Communist bloc it was primarily the Soviet Union that he hoped to build a better relationship with. There was to be no instantaneous change in policy towards the Chinese. The other major event of October 1962 was the Chinese attack on India. This came about as a culmination of a long-running border dispute between the two. On October 24 the Chinese began a military assault which would continue until November 18, when Chinese forces were only 30 miles from the plain of Assam whose oil fields and tea plantations were vital to India's trade with the outside world.[107] The attack especially affected the liberals within the Administration including Chester Bowles. Whereas up to then Bowles had been a supporter of a relaxation in Sino-American relations, he became a hard-line opponent of any change seeing the Chinese as extremists. The Ambassador to India, Galbraith, also changed his view of Sino-American relations. In short, their sympathies for Indian democracy and Nehru outweighed any attachment to the Chinese, or even a change

of policy. An armed attack, however limited, turned Bowles and others against the Chinese for the rest of the 60s.[108] Obviously for others within the Administration, including the President, the attack represented yet another example of the aggressive militant world-view and behaviour of the PRC. For Roger Hilsman, as he later recalled, the attack sent another message to him. He believed that China had shown that it was able to seize the initiative in Asia and exercise its power virtually unimpeded. In reality, he felt this more than anything showed why policy needed to be overhauled.[109] This changeover between Bowles and Hilsman was emphasised by the fact that Bowles was about to leave the Administration. In 1963 he went back for a second stint as Ambassador to his beloved India, and Hilsman was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs replacing Harriman who was promoted to Undersecretary of State.[110]

(iv) Conclusion.

By the end of 1962 the original policy adopted by John Kennedy of temporising had clearly come to the end of its usefulness. In the first two years of the Administration the domestic opposition to any change combined with the hostility of the PRC pushed pragmatists like Kennedy away from giving serious consideration to the ideas being floated by men like Chester Bowles and Jim Thomson. That being said, underneath the surface, the desire to reform policy was carried into the Administration primarily by liberal policy makers who hoped to shake off what they saw as the sterile policies of their predecessors Eisenhower and Foster

Dulles. Although they won few battles in 1961 and 62 they continued to pursue their agenda and influence the minds of policy makers. They also held views, which dovetailed neatly with the academics in institutions like Harvard who had tried to influence policy before the 1960 election. In Thomson they had a friend and ally who had studied at Harvard, understood, sympathised and shared their viewpoints and was able to promote their ideas within the government. Thomson did this in a way that met their intellectual predilections but also was explicable to the politicians of the time like Bowles. This convergence between politicians and academics would continue. Another point was that the policy agenda in terms of political steps was introduced in the first two years of the Kennedy era. After that all policy debates would focus on the US taking a series of small unilateral steps to entice the PRC into dialogue. In fact, in 1969 that was the course that Nixon followed.

CHAPTER FOUR: 1963: A TURNING POINT.

(i) Introduction.

The first two years of Kennedy's presidency saw little change of policy towards the People's Republic of China. Faced with what he viewed as a hostile and intransigent opponent and with an American public, which would countenance no change, Kennedy preferred to temporise and await a change in circumstances before deciding what long-term policy to adopt towards the PRC. By the beginning of 1963, he had begun to change his viewpoint. The nearing Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons and the emotional affects of the Cuban Missile crisis had convinced him that policy had to be reformulated to take account of the changing situation. Elsewhere within the State Department the voices calling for a change in policy were becoming more noticeable. The departure of Chester Bowles, rather than weakening their case, strengthened it as new voices emerged who had the ear of the President in a way that Bowles had never had. The two key figures in this process were Averell Harriman and Roger Hilsman. During the course of 1963 they set in train a motion of events that looked like the prelude to a possible change in China policy. This chapter argues that in 1963 a twin track approach emerged. On the one hand this meant moves towards a more openly hostile policy including making overtures to the Soviet Union regarding an anti-Chinese alliance that might even include joint military action against Chinese nuclear facilities. On the other, new moves with tacit approval from the White House were begun that gave the President the option of changing to a more moderate stance. Finally, worth noting

is the fact that as the pressures for change mounted with a critical speech by Hilsman in December 1963, Thomson used his connection with the academic community to garner their support and make them aware of the proposed alterations being promoted.

(ii) W. Averell Harriman.

Central to the development of the twin track China policy that developed in the last year of Kennedy's life and presidency was W. Averell Harriman.[1] The grandson of the railroad magnate E. H. Harriman, he had a long and impressive record in the Democratic Party and international diplomacy. He had been Ambassador to the Soviet Union and in the 1950s served a term as Governor of New York. He had managed to develop close relations with both FDR and Truman; and quickly in the 1960s, despite the potential rivalry, with the Kennedy family. Later it would be Harriman who smoothed Robert Kennedy's entry into New York politics where he was elected Senator in 1964.[2] Harriman had long viewed the communist powers as normal states to be dealt with by the traditional routes of diplomacy rather than as revolutionary states intent on global expansion that was implicit in much of the thinking of men like Kennan and Foster Dulles. As early as the 1920s, he had been developing trading links with the Soviet Union.[3] He had a similar flexibility towards the Chinese as well as a keen understanding of Kennedy's attitude towards them. In 1959, he had applied for a visa to visit the mainland but the Chinese Embassy in Moscow had let it be known that he would not be welcome.[4] He had also hoped to be

Secretary of State in the Kennedy White House but had to accept lesser positions although he worked himself into a position of influence partly due to his good working relationship with Robert Kennedy.[5]

From very early on in the administration he had been attracted to China policy. In the early summer of 1961, whilst in Geneva, he had wanted to develop contacts with the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi and had sought and obtained clearance from the President to make an approach.[6] The clearance was given, but by that time the Chinese minister had left the city. When in late 1961, he took on the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; he became the key player on policy for the region. To these ends he built up a little circle of advisers who shared many of his views. These included Hilsman, Michael Forrestal (a member of the NSC Staff from 1962 onwards), Paul Kattenburg, who was the Vietnam desk officer, and Thomson.[7] From that position he developed a reputation for flexible thinking and unswerving loyalty which earned the respect of the President. He became the one member of the Administration involved with both tracks of the new potential China policy.

That is not to overstate the degree of influence that Harriman possessed over the President. For example, he was excluded from the crisis talks over the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the Vienna Summit, evidence that JFK did not want his influence over Soviet policy.[8] Moreover, both Rusk and Ball within the State Department distrusted him. His biographer Abramson claims that they were unwilling to have weekends away from Washington simultaneously in case Harriman was

able to gain too much influence.[9] It would be fair to say that the best that can be said for him was that he carved out a niche, which included a key role in China policy.[10]

In March 1963, he was promoted to Undersecretary of State replacing George McGhee who became Ambassador to Germany. He was left in charge of Far East policy. His replacement as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs was Roger Hilsman and according to the latter Harriman made it clear to him from the beginning that his main area of concern was to be China policy.

(iii) The Military Option.

There can be little doubt that John Kennedy viewed the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Chinese Communists with horror. On January 10, 1963, in a meeting with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) John McCone, NSC (National Security Council) Adviser, McGeorge Bundy made the President's position clear:

> Bundy then brought up the question of the estimate of Chinese Communist nuclear capability, with its current status, and what was the present estimate of when the ChiComs would explode a device. He stated that the President felt that this was probably the most serious problem facing the world today and intimated that we might consider a policy of indicating now that further effort by the Chinese Communists in the nuclear field would be unacceptable to us and that we should prepare to take some form of action unless they agreed to desist from further efforts in this field. Bundy said

> that he felt the President was of a mind that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Chinese Communists would so upset the world political scene it would be intolerable to the United States and to the West.[11]

McCone's notes of the meeting recorded that: "It appeared to me that Cuba and the Communist China nuclear threat are two issues foremost in the minds of the highest authority and therefore should be treated accordingly by CIA".[12] McCone was honest during the meeting in admitting that up to that point the CIA had been unable to gather sufficient information to make any kind of detailed assessment of the extent of the Chinese nuclear development.[13]

On January 16, Bundy told Harriman that the President wanted a thorough assessment of China's long range military capability with special reference to her nuclear strength and a list of possible US responses to the threat posed. Harriman agreed to set up an interdepartmental working group to look into the matter.[14]

Six days later, the subject came up again at a meeting of the NSC where Kennedy made clear his feelings on Chinese nuclear development.[15] He also floated the idea of working with the Soviets to prevent it. A day later, Harriman took up the same theme in a letter to the President.

> To my mind, the most important matter in the interest of our security which you touched upon was the question of attempting to prevent Red China from obtaining nuclear capability, and the possibility of working with the Soviets to this end ... (I)n a

> conversation with one Russian representative, I asked what was the use of our coming to an agreement on a test ban without Red China. He replied that if the United States and the Soviet Union agreed, world opinion would prevent China from acting independently. The earnest manner in which he spoke gave me the impression that what the Kremlin had in mind was that with such an agreement, together we could compel China to stop nuclear development, threatening to take out the facilities if necessary. In any event, I was glad to learn that you put this subject so high on your priority list.[16]

At this juncture two points need to be made. Firstly, it is clear that Kennedy and Harriman viewed the Chinese as the more extreme of the two communist powers. Whereas the Soviets could be negotiated with, the Chinese had to be prevented at all costs from developing a nuclear capability. In short, they believed that the Soviet State had a degree of rational thinking where nuclear weapons were concerned which the Chinese did not appear to possess. Whether these feelings had any racial component can only be speculated upon. It has to be said though that this is a remarkable view given that only three months earlier the US and the Soviets had gone head to head over the Soviets attempt to place weapons in Cuba. The other point is that triangular international diplomacy was beginning to emerge in US policy makers' minds regarding the two communist super powers. Kennedy and Harriman both wanted to play on the Sino-Soviet split to ally with the Soviets against the more extreme (as they saw it) Chinese. These early attempts at

triangular diplomacy showed that even in 1963 US politicians were now adapting to the split and the range of opportunities that it presented them. By 1969, and the inauguration of Richard Nixon, the international environment was both more complex and the problems facing the US more pressing. In short, for Kennedy and Harriman caution was a sensible approach whereas for Nixon the bold strokes associated with the opening to China were in many ways necessities. There appears to be no evidence at this point of members of the Administration arguing for the US to ally with the Chinese against the Soviets.

The subject of an anti-Chinese alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States came up during the Tripartite negotiations between the two superpowers and the United Kingdom held in Moscow between July 15 and 25, 1963. The subject for discussion, which led eventually to a deal on the last day of the talks, was the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Harriman represented the United States at the talks. On the first day of the talks Kennedy ensured Harriman understood that he wanted the issue of the Chinese discussed. In a message to his representative, the President wrote: "You should try to elicit Khrushchev's view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness either to take Soviet action or to accept US action in this direction".[17] The matter was discussed on that day in a meeting between Khrushchev, Harriman and the British representative Lord Hailsham and again several times during the talks. The outcome of the talks was inconclusive, as Khrushchev was unprepared to make such a commitment at that time.[18] A memo written

by John J. de Martino of the State Department Executive Secretariat to the Executive Secretary Benjamin Read in October 1964 recounted the talks as follows:

> A search of our records of the Test Ban Treaty negotiations in Moscow fails to reveal any Harriman proposal for a joint US-USSR effort to slow down Red China's nuclear development. On the other hand the question of Chinese nuclear capacities came up in various Harriman/Khrushchev conversations. Harriman probed USSR knowledge of Chinese capacities and its attitude toward them. He expressed our concern regarding this matter and said he hoped that the problem would be solved by eventual Chinese adherence to the Treaty or by disarmament. Khrushchev was obviously unwilling to talk at much length on the question and he tried to give the impression of not being greatly concerned.

One of the reasons that the Chinese issue was raised with Khrushchev was Harriman's theory that Khrushchev's interest in a test ban treaty flowed from his desire to isolate Red China in the international communist movement. Aside from this Harriman was also under instructions to express the President's great concern over Chinese development of nuclear weapons.[19]

This tells us that the US and especially Averell Harriman were moving towards triangular diplomacy. Nevertheless, the US remained cautious and on the evidence of the Test Ban treaty with good reason given that Khrushchev was unprepared to commit himself to such a potentially risky adventure. Ironically, his successor Leonid Brezhnev would be more

prepared to seek US support in the Soviet conflict with the Chinese.

Kennedy also convened a NSC meeting on July 31, 1963 to consider the threat posed by the Chinese. His concerns were questioned by the CIA, which argued in a report that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was unlikely to change the foreign policy of the PRC. The CIA argued that the Chinese adopted a cautious approach towards world affairs, which stood in marked contrast to the provocative language that often emanated from the Chinese leaders and media in Beijing. The meeting broke up without reaching any firm decisions.[20] Thereafter, the fear of Chinese nuclear development seems to have concerned the President less as he began to lay his preparations for his re-election campaign. The more hostile track of the new China policy was set aside for the meantime. In reality, it would never be implemented as events moved the US to a different assessment of the PRC.

At about the same time as the Test Ban Treaty was being signed between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Chinese were making clear their view on the Treaty and the nuclear arms race. On August 7, John Cabot, the US Ambassador to Poland and representative in the US-PRC ambassadorial talks reported that he had had a long meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Ping-nan (the Chinese Ambassador to Poland). Cabot reported that Wang spoke "at times more emotionally than he has for some time".[21] According to Cabot's report, Wang made Chinese feelings known on the Treaty,

> he (Wang) must point out August 5 tripartite test ban treaty goes against aspirations people of world because it can be used by

> nuclear powers consolidate their nuclear monopoly. It legalizes continued manufacture, transportation, underground testing and use of weapons by US while binding hands of peace-loving countries, denying them adequate means protecting selves against nuclear threat. Treaty thereby actually increases hazard of nuclear war and is menacing world peace. Asked how a few nuclear powers could take into own hands serious issues affecting human destiny. How can desire of people of whole world be ignored and a few nuclear powers be permitted monopolize everything. Without participation China no major questions in international affairs can be settled in our times. Said President Kennedy had gone out of his way to resume tone and airs of world overlord presuming describe nonnuclear powers as stable or unstable, responsible or irresponsible. That was outright imperialistic attitude. Even Kennedy cannot deny that far from prejudicing nuclear strength of USG (United States Government), treaty makes possible carrying on of nuclear race. If US sincere in wanting take first step, should first remove nuclear threat it now possesses by dismantling all overseas bases and reaching an accord establishing nuclear-free zones.[22]

This quotation, allowing for some overblown rhetoric, neatly puts forward the Chinese viewpoint, which has cogency. The Chinese were developing a nuclear capacity partly to ensure that no power could attack them with impunity: a situation no national government could find tolerable. Moreover, Wang is surely right in saying that no major

international problems of the time could be solved without Chinese participation. Arguably, the US policy of non-recognition was therefore not only a failure in its own terms but warped US reaction and flexibility on other issues such as the nuclear arms race. Finally, Wang was right to say that the Test Ban Treaty solidified the US and Soviet right to maintain their own nuclear stockpile whilst forbidding other countries from developing theirs. Therefore, it is not really surprising that the Chinese found the treaty wholly unacceptable.

The Chinese were however quick to emphasise their peaceful intentions. They were not seeking a nuclear capability to threaten the world or to aid regional expansion. After the Cabot-Wang meeting, the Chinaman struck up an informal conversation with his American counterpart:

> He said he had just come from China where his people were working hard in constructing their country. They had much to do and would never attempt to break out of their own borders into other areas. Said I should not believe newspaper accounts in the US which claimed China was a peril in the Far East.[23]

This conversation and the manner in which the Chinese leadership used their eventual development of a nuclear capability show that they understood that it was a deterrent against attack rather than a conventional weapon of war. In November 1963, a matter of days before Kennedy's death, an interdepartmental PG (Planning Group) met to discuss the consequences of the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons. A report of the meeting concluded that: "The consensus was

that the Chinese would remain basically cautious in the overt use of force even after they acquired a few nucs; first use by them would be highly unlikely - instead they would see their nucs as a deterrent to escalation by us".[24] The paper arising from this meeting was never sent to the President because as Bromley Smith (Executive Secretary of the NSC) explained in a note to Bundy: "This event is so far down the road I doubt JFK should be given this this year".[25] In short the US was becoming more accustomed to China's nuclear development and was beginning to accept that the Chinese too would see it as a deterrent. Also, the lack of interest by the Soviet Union in any joint alliance to prevent Chinese nuclear development closed off this option. All of this made it easier for the President of the day to reach out to the mainland, just as the mere fact that it possessed the nuclear capacity made it more necessary. Moreover, the Chinese nuclear capability gave them a greater status as a world power, in their own eyes, but also in the eyes of the outside world. Again, all of this was clear to Nixon in 1969 but uncertain in 1963.

(iv) Roger Hilsman and the Peace Track.

In April 1963, Harriman took up his post as Undersecretary of State. Roger Hilsman replaced him as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. A graduate of West Point, with a doctorate from Yale, Hilsman had the right combination of brain and brawn that Kennedy liked in the people around him. During the Second World War he had been a member of Merill's marauders in Burma, where he had developed the reputation as a military expert especially in counter-insurgency, a

fascination he shared with the President.[26] Hilsman, using this expertise, had a tendency to question military decisions and lecture officers in the military and Pentagon. Kennedy liked this form of questioning but others such as Lyndon Johnson, Dean Rusk, General Maxwell Taylor and Robert McNamara did not and became enemies.[27] Their dislike was kept in check so long as Hilsman had a friend in the White House. For example, Kennedy stepped in to ensure that Hilsman stayed in the Administration after Yale had offered him an academic post.[28] James Thomson in a later interview makes the point that Hilsman's only close friend and mentor within the Administration was the President and that after his assassination Hilsman's "days were numbered".[29]

On taking office, Harriman made it clear that Hilsman's priority must be sorting out China policy and that he was to reflect on what policy should be during a second Kennedy Administration. Hilsman believed from his conversations with Harriman and the President that Kennedy wanted a form of détente with the Chinese as part of a general improvement in international relations.[30] Kennedy prioritised improved relations with the Soviets, but believed that if circumstances were right, then the US should try to improve relations with the Chinese as well. Hilsman's job, as he saw it, was to flesh out these ideas and to apply the principles that Kennedy had begun to take towards his policy towards the Soviet Union to his policy with the Chinese. These principles were "Firmness, Flexibility and Dispassion".[31] Hilsman verified this in *To Move a Nation*, his account of his time within the Administration, writing of these three

principles: "In all three aspects, the policy was basically what President Kennedy had followed so successfully in dealing with the Soviet Union".[32] The other factor that motivated Hilsman was the Sino-Soviet split.[33] In short, he understood that the nature of international politics was evolving and that the US could take advantage of the change in climate.

The first major task that Hilsman undertook in order to begin to alter the parameters of how China policy was dealt with in the State Department was to reorganise the desks or compartments where policy towards the Asian region was dealt with. He especially intended to separate policy towards the Chinese Mainland from policy towards the Republic of China. He decided to create an Office of Asian Communist Affairs, which would be the motor for consideration of policy towards the PRC and its communist neighbours North Korea and North Vietnam. He also decided that he wanted somebody who shared his flexibility and was experienced in US policy towards the region. He turned to Marshall Green, who at the time was based in Hong Kong, but had recently been turned down for the post of Ambassador to Thailand. In July 1963, Hilsman wrote to him to express his regrets about Green's disappointment but also to offer him a job back in Washington:

> I have a proposition to make to you to which I hope you will give careful consideration. As you have no doubt suspected, many of us in the Kennedy Administration would like to lay at least the groundwork of a rational China policy. This is something that is high on my own agenda, high on Governor Harriman's agenda,

> and, I know, high on the President's agenda. We will be making the first tentative moves in this direction in the next few weeks. Beyond that, no one has any very clear notions of what we will do next -- only the ambition and, I might say, determination. I would like you to be in on the policy-making of this fundamental and (I need not tell you) most far reaching series of steps. Although I have not raised it in a formal fashion, I have reason to believe that the seventh floor would look with favor on a request from me to establish a third Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs with special responsibilities in developing and carrying out a new look at our China policy. I have not asked for this position to be formally established yet, simply because I want to know my man before I establish the position. If you are interested ... I would like to move ahead looking toward your early reassignment to Washington to take on these very heavy and serious responsibilities. I would appreciate your reaction as soon as possible.[34]

An excited Marshall Green responded almost immediately after receiving the letter sending a personal telegram to express his interest in the post:

> I have long been interested in a relook at our China policy and I consider it a stimulating challenge and opportunity to be in on the ground floor of the project you describe. If the position is created and if I am assigned to it, you may be sure that I will do my utmost.[35]

In August, letters were exchanged between the two of them to the affect

that Green would take up his new assignment in mid-September. Green returned to Washington then.[36] Hilsman next turned to establishing the office. In an undated Memo, which was almost certainly written by Hilsman, the rationale for the new Office was set out:

> Current trends underline the need for taking a new look at the problem of Communist China in a changing world: the deepening of the Sino-Soviet rift, the growing triangulation of the Cold War, the new diffusion of power and authority in the communist world, progress in arms control counter-balanced by evidence that a truculent China may soon enter the club, and signs that Peiping (Beijing) baffled by the great leap backward and the enormity of China's long-term economic problems is casting about for new solutions which could involve dangers and/or opportunities for us ... In this situation there is a need to lay the foundation for a longer-range China policy, for a better coverage of North Korea, North Vietnam and Outer Mongolia, for closer attention to the world-wide implications for US policy of the Sino-Soviet split and for new focus on Subcontinent affairs as they affect China.[37]

The Memo went on to explain why it was important to separate China policy from the departmental desks that dealt with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. It argued that the two officers in the department had to deal with the operational problems of relations with allies, including Japan, which was the key, US ally in the region. Hilsman proposed that a total of six officers be placed in the Office, the most important being Green. Three would work on China policy, another on Sino-Soviet relations, and

another on South and Southeast Asia and a final officer would concentrate on North Vietnam and North Korea. The new office structure (Hilsman also created a second new Office of Regional Affairs whose brief included SEATO and general economic development) was approved on November 14 and came into affect thirteen days later.[38]

Hilsman then put forward his programme of alternative policies, which were generally the same ideas that Bowles and others had previously espoused. These were an exchange of newsmen, diplomatic recognition by the US of Mongolia, re-examining US trade restrictions with China and most boldly bringing the PRC into the disarmament talks in Geneva. He saw little chance of a positive Chinese response to this programme but felt it would put the onus on them as the cause of the poor relationship between the two countries as well as possibly having an impact on the internal politics of the PRC. These ideas were put in a memo that due to Kennedy's assassination would have to go to his successor Lyndon Baines Johnson, but it was decided to wait until after a major speech before putting the ideas forward to the new President.[39]

(v) The December 1963 Speech: Preparation.

Unlike the Truman Administration and to a lesser extent the Eisenhower Administration, Kennedy and his aides placed less emphasis on formal policy documentation.[40] He preferred confidential discussions with key advisers. This meant that policy was often less structured than for example the Truman/Acheson approach, which were formalised in documents like NSC 68. It meant that those trying to influence policy

tended to use vehicles other than memos. It also meant that it is harder to trace what the policy was and how it developed over time. One way as William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under Lyndon Johnson recalled "was to make major speeches even more important than in the past as a vehicle for codifying what was being done and thought".[41] Bundy believed that the speech given by Hilsman at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on December 13, 1963 fell into that category.[42]

Hilsman had been looking since the summer of 1963 to make a speech outlining the new direction that policy towards the mainland might take. The first opportunity to give a speech of this nature took place in August when he was asked to substitute for Rusk at the 16th Annual Meeting of the National Legislative Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii. He was offered the speech that Rusk was to give but decided that he would prefer to give a speech on US policy towards China. The Far Eastern Section of the State Department produced a draft for a speech, which restated what policy had been since 1950. Hilsman and Thomson reviewed the speech in mid-August and decided that it was unacceptable as it stood.[43] As Thomson noted in a Memo on the genesis and reaction to the speech that he wrote for the record in May, 1964,

> it was largely a one-sided chronicle of U.S. relations with Communist China from 1949 to the present; it placed the onus for our bad relations entirely on the Chinese Communists. In effect, as Hilsman said, it forced him to identify himself with all the actions of previous administrations on China policy.[44]

The two of them decided that it was impossible to make the numerous changes to this draft to make it acceptable as a speech that Hilsman might want to give. Instead, he reverted to the original speech that Rusk had intended to make.[45]

The next opportunity came when the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco invited Hilsman to come and make a speech on December 13th. This time both he and Thomson were ready to ensure that the text would suit their purpose.[46] Hilsman has always suggested that the specific nature of the speech was cleared with Kennedy and that it would represent an elaboration of Kennedy's comments at his last ever press conference on November 14.[47] Responding to a question about trade with the PRC, Kennedy had replied:

> We are not planning on trade with Red China in view of the policy that Red China pursues. If the Red Chinese indicate a desire to live at peace with the United States, with other countries surrounding it, then quite obviously the United States would reappraise its policies. We are not wedded to a policy of hostility to Red China.[48]

This statement set out a basic willingness to come to terms with the PRC. Hilsman has always claimed that the December speech was aimed at laying the basis for US policy towards the PRC for a second Kennedy Administration. This was based on the assumption, which seemed logical at the time, that JFK was likely to win a second term and have five more years in the White House, the last four unencumbered by electoral considerations. Hilsman was also certain that the President wanted the

seeds of this change put in place before the election.[49] Thomson has always been more sceptical about these claims: "Roger (Hilsman) thinks that he had a go-ahead from John Kennedy, I've never been able to ferret out precisely how specific that go-ahead was and when Kennedy gave it".[50] Historians have tended to share Thomson's scepticism, but a logical explanation is that Kennedy was happy to give the green light, knowing that he could disassociate himself from it if necessary and that he could gauge the reaction to the proposals that Hilsman put forward.[51] By late 1963, Kennedy knew that the Soviet Union would be uninterested in any joint anti-Chinese alliance and that the CIA was emphasising the cautious nature of the PRC's foreign policy. Furthermore, Kennedy was now in a far stronger position domestically, likely to win re-election comfortably and was perceived as a tough anticommunist, which would give him the space to manoeuvre in relations with the Communist superpowers. There seems to have been no reason to suggest that Kennedy would not give Hilsman, whom he undoubtedly trusted, the green light knowing that Hilsman would not be too controversial and would carry out his intentions. Finally, Kennedy always knew he could back out of any commitment if necessary.

At the end of November the State Department produced its draft for the San Francisco speech. The result was another hard-line document, which outlined traditional US policy. Thomson reviewed it on December 1 and rejected it.[52] He then recommended to Hilsman, that given that there was a new man in the White House who was still finding his feet, it might be better to abandon the speech. Hilsman rejected this advice and

decided to press on. This decision and the rejection of the original draft prompted two new drafts by Robert Barnett (brother of Doak and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs) and Lindsey Grant who was the Acting Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs. Thomson reviewed these new drafts and decided that the latter "could be readily adapted" to suit Hilsman's requirements.[53] Over the next few days Thomson worked on the speech to adapt it to the specific requirements of the occasion. On December 7, Thomson took the latest draft to a meeting with Grant, Barnett, Marshall Green and Allen Whiting, who was the Director of the Office of Research for Far Eastern Affairs and noted China academic.[54] At that meeting the final draft was worked out and Thomson took it to Hilsman who was satisfied.[55]

The next stage was getting it cleared by the White House, Harriman and especially by Dean Rusk. On Monday December 9, copies were sent to Michael Forrestal at the White House, William Sullivan who was the special assistant to Harriman and the Bureau of Public Affairs. Forrestal approved it telling Thomson that he was disappointed that they had not gone even further, Sullivan approved it saying that he saw no problem with it although he had been unable to get hold of his boss.[56] On the evening of December 11, Hilsman requested time with the Secretary of State to apprise him of the speech. He had already shown it to Undersecretary of State George Ball who had raised no objections.[57] Hilsman recalls in his book *To Move a Nation* his encounter with Rusk over the speech:

> (I described) what was in the speech, I warned him that the China

> Lobby would probably raise a fuss, along with the Chinese Nationalists and probably some Congressmen. We discussed the implications of an intelligence report that the French were about to recognize Communist China. Finally, I asked if he wanted to go over the speech himself. He saw no need for it - and that was that.[58]

Thomson backs this story up noting that Rusk's only concern was the timing, given that the French were establishing relations with the PRC (which they formally did in January 1964) and that this speech might be interpreted as a US blessing for that move.[59] Assuming that Hilsman accurately informed him of its contents Rusk clearly found the text acceptable. Thomson has always claimed that Rusk was hoodwinked into clearing a text, which advocated a policy he did not agree with.[60] However, Rusk was politically shrewd enough to know how sensitive China policy was. A more likely explanation was that, given the speech already had presidential clearance, it met the basic requirements of the Administration. William Bundy's view is that the speech was only different in tone from Rusk's viewpoint and therefore the Secretary of State would have found the ideas contained within it acceptable.[61] The text was released to the press on December 12 and delivered in San Francisco the following day.

(vi) The Text of the Speech.

The speech itself was carefully crafted and aimed at appearing hard-line enough not to cause upset in the domestic arena too much whilst

simultaneously clearly representing a shift in policy terms. The basic policy position was summed up in the most famous section of the speech:

> We believe ... that policies of strength and firmness, accompanied by a constant readiness to negotiate -- policies long and effectively pursued with the Soviet Union -- will best promote the changes which must take place on the China mainland.[62]

In short, Hilsman was stating that the US was preparing to move away from a policy of total isolation to one of containment as pursued towards the USSR. The other key change in terms of immediate policy attitude towards the PRC was an acceptance that the CCP were now firmly entrenched in power.[63] This clearly repudiated Dulles' view that the PRC was "a passing phase". The US now accepted that if it was to come to terms with the rulers of the Mainland, then that meant coming to terms with the Communists. These changes grew out of the policy debates that had been taking place within the Kennedy Administration since 1961. They found substance in the most conciliatory section of the speech:

> We do not know what changes may occur in the attitudes of future Chinese leaders, but if I may paraphrase a classic canon of our past, we pursue today towards Communist China a policy of the Open Door: We are determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change, and not to slam it shut against any development which might advance our national good, serve the free world, and benefit the people of China.[64]

This statement showed that the US would be prepared to build bridges with the CCP leadership if they were prepared to change their stance.

The other most interesting aspect of the speech is its acceptance of the liberal interpretation of recent Chinese history. Firstly, Hilsman acknowledged that the US and the West in general had failed to understand the collapse of the Confucianist state and the degree to which the Chinese felt humiliated by Western intervention in their country:

> We had little understanding of the ferment and weakness created by the collapse of the Confucian state. And we were little aware of the depth and fervor of Chinese nationalism in reaction to a sense of repeated humiliation at the hands of the West.[65]

For that reason, Hilsman went on to state; the US was unprepared for the rise of the CCP. This view, although simplified, is not far from Fairbank's assessment that Americans failed to understand how humiliated the Chinese were at Western interference. Hilsman avoided directly the issue of the indigenous nature of the CCP but clearly hints that the US must now come to terms with it. However much the US may continue to dislike it: "It is time to take stock - dispassionately - of the greatest and most difficult problem we face in our efforts to assist in the development of a peaceful Far East".[66]

A final aspect of the speech worth noting is the belief of the need for a regional approach and the inclusion of the PRC in that approach. If the US wanted a peaceful Far East and recognised that the communists were firmly established on the Chinese Mainland and that the US shared some responsibility for the unhappy relationship, then it admitted the PRC must play a part in any regional structure that may emerge in the longer term. This is most succinctly put in another important passage of the speech:

> Of course, the paradox of nation building is that the ultimate guarantee of its success lies in the capacity of national leaders to transcend parochial nationalism and to understand the interdependence of all peoples. How to bring peaceful regional cooperation out of conflicting national revolutions - that is the key question. In the Far East that question has a special significance. For the evolution of each Asian state is taking place today under the long shadows cast by China - by the China of history that was for so long the matrix of east Asian civilization, and by the mainland China of today, the torchbearer of a rigid totalitarian ideology that threatens all its neighbors.[67]

In short, Hilsman emphasised the cultural importance of China. This view stemmed directly from Fairbank and his emphasis that Chinese culture must be understood as a means of coming to terms with it. Moreover, no regional policy for the area could survive without Chinese co-operation. This speech, which in many ways was still hard-line, was the most concrete evidence of the returning influence of the liberal academics, such as Fairbank and their disciples, most notably James Thomson. It is not therefore so surprising that Thomson gives the speech and his input into it such prominence amongst his papers, which are to be found at the Kennedy Library in Boston. Of course, this speech failed to note some of the tensions created by this Sino-centric view of East Asian history. Any historian of the area would have noted the lengthy animosity that existed between the Chinese and Vietnamese, which even a shared communist ideology had not extinguished.

(vii) The Reaction to the Speech.

The distribution of the speech was handled by Thomson, who in his choice of recipients, showed a bias to senators and academics that he knew were likely to approve of its contents. To those who were less likely to approve, the emphasis was that policy had not changed. To his friends in the academic profession, Thomson clearly was pushing at an open door and appealing to their already firmly held viewpoints. The evidence of this can most clearly be established by their reactions.

Thomson distributed the speech to twelve Senators who were regarded as most likely to sympathise with its contents and were known for liberal views and an interest in foreign policy. The speech was also sent to one hundred and seventy members of the AAS (with a note from Thomson enclosed in each case) and to those who usually received general information from the State Department.[68] Thomson's careful targeting of sympathetic academics reaped a favourable response that built on the positive response in the nation's press. Of twenty-one US newspaper editorials, fifteen praised the speech; three attacked it for being soft on communism and another three, including the *Washington Post*, criticised it for not going far enough.[69]

The reaction of the academic community was the most positive of all. Reischauer in Tokyo wrote to Thomson praising it as "excellent".[70] Thomson replied pointing out that he was only one of a number of authors but explaining the rationale behind its delivery:

> the speech involves at best a change in posture, not policy; but that

> in itself is significant. Now that we have talked dispassionately about China without having the roof fall in, we will have the courage to talk a great deal more about China.[71]

A. Doak Barnett wrote to Thomson saying that: "I am delighted that some of the ideas that have been current within (the) State (Department) for some years have been publicly articulated".[72] Kenneth Scott Latourette of Yale described the speech "as a miracle" whilst Karl Pringsheim of the University of Chicago called it "sane, sound and reasonable".[73] John Kenneth Galbraith, whom although not a China academic nevertheless was linked to the liberal academic community, described it as a "great speech".[74] In total the State Department received fifty letters praising the speech, mainly from academics working on East Asia and China, and only eight criticising it.[75] From this reaction alone one can surmise that these views enjoyed the support of a substantial section of the academics working on the region. Thomson also sent a copy to Bowles in New Delhi writing that "it is the first effort since the days of Parsons to articulate the policies that we have been pursuing on a pragmatic basis since early 1961".[76] Thomson also emphasised to his former boss that it did not mean that the US was "going soft" on the PRC: "We are merely being rational, firm, and patient -- as befits a great power!"[77]

Amongst the Senators who received the speech, the most outspoken in its favour was George McGovern of South Dakota, himself an academic historian, who had come into contact with many of the ideas contained within it whilst in the Administration. McGovern talked of:

> my growing belief that we cannot continue on the rather sterile

> course which we are now following with reference to mainland China. I hope that Mr Hilsman's statement ... is an indication of growing consideration of possible alternatives to our present China policy.[78]

This type of comment from a Senator would have been unheard of even in 1961 and is evidence that the shift towards a new policy had begun and that Hilsman and Thomson had correctly judged the national mood in making public that policy was under review. Also notable was the muted reaction of the Committee of One Million. They released an elaborate statement which condemned it but not in the extravagant terms that they had been used to dealing with those daring enough to advocate relaxing policy with the PRC in the past.[79]

(viii) The December Speech: Conclusions.

Given the time and effort that men like Hilsman and Thomson put into the speech and their obvious satisfaction with the outcome, what was the overall affect of it and where should it be placed in the overall development of policy towards the PRC? Moreover, what does it tell us about Kennedy's policy towards the mainland Chinese Government? Seymour Topping writing in the *New York Times*, in February 1964 stated: `While Mr. Hilsman's speech did not represent a change in United States policy, it was widely interpreted as an effort to prepare the ground for the adoption of a more flexible attitude".[80] Topping neatly identifies the two features and purposes of the speech: to clarify the existing position of the US Government; and to ensure that publicly it is noted that

the US is now prepared to change its policy and to respond to any initiatives from the Chinese.[81] Moreover, it was part of a process, pushed by Hilsman and Thomson, to get China policy placed on the agenda and to set off a wider debate, already taking place within the academic community, about how China policy should develop. It can be argued that this speech represented a turning point whereby mainstream politicians and government officers could support, if they wanted to, altering policy towards the PRC without fear of being subject to vilification from the China Lobby. From now on that debate and the pressure for change would grow stronger and even academics that had remained silent in years previous began to find their voice. Finally, it suggested that Kennedy probably approved the stance taken by Hilsman knowing that such a debate would strengthen his room for manoeuvre and that he could disown it if necessary. In conclusion, the speech represented the first signs that the hard work by men like Hilsman and Thomson was beginning to pay off. It also signalled that the national mood was beginning to alter to the extent that they were now able to express their opinions more openly. Certainly, they must have felt optimistic as 1963 drew to a close, that the policy debate was moving in their favour and that Lyndon Johnson might be prepared to carry out the promises that Hilsman felt he had received from Kennedy.

Hilsman waited a couple of weeks and then in conjunction with a couple of close associates of the new President, Walter Jenkins and Tom Hughes, set about finding out what Lyndon Johnson thought of the speech. According to Jenkins the response was: "On the whole, very

good".[82] Nevertheless, Hilsman backed out of making any more moves on China policy, possibly fearing the likely reaction, and in March he was sacked. His rationalisation later was,

> my feelings would be that you don't want any grand initiatives in foreign policy in the period when the new President has got to get his hands on the reins. The time to do that would have been after the 1964 election.[83]

A couple of years later in the summer of 1966, he got a call from the White House saying that Johnson had taken up his ideas but by that time the domestic and international circumstances had altered dramatically.[84]

(ix) Conclusions.

The first issue that must be assessed is the precise nature of Kennedy's policy towards the People's Republic of China. Clearly, it was governed mainly by a combination of caution and pragmatism. Central to that was the belief that the Chinese were unwilling to accept any overtures from his Administration and that domestically the criticism that a likely change of stance might generate was not worth the risk. This understandable caution ensured that Kennedy gave very little thought to any early substantial change in US policy. All of this was underpinned by Kennedy's instinctive anti-communism and his belief (shared by his aides) that China was the more extreme of the two communist superpowers. Within that context, it is therefore not surprising that Kennedy did not entertain the suggestions propagated by men like Chester Bowles. By 1963 faced with the onset of Chinese nuclear development, the growing

Sino-Soviet split, and his improving domestic position, helped by his popular stand over Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, Kennedy was given more room to manoeuvre and more need to do so. His reaction to Chinese nuclear development was horror to such an extent that he allowed Harriman to approach Khrushchev with a view to some form of tacit agreement between the two on the subject. It was a combination of Khrushchev's disinterest in such an arrangement, and CIA and other Administration assessments that the Chinese were likely to remain cautious even with nuclear weapons, that made him back away from that position. It was then that a second track emerged which involved Harriman and to a greater extent Roger Hilsman. Hilsman was given the green light to reassess policy and to lay the groundwork for possible policy alterations in a second Kennedy term. To that end, he set up a new Office of Communist Affairs; put a set of innovative proposals forward and in December 1963, despite his patron's death, made a keynote speech on the subject. Hilsman was influenced by the Sino-Soviet split and hoped to move China policy towards a more dispassionate and flexible viewpoint that he felt was being followed by Kennedy towards the Soviet Union. To Hilsman the split gave the US the chance to build a new relationship with both superpowers based on Realpolitik not rigid ideology. Kennedy's death has robbed the historian of a definitive answer as to how far he would have followed that stance had he remained alive and won re-election. His instinctive caution would certainly have acted to limit his flexibility. Moreover, just as with Johnson, Vietnam would have played an ever-greater role in his thoughts and

would have impinged on his attitude towards the Communist Chinese. However, Kennedy had shown considerable flexibility and was willing to give men like Hilsman leeway in pursuit of their ideas. Ultimately, the jury is out on whether or not Kennedy might have conducted a different policy than his successor, but he certainly showed more flexibility and was willing to engage with these ideas in a way that Johnson would not until they were forced on him in 1966.

The key issue would however be the Republic of China/Taiwan. In October 1963, Zhou En-lai was interviewed by Reuters and amongst the questions was one concerning Sino-American relations. Zhou responded that the failure to reach agreement between the two turned on one issue: "Would the United States agree in principle to withdraw its armed forces from the Taiwan Strait and remove its armed threats"?[85] From the Chinese perspective Taiwan remained the key issue and only when the US was prepared to start to be flexible on that, as Nixon was, would the possibility of an improvement in Sino-American relations be likely. If Kennedy had been prepared to make concessions in that arena he might have stood a chance of changing the hostile relationship between the two. The likelihood is that he would not have, given the domestic circumstances, and because in 1963 even Hilsman and Thomson were not openly advocating a change in attitude, to an extent acceptable to the PRC, towards Jiang's regime on the island. The conclusion based on probabilities is that Kennedy might have been more flexible but that the circumstances would still have not been right for the major shift that Nixon brought about.

A second area concerning Kennedy's approach that must be considered is the influence of academics on policy, especially the liberal ones identified in the second chapter. Here the difference with Eisenhower is marked. Whereas the academics were almost totally excluded in the fifties, under Kennedy they began to regain influence within governmental circles. A key ally of theirs, Chester Bowles was appointed Undersecretary of State and he appointed James Thomson as his Special Assistant. Reischauer became Ambassador to Japan and during the next three years even Fairbank was invited to Washington to confer with governmental officers (something which would have been unheard of under Eisenhower).[86] Bowles was also able to begin to remove hard-liners like Parsons and replace them with officers more amenable to a more flexible view of the PRC. In 1963, Roger Hilsman another academic, became a key player on China policy. The crucial individual at the centre of all of this was Thomson. He retained contact with these academics whilst simultaneously working to promote a new policy within the Administration. The nearest his ideas, and those of his friends and allies in the academic community, came to being put into practice was the December 1963 speech, which was generally applauded. Thomson would look back feeling that a basis for change had been achieved but little more.[87] However, it can be argued that a decisive shift in attitude took place and that the academics that worked within the Administration were vital in achieving that.

The final question must be: how can the Kennedy period be placed in the overall consideration of the precise nature of the domestic roots of

Nixon's opening to China? This thesis would argue that the Kennedy period represented a vital shift away from the Truman/Eisenhower policy of total isolation and that it represented the beginning of an evolving consensus, which by 1969 would give Nixon the freedom to manoeuvre. By the end of 1963, the constraints on the Administration were still too great and the academics that promoted change still too cautious. Within a couple of years that caution would have largely evaporated.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE REAL QUESTION

(i) Introduction.

The death of John Kennedy deprived those within the Administration who had wanted to reform China policy of their patron. They now faced a new President who had had no involvement with the subtleties and loose ends that had characterised the later parts of the Kennedy outlook.[1] The bridgehead that had been built by December 1963 therefore would have to be reconstructed in terms acceptable to a new man. As things turned out, in the short term at least, those who wanted to reform policy faced an uphill struggle of an otherwise occupied President and a deeply hostile Secretary of State. However, by 1964 the view that China policy should be reformed was beginning to emerge within the public arena. In the period between 1960 and 1963, men like Thomson had enjoyed significant support for their ideas within the Administration, but had feared the public reaction to what they were proposing. In 1964, their influence within government diminished, but they began to see signs of public support for changing China policy. Throughout 1964 and 1965 they continued to promote reform within government, but although they were stifled internally, publicly, support was beginning to grow. The growing consensus that had enveloped the academic community by 1960 and the China experts in the State Department by 1963 was beginning to find expression in the public domain in 1964.[2] This chapter charts the period between Kennedy's assassination and 1966 when it can be argued that the public clamour led by China intellectuals reached the point whereby the Johnson Administration felt it could not ignore it any longer.

(ii) Lyndon Johnson.

On November 22, 1963, as a result of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the presidency passed to Lyndon Baines Johnson. A formidable political operator from the Pedernales in Central Texas, Johnson had been a successful Senate Majority Leader before becoming Vice-President. A man not accustomed to being second to others, he had detested being Vice-President and had had a difficult relationship with amongst others Robert Kennedy. Johnson had a very different character and style to his predecessor. Earthy and blunt, he felt uneasy and distrusted the academics and socialites with whom Kennedy had surrounded himself. Moreover, his background had been in domestic policy rather than foreign affairs. The sureness of touch and confidence with which he handled issues such as his famous "War on Poverty" and civil rights in the South deserted him when dealing with foreign policy.

This was not helped by his attachment to certain fixed ideas about foreign affairs. These included a lesson from the Munich Agreement of 1938 that all foreign leaders engaged in armed aggression should be faced down otherwise they would continue to threaten others until they directly challenged US interests. This reading of Munich had been prevalent since World War II but its most disastrous application was in Vietnam during the 1960s. Johnson's refusal to countenance the argument that Vietnam might be a civil conflict partially explained the disastrous US commitment and its failure to cut its losses even when it was clear that the US would be unable to achieve its objectives.

Although this reading of the Munich Agreement was common amongst US policy elites, it is important to note that Johnson was particularly intransigent when faced with the obvious differences between the challenge offered by Hitler in the 1930s and Ho Chi Minh in the 60s. Although the US involvement in Vietnam grew out of a generation of US policy thinking, nevertheless it had Johnson's stamp on it: it was his war.[3]

Another fixed concept that the President held was the belief that American values of hard work and the importance of economic development could be universally transferred to other parts of the world no matter what the circumstances. He believed that all peoples of all nations shared common aims. Again, he would discover that the world was a far more complex place. Ironically, this transfer of aims would account for his development of a benign view of the Chinese wanting peaceful economic development.[4]

A final factor that influenced Johnson's thinking was his reading of the CCP take-over of China in 1949. He believed that the affect of the so-called fall of China in 1949 on the American domestic scene was so profound and traumatic that it had made it impossible for President Truman to properly lead the nation. The lesson for him was that defeat in Vietnam would destroy his cherished domestic programmes and warp other foreign policy areas or initiatives that he might wish to undertake. In short, very quickly all foreign policy became subservient to Vietnam policy. That led to a situation whereby all other foreign policy issues became secondary to the war and its successful prosecution.[5] It became almost impossible to shake the Johnson Administration out of this

assumption.

Johnson also came to rely more heavily on his key advisers whom he had inherited from his predecessor. These included Dean Rusk as Secretary of State; Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense; McGeorge Bundy as National Security Adviser and, his successor from 1966, economist Walt Rostow. In spite of his hostility towards intellectuals, whom he associated with Harvard and the Kennedy family, Johnson relied heavily on certain academics inherited from his predecessor throughout his Administration.[6]

This heady brew of a president lacking in foreign policy knowledge; with fixed ideological concepts; reliant on relatively few advisers and mistrusting academics and State Department Officers laid the basis for the disaster that befell the Administration in Vietnam. It also explained the protracted debates and delays in reflection on China policy.

(iii) China Policy

The steps taken to reform China policy in the last few months of the Kennedy Administration, leading to the Hilsman speech of December 1963, came to an end in March 1964. First, Roger Hilsman was sacked from his post as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.[7] Hilsman had made numerous enemies and as soon as Rusk felt comfortable in his improved relationship with the new President, he moved against the Kennedy confidant. Hilsman's replacement was William Bundy, brother of National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, and a hard-line anticommunist. Second, Harriman was removed from all

influence on China and Vietnam policy and given special responsibility for African affairs.[8] In short, Rusk with Johnson's blessing had, in one swoop, removed the influence of the group that had surrounded Harriman: the group that had wanted to moderate and alter policy towards the PRC. Johnson mistrusted Harriman being especially wary of his relationship with Robert Kennedy.[9]

As a consequence during 1964, policy towards the PRC hardened. William Bundy in his memoirs stored in the Johnson library states that "there was no conscious change in policy or assessment concerning China" after he took office.[10] However, he admits that there was: "No question, however, that the Administration judgement of China did tend to harden somewhat".[11] In September, Bundy put his views on China policy forward, which served as a corrective to the views, expressed by his predecessor nine months beforehand:

> So long as Peiping, as well as Hanoi and Pyongyang, continues on their present course, I see no basic change in United States Policy toward mainland China. It is inconceivable to me that, at a time when Communist China is stridently proclaiming a militant revolutionary thesis and bearing out its threats with actions that undermine the security of nations both in Asia and Africa and even in the Americas, we should relax our guard. It remains that first requirement of our policy to help maintain adequate free-world military strength in order to deter aggression or, where aggression or threats to the peace occur, to be able to cope with such threats effectively.[12]

The extreme language of this speech, which taken to its logical conclusion might even include war with the Chinese, reflected a return to the hard-line stance of the Eisenhower years. There were some accentuating factors that might have accounted for this shift. The US Presidential election was a matter of weeks away. The Republican candidate Barry Goldwater was adopting a hard-line anticommunist line. This would not be the time for a Democratic Administration and Presidential candidate to appear to be going soft on the Communist Chinese. Moreover, the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, where the North Vietnamese were alleged to have fired at US vessels heightened the anticommunist mood in the US.[13] Finally, the Chinese were about to explode a nuclear device. The US would not want to appear to be caving in any form of nuclear blackmail or appearing weak at such a moment. Nevertheless, Bundy's rhetoric represented a significant shift.

The Administration, in its consideration of the new nuclear threat returned to the hard-line perspective associated with Kennedy in the early part of 1963. On September 15, 1964 Johnson met with Rusk, McNamara, McCone and McGeorge Bundy to discuss the forthcoming Chinese nuclear tests. The mood was one of extreme hostility towards this and once again discussions turned to the possibility of a pact with the Soviet Union that might include an attack on the PRC. It was agreed that Rusk would meet with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington Dobrynin to feel out Soviet intentions.[14]

Related to these moves directly with the PRC was the Administration's growing involvement in Vietnam, where it was defending the Government

of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) against the guerilla activities of the Vietcong, who were supported by the Communist north. Kennedy had always separated Vietnam policy from China and Soviet policy. He saw a global ideological competition taking place in the Third World between the two superpowers of which Vietnam was an example. Kennedy relied on counter-insurgency experts who believed that the war in Vietnam, which was primarily civil in nature, could be one with US advisers training and supporting the ARVN (South Vietnamese Army) and the US supplying weaponry to the South.[15] By 1964, the situation had worsened considerably with the South in turmoil and clearly losing the battle to the Vietcong. In August 1964, after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, a resolution was passed by both Houses of Congress giving Johnson powers to pursue, what was in effect war, in Vietnam. The Johnson Administration believed that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were being backed by the Chinese and that any defeat for the South might encourage any expansionist aims that Mao and the Communists in Beijing might have.[16] Moreover, Johnson was haunted by the fate of Truman and Acheson in the late 1940s. The fall of China had set off the McCarthyite storm, which had decimated Truman's Administration. Johnson believed that the fall of South Vietnam would precipitate another similar storm. These fears helped harden his view of policy towards the PRC and in the short term made him unwilling to countenance any reflection on policy. Ironically, Johnson's fears of Chinese intervention to protect her southern neighbour placed limitations on the US bombing campaign against North Vietnam, which Johnson launched in March

1965.[17]

This specific fear of Chinese influence in Vietnam was part of a general fear that the US had of a general increase and extension of Chinese power and prestige. The explosion of the nuclear device, the growth of the Chinese economy and its recovery from the famine of 1961-2, and the Sino-Soviet split, all concerned policy makers in Washington.[18] Ideologically, the US feared that the Chinese might emerge as a key influence on Afro-Asian countries on the basis of colour. In short, China was a major world power that was non-white yet had successfully competed with the West and had entered the nuclear club on its own terms and against the wishes of both the United States and the Soviet Union. William Bundy recalls that the US feared Chinese intervention and influence in North Korea, Southeast Asia especially Indonesia and as a result of the Sino-Pakistani alliance even in South Asia.[19] In short, when added to the war in Vietnam, the US believed that the Chinese were now intent on establishing themselves as the dominant power in the region. Bundy condemned this extension of influence as "an active and opportunistic policy, which by the fall of 1964 had achieved quite a lot and gave promises of achieving a great deal more".[20] It is not surprising given this, that the US began to see the Chinese in 1964 as its major rival in Asia instead of the Soviet Union.

The final factor was Dean Rusk. Rusk became a far more powerful figure in the Johnson Administration than he had been under Kennedy.[21] Lyndon Johnson respected and liked his fellow southerner. Rusk was vehemently opposed to changing policy towards the PRC. He believed

that the Chinese were not interested in the series of small steps that men like Thomson and Hilsman were proposing. In fact as he later argued many of these ideas had been put to the Chinese at the Warsaw talks and had been rejected by them.[22] In 1970 he argued his case succinctly in an Oral History interview recorded for the Johnson Library:

> We, in our talks in Warsaw, took various steps to try to improve relations with Peking. We repeated the effort made by the Eisenhower Administration to bring about an exchange of newspapermen. We proposed the exchange of scientists, scholars, of professional men - - doctors. We proposed the exchange of weather information. We proposed the exchange of basic plant materials in the basic food crops such as rice and wheat, things of that sort, but we got nowhere with it because Peking always came back with the answer that there was nothing to discuss until we are ready to surrender Taiwan ... They insist that Taiwan, sometimes known as Formosa, is a part of China - - their China. They don't recognize that China split in a civil war and that the Republic of China on Taiwan has an existence of its own.[23]

All of this is accurate. It also explains Rusk's hard-line position. He knew that the Chinese would never accept these proposed compromises without a shift by the US on its protection for Jiang. He was never prepared to accept that shift. Ironically, the liberals like Thomson had always felt uncomfortable with supporting Jiang, but tended to support the concept of two Chinas, whilst hoping a more palatable administration

might emerge on Taiwan.

Rusk had a particularly harsh view of Chinese rhetoric, which he reciprocated in his own statements. This included comparing Mao to Adolf Hitler and Lin Biao's famous doctrine of "Long Live the People's War" to Mein Kampf.[24] Lin Biao's statement is interesting in that whilst it called for communist insurrection and the seizing of the cities by the countryside, it ruled out Chinese assistance in accomplishing it.[25] A more subtle reading by Rusk might have altered his perspective.

Rusk by both his actions and viewpoints prevented a more substantial review of policy towards the People's Republic of China. Thomson recalls a conversation with McGeorge Bundy when the latter said of Johnson and China:

> Frankly, this President will never move on such a sensitive issue as China, unless advised emphatically to do so by the constitutionally designated chief advisor in foreign affairs, the Secretary of State, and frankly, this Secretary of State will never advise him so to do, and that's the way it is.[26]

It could be argued that Rusk was more receptive to alternative views on China policy but accepted the decisions of his two Presidents; Kennedy and Johnson. For example, the historian Warren Cohen has argues this in a biography of the Secretary of State. Cohen does accept that his view hardened in the mid-1960s but believes that he was always more moderate than historians do and colleagues have portrayed him.[27] This perspective ignores Rusk's opposition to those advocating a moderate course and the fact that he never went beyond the cold war

mindset of the 1940s. Clearly, failing to go beyond that mindset was a common failing in the Johnson Administration, which ultimately manifested in the disasters unleashed on Vietnam. However, on China policy and especially Taiwan other Cold War warriors like Nixon were prepared to alter their thinking. This was never the case with Dean Rusk. That is not to deny the legitimacy of Rusk's viewpoint on Taiwan. Jiang's regime had been an ally of the US by this point for over thirty years and the links between the two were extensive.

Another defence of Rusk was that he was typical of the thinking of the era. But he never opened himself to the more reasonable arguments put forward by men like Harriman and Hilsman and the influence of those ideas withered after the death of Kennedy who was more flexible in his thinking. That is not to underplay Johnson's role. The President listened to few people in 1964 and 1965 on China policy and Rusk merely reinforced opinions he already held. Again, this process was repeated on Vietnam. Ultimately, Johnson who was a formidable politician held the reins of power and must be held accountable for their shortcomings. Leonard Kusnitz is more persuasive when he argues that Rusk acted as a brake on all discussions on China policy. For example, he notes that Johnson came round to supporting "two Chinas" in 1966 yet Rusk prevented him from putting those ideas into practice.[28]

In conclusion, at the upper echelons of the Johnson Administration a number of factors converged to destroy the liberals' attempts to change policy within the government. Firstly, the influence of Dean Rusk. This included sacking Hilsman and removing Harriman from a position of

influence. Second, Vietnam, which diverted the Administration, as well as making it even more apprehensive about reforming China policy. Third, the Chinese acquisition of a nuclear capability which in the short term alarmed the United States and finally, the presence in the White House of a man who was hesitant when dealing with foreign affairs preferring to concentrate on domestic reforms.

(iv) The Continuing shift within Government.

Although, reform of policy was halted in the early months of 1964, that did not alter the perspective of men like James Thomson and others who continued to use their positions deep within the government to argue for change. Their influence had certainly diminished. But that did not stop them from continuing to try and in December 1965 they claimed another minor victory when the US agreed to relax some of its travel restrictions on Americans wishing to visit the Chinese mainland.

In July 1964, after the departure of Hilsman, Thomson was transferred to the NSC where he worked for McGeorge Bundy. Before moving across from the State Department, Thomson had been alarmed by Bundy's influence on President Kennedy believing that he represented a conservative influence on a potentially liberal leader.[29] However, once there Thomson developed an attachment to his new departmental boss and began to write an incessant flow of memos where he outlined his ideas on China policy.[30] These ideas were essentially the same policy alterations that he had been recommending since 1961. An example of these memos was one sent on October 28, 1964 to Bundy outlining what

he believed policy should be towards the PRC during the next four years of Johnson's presidency.[31] Thomson was convinced that the Chinese would enter the UN and participate in nuclear negotiations between the superpowers. To adapt to these predictions (erroneous as it turned out) he recommended that the US should, de facto, recognise the PRC, remove travel restrictions and increase trade with the PRC and support two Chinas in the United Nations.[32] Thomson concluded that

> we should move toward moving treating the Chinese much as we treat the Russians: an appropriately tough response wherever or whenever they seriously cause us harm; but otherwise, a groping toward coexistence on the basis of self-interest.[33]

Thomson continued throughout 1964 and 1965 to put forward suggestions for possible small policy steps that the US could take to open a relationship with the PRC. For example, in November 1965, he had lunch with William Bundy where he once again advocated a policy of "two Chinas" for the United Nations and in the same month tried to get the US, at the Warsaw talks, to invite Chinese newsmen to tour the United States.[34] His viewpoint retained substantial support amongst serving officers within the State Department and NSC. These included Lindsey Grant, Marshall Green, Robert Komer and to a lesser extent Averell Harriman. For example, in November 1964, Robert Komer outlined in a memo to McGeorge Bundy his view on the future of China policy:

> Most people agree that, after 15 years of sustaining a rigid policy against Peking (and rather successfully at that), the erosion of our position is forcing us to take a different tack ... We want to retreat

> gracefully from an increasingly isolated position toward a stance which puts the onus for continued friction more on Peiping and less on us. In effect, we want to make our ChiCom policy more like that toward the USSR - - tough where they push us but flexible where there's something to be gained, if only in terms of willingness to talk ... So the real question is no longer whether to disengage from the more rigid aspects of our China policy but how and when.[35]

Komer went on to argue that Johnson's massive election victory had given his room for manoeuvre and the Chinese acquisition of a nuclear capability necessitated that the US seek dialogue with the PRC.[36]

In November 1964, Marshall Green made his continuing support for reform clear. In a memo to Harriman he gave details of a speech that Hilsman was intending to give in San Francisco. Hilsman was going to argue for Chinese participation in nuclear disarmament talks in Geneva, lifting restrictions on travel to the mainland, review of trade policy towards the PRC and US recognition of Outer Mongolia. Green, writing about these proposals, concluded that: "I personally agree with at least three of the above policy lines which, you will recall, we considered very actively last fall".[37]

However, Lindsey Grant provided the most interesting angle of all. Grant who was the Officer in charge of Communist China in the Asian Communist Affairs Department shared many of the views of the others but had concluded that a policy of "two Chinas" was wrong for the reason that neither Beijing or Taipei would find it acceptable. Moreover, Grant was specific in identifying a positive policy towards the Chinese as

helping to fracture the Communist bloc still further. In a memo dated March 18, 1965, Grant outlined his perspective. He believed that the conflict in Vietnam and the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia prevented any immediate moves towards changing policy.[38] However, in the medium term Grant felt that changes to policy such as removing restrictions on travel to China and recognising Mongolia "are demonstrably justifiable in the pursuit of a positive policy".[39] On travel, Grant wrote that: "I believe that a general removal of travel restrictions would do more good than harm, even in the present context".[40] He was more specific about the need to allow the PRC into the United Nations believing that their entry was inevitable. US efforts, argued Grant, should focus on protecting the Republic of China against PRC efforts to expel it from the organisation: "Even in defeat, one would win considerably more sympathy fighting for the representational rights of a "small nation" than in fighting against the representation of a large one".[41] He went on to argue that:

> The effort to exclude the ChiComs is at cross purposes with our purpose to promote the flow of ideas into Communist China. The old arguments are decreasingly valid. Keeping them out no longer effectively isolates them; and they are hardly likely to do much harm to a peace-keeping machinery which is increasingly circumscribed by other factors, anyway.[42]

Grant went onto to challenge the whole concept of "Two Chinas". Although he did not favour recognition of the PRC or support for their claims to Taiwan he did feel that the US should benefit from a change of

approach to the whole issue.

> I would have us recognize more explicitly that there are competing claimants to power in China ... We have stated the presumption that treaties with the GRC are not applicable to the mainland, and have long ago recognized the juridical entity of Communist China ... It is a small step to say that we recognize them de facto ... We should carefully avoid any indication that the United States Government supports or favours the division of China. (I think of nothing better calculated permanently to sour our relations with both claimants.) It is this feature which separates this line from "two Chinas", and leads me to promote the phrase: "contending claimants" (emphasis in original).[43]

This new emphasis on contending claimants represented another small step towards the position taken by Richard Nixon in February 1972 when he emphasised that Taiwan was an internal matter and that there was only one China.[44] Grant was clearly taking a different stance to that of Dean Rusk, who saw the disagreement over the status of Taiwan as a fundamental block to any alteration in US attitudes towards the PRC. Grant had come to understand that the US would have to find a way of watering down its commitment to Taiwan as an individual state whilst retaining formal support for Jiang and opposition to any Chinese military take-over of the island. This position represented a firmer desire on the part of US policy makers to disentangle themselves from Jiang. They were of course aided by the decline in influence of the China Lobby. As the China Lobby became less feared, academics and US policy makers

began to challenge openly US support for Jiang.[45]

By 1965, it was becoming clear that the ideas put forward by Roger Hilsman and supported in the lower reaches of the US Government had little chance of gaining currency from the President or Secretary of State. In fact they tended to generate little formal response. The men associated with these policies began to leave the Administration. In July 1965, Marshall Green took up the post as US Ambassador to Indonesia. In a Memo to Chester Cooper and Thomson, Green made his disappointment clear: "A personal disappointment in leaving FE after almost two years has been our inability over that period of time to strengthen and modernize our China policy. "[46] More dramatic was the view reached by Lindsey Grant before his departure from the State Department in 1966. Grant did not formally state his views but State Department aide Dave Osborn wrote a valedictory memorandum.[47] Grant was reported as arguing that the US should only be prepared to protect Taiwan from "unprovoked attack from outside" (emphasis in original).[48] The memo went on to state that the US should issue a declaration stating that at the moment there were two governments of China. However, the declaration should go on to say that Taiwan is part of China and the US hoped for a peaceful solution to the conflict based upon the will of the majority of Chinese. This declaration would then state that it hoped that both Chinas "will have cultural, diplomatic and economic relations with all other countries and participate in the international community".[49] The final clause of this proposed US declaration would state that the US:

> Calls on all other governments to declare in similar terms their support for the integrity of China; for the ultimate peaceful resolution, in accordance with the wishes of the Chinese people, of the differences between the two Chinese governments; and for the removal, pending such peaceful resolution, of artificial barriers to the conduct of diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations between the nation of China and the other nations of the world.[50]

Given US policy towards the PRC since 1949, this statement showed the extent to which the debate was now moving in favour of men like Thomson. By 1966, the consensus on China policy had begun to move to such an extent that a US State Department official could advocate the virtual ending of US support for Jiang. Whereas the Eisenhower era had seen the US support Jiang and the Guomindang and its claims on the Mainland, the officers of this era were taking a minimalistic view based on solely defending him from an unprovoked attack. Moreover, anybody arguing for an internal solution to the dispute between Beijing and Taipei knew that this would mean the Chinese Communists claiming Taiwan. Jiang had neither the support on the mainland nor the power to challenge any alternative to a communist take-over. In short, US policy makers who in 1963 had been prepared to advocate a series of small steps were now prepared to question the one issue which prevented a Sino-American détente: Taiwan. The impetus for this change did not come from the President or a Secretary of State who was deeply hostile to any lessening of the American commitment to the Jiang regime. It came from the public debate that was now swirling around the issue and from the set of

assumptions that US Government officials had inculcated from their study of the China issue, especially their study under academics who held the liberal view that Jiang had never been an acceptable ally. After all, if one accepted the liberal perspective and knew that the CCP were unprepared to alter its relations with the US without movement on the issue of Taiwan, then there was little reason to want to maintain the status quo on that basis. Put bluntly, as the liberal view of China began to regain strength then the US commitment to Jiang was always likely to be challenged. That such a debate was taking place within the State Department was evidence of how the consensus was moving towards a détente with the PRC and how Taiwan was no longer the stumbling block it had hitherto been. That shift was evidence of the subtle interconnection that existed between US governmental policy consideration and the public arena including academics writing about individual areas of policy and business, political and other leaders and opinion formers trying to influence and alter policy. The reason for the boldness of men like Thomson, Green and Grant could not be located higher up in the echelons of the government because Johnson and Rusk were notably more intransigent then Kennedy. The reasons were located elsewhere.

(v) Travel Policy

The one alteration in China policy was a relaxation of some of the restrictions that had prevented US citizens travelling to the mainland. Relaxing the travel restrictions had been discussed in the winter of 1965

at one of the famous "Tuesday Luncheons", where Johnson would meet with his most trusted aides and thrash out foreign policy issues.[51] On that occasion, Johnson had decided against changing policy. The issue was again discussed at a NSC meeting in June.[52] However, it was the intervention of Dr Paul Dudley White that spurred the Administration into taking action. White, a world famous heart specialist, counted amongst his patients Dwight Eisenhower. The President of the Chinese Academy of Medicine had invited him in July 1962 for a visit that had been scheduled for the spring of 1963, and although the US State Department had approved his visa, the Chinese had withdrawn the offer.[53] In the summer of 1965, he wrote to Johnson offering his services to try to unlock the stalemate between the US and the PRC.[54] At this point, the US only allowed three categories of Americans to travel to the Chinese mainland: authorized news correspondents; families of the four Americans held prison in China and what was termed "special cases" (the status under which Dr White had been approved). In August, McGeorge Bundy put a suggestion to Johnson that it might be a good idea for the Administration to change the policy in response to an appeal from White, whom it was believed the Republicans would find it harder to attack.[55] Bundy believed that three more categories should be introduced to cover people with expertise in medicine, education and general welfare.[56] The State Department Far East officers also supported the proposed change although they added that: "We doubt very strongly that the Chinese will admit any Americans in the new categories. Nevertheless, we think it is an excellent step towards improving our public posture".[57] In early

September, Johnson approved the move but what Thomson described as a "holding operation" by Rusk "and a few others" held back an announcement until December 31, 1965.[58] When the step was announced it was made clear that it had been done at the express suggestion of White so as "to drape it in the cloak of respectability for Republican consumption".[59] In March 1966, the Administration announced a further relaxation in travel restrictions and by November 1966 a governmental interagency working group set up to look into China policy was recommending the removal of all of the remaining restrictions.[60]

These changes were another example of the slight affect that internally men like Thomson could have. Moreover, it also showed that outside pressure could be used to make the Johnson Administration make alterations to its China policy. Finally, it showed that Johnson could be convinced of the need for change if he felt that it would not engender a public outcry and might make communication between the two nations possible.

(vi) The Interagency China Country Committee.

The other area in which the Johnson Administration moved in 1965 was in the setting up of a long-range study into China policy headed by Joseph Yager who worked in the Policy Planning Council of the State Department.[61] Yager, who had served as a Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Taipei, was regarded by Thomson as "well informed" but "conservative" in his views.[62] Yager saw the study as an opportunity

to push for the setting up of a major interagency China Country Committee made up of officers from the Departments of State and Defense, who could continually look at major areas of policy and possible conflict with China.[63]

(vii) Conclusions.

On December 31, 1965 the State Department announced the first relaxation of travel restrictions to the PRC. Dealing only with medical experts, it seemed a minor change and was generally welcomed. For James Thomson, it was another tiny step that he had been pushing for since he had first entered the US Government in 1961. However, he was exhausted from his efforts and had begun to develop serious doubts about US policy in Vietnam.[64] Nevertheless, he remained hopeful that in 1966 a breakthrough might be achieved.[65] The period between December 1963 and December 1965 had seen the cause of these reformers stifled. Johnson, in the short term, had stepped away from the subtleties of the Kennedy approach and had relied more heavily on the intransigent Rusk and had believed that the conflict in Vietnam prevented any major consideration of China policy.

CHAPTER SIX: The Context.

(i) Introduction

Foreign policy is not conducted hermetically, free of outside influences. A range of concepts and perceptions affect the decision process and those involved in policy making as well as the relationships between the individuals themselves. This was true of all US foreign policy including that towards the People's Republic of China. In this chapter, those influences will be identified and their importance assessed. From that analysis an understanding of the decision making in the later Johnson years and of the more radical policies pursued by his successor, Richard Nixon, can be put forward. Those influences will be divided into five broad categories: US academics, whose attitudes have already been considered; other domestic opinion including business and general public opinion; US policy towards the Soviet Union; the war in Vietnam and finally the People's Republic of China itself. That is not to say that there were not other influences but they were tangential in the early 1960s and remained secondary even when Nixon took office.

(ii) Academics

The Kennedy administration brought about a change of thinking on China policy. This change affected the academic community especially the more liberal members of that community such as Fairbank and Reischauer. Kennedy appointed a number of Harvard academics to his administration such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr and McGeorge Bundy who got jobs within the White House.[1] From the Asia scholars, Thomson was

appointed to the State Department and most significantly of all Edwin Reischauer became Ambassador to Japan. The gulf that had existed between the Harvard scholars working on Asia and the government in the Eisenhower period was bridged by his successor. Moreover, during the Kennedy period their views on policy were sought, as was their support for the initiatives men like Roger Hilsman and Thomson were trying to enact.[2] In short, the relationship between the Kennedy Administration and these academics was fruitful. They supported the election of John F. Kennedy and the general thrust of the policies he was trying to pursue. Later they would support his brother Robert Kennedy in his presidential bid in 1968.[3]

The 1960s also saw a period of rapid growth in the Asia studies field. For example, in 1956 there had been 903 members of the Association of Asian Studies (AAS). By 1968 that figure had risen to 3,752.[4] Similar rises took place in the numbers attending the AAS annual conferences and those subscribing to the AAS journal the *Journal of Asian Studies*.[5] Furthermore, regional subsections of the AAS were set up in New York, New England, in the Midwest and on the Pacific Coast. The development of these subsections reflected both the expansion of the academic discipline as well as the tensions that remained within it.[6]

Those tensions continued to surface at regular intervals. For example, in 1960 it exploded in a bitter dispute in the pages of the *China Quarterly*, a newly formed British journal, which quickly came to be dominated by American academics.[7] Benjamin Schwartz accused another China academic Karl Wittfogel of being "obsessed with the view that Fairbank,

Schwartz and Brandt (an indivisible entity) have committed an "error" (not an accidental error!) which has led to incalculably evil results in our struggle with world communism".[8] In the mid and late 1960s, when the liberal academics began to sway governmental opinion, the conservative and pro-Jiang members of the profession like David Rowe repeatedly attacked the integrity of men like Fairbank and Barnett.[9] However, in the early 1960s the new dynamics of the relationship between government and the China community was only slowly becoming apparent. Fairbank's biographer Peter Evans is closest to the mark when he writes that by the 1960s the conservative grouping around George Taylor and David Rowe "were very much in the minority in the academic community but continued to carry, considerable weight in Washington and in public opinion".[10]

The next question that needs to be considered is how academic views of China developed in the 1960s and how these affected the profession and its relationship with the US government. Initially it is difficult to quantify that influence. However looking at the role of one academic Allen Whiting and both his academic and governmental work can be instructive both as an indicator of the way that academics were influencing policy debates and how their academic study often had policy implications. Also, Whiting is a very good example of a policy academic who works in government as well as interacting with governmental agencies. He was not only an academic but worked within the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations serving as director of the State Department's Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East between

1962 and 1966.[11] Later, in 1969, Whiting acted as an adviser to Nixon and Kissinger about the Sino-Soviet split where he challenged the accepted wisdom that China was the more aggressive power.[12] That is not to claim that Whiting was the most important academic influence on China policy but his career is instructive and he is clearly extremely important.

Undoubtedly, Whiting's *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to enter the Korean War*, which was published in 1960 represented a landmark assessment of the Chinese leadership in Beijing and challenged the assumptions made about them by many conservative commentators.[13] For *China Crosses the Yalu,* Whiting had used his extensive contacts and diplomatic background to gain access to restricted US governmental documents. Moreover, he made extensive use of Chinese public sources.[14] In the book, Whiting challenged the accepted interpretation of why China had decided to enter the Korean War in the summer and autumn of 1950. The traditional viewpoint that had been widespread in the 1950s was that the Chinese entry had been part of a global communist plot emanating from Moscow, which had seen Korea as part of the ideological struggle between the communist and capitalist worlds. For example, this was the view expounded by David Rees in his book *Korea: The Limited War.*[15] This interpretation obviously fitted in with the views of the hard-line anti-Communists such as the China Lobby who were happy to see the CCP portrayed as Soviet pawns. Furthermore, this perspective supported the notion that the communists were expansionist and therefore represented a threat to the security of the

region as well as a challenge to the United States.

Whiting's book challenged that thinking as well as putting forward a far more convincing explanation as to the reason the Chinese had entered the war on the peninsula. Whiting's thesis was so convincing that it would remain virtually unchallenged in historiography on the war until the 1990s.[16] Whiting argued that the Chinese had entered the war not because of ideology or Soviet urging but because they had felt threatened by MacArthur's attempt to unify the peninsula under an anticommunist government.[17] According to Whiting the Chinese had had little or no involvement in the decision to invade the South by the North based government of Kim Il-sung.[18] China, argued Whiting, had felt threatened by US actions to such an extent that they had no alternative but to intervene to protect their own borders. Whiting pointed out that the Chinese had issued a number of warnings that they would not accept UN soldiers marching to the Yalu River, which borders Korea and China.[19] In short, Whiting argued that the Chinese had acted not because of ideology but because the UN/US had threatened essential Chinese interests by attacking the Northern part of Korea just as the Japanese had done half a century earlier.

Academically, Whiting offered a wide-ranging alternative perspective of the reason for the Chinese involvement in the Korean War. His thesis that the Chinese reacted to a strategic threat has become the basis of all academic thinking on the subject. Bruce Cumings in his seminal two-volume work *The Origins of the Korean War* refined it by emphasising the historical ties that existed between China and Korea but accepted that

strategic factors were paramount in the final analysis.[20] In the 1990s, Chen Jian in *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* emphasised Mao's ideological ideas and his belief that Chinese revolutionary fervour could be crucial in a conflict with the imperialist nations represented by the United Nations in Korea.[21] Chen Jian also showed that the Chinese were thinking about a possible intervention much earlier in the war than Whiting allowed for.[22]

Whiting's thesis also had profound political implications in the atmosphere of the early 1960s and the relationship between China academics and the US government. First, was the factor of Whiting's credentials. Steeped in governmental and intelligence contacts, it was impossible for conservative academics like Rowe and Wittfogel to attack him convincingly. Moreover, the range of sources that he was able to call upon gave the book added validity and protection from ideological attack. Related to that was the fact that Whiting was not a liberal academic in the mould of Fairbank, Barnett or Reischauer. Whiting was a realist in the sense that he downplayed the importance of ideology, instead emphasising strategic interests.[23] Ultimately, to attack Whiting's premise would mean challenging the importance of the northern part of Korea to the Chinese.

Secondly, Whiting's thesis challenged the whole premise of US policy towards the People's Republic of China which publicly at least emphasised the ideological stridency of the Beijing regime as well as its supposed subservience to Moscow. Whiting argued that China had entered the war to protect their interests and because of *Realpolitik* not

because of ideology. China's conduct in the war had not been that of an extremist nation but had acted rationally under threat from an ideological enemy invading its neighbour. Whiting made the point in the introduction to the book that one of the key areas he wanted to address was the question of communication between the US and the PRC in a potential conflict situation.[24] By implication, therefore, the current Chinese government could be dealt with because they were not subservient to Moscow and could think and act in their own interests. Perhaps they shared certain strategic concerns, which were understood by the west. Whiting's work was crucial in undermining the intellectual basis of the US foreign policy towards the PRC, which had been followed since the onset of the Korean War.

Finally, Whiting's book was vital because of the powerful lesson it gave political leaders in the 1960s which was that the Chinese were prepared to go to war with the United Nations including the United States to protect its strategic interests. Whiting's thesis emphasised that the Truman Administration had made a terrible error of judgement in allowing MacArthur to go up to the Yalu. In blunt terms the ultimate conclusion was that the US had provoked the Chinese intervention. In the 1960s, as the US was becoming bogged down in another civil war in Asia, the same factors would come into play. To policy makers in the Johnson Administration, of whom Whiting was a minor player, it would be vital not to provoke another Chinese intervention.[25] That implied limiting the scope of military operations in Vietnam and forbidding any invasion of the North. Whiting's thesis suggested communication with and possibly even

acceptance of the PRC. One of the factors that had contributed to the Chinese intervention in Korea had been the American refusal to treat Chinese warnings sufficiently seriously. The best way to avoid a repeat of that would be direct communication between the US and the PRC.

In conclusion, Allen Whiting's book played a tangential but vital role in altering the terms of the debate about how the United States should deal with the People's Republic of China. It modified the accepted establishment viewpoint of the Chinese showing them acting within strategic boundaries that were understood and followed by all of the other major nations of the world. Critics of Whiting, especially Chen Jian, have argued that Whiting's thesis still portrayed the Chinese as reacting to American initiatives and he emphasises the ideological precepts which Mao Zedong was working from which he argues convincingly was also vital in explaining Chinese actions.[26] However, a careful reading of *China Crosses the Yalu* shows that Whiting was aware of that thinking using Mao's writings to identify it. In addition, US academics had no access to Chinese archival sources.[27] In fact the more one goes through the archives and governmental papers the more one comes to understand the intellectual and physical void that existed between the US and the Chinese in this period at least, evidenced most clearly by the different attitudes towards Taiwan.

Allen Whiting was also a key player in the formal research relationship that existed between the government and China academics in his position as Chairman of the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group (FAR) China subcommittee on External Research Priorities. FAR had been set

up by the US Government to co-ordinate government and academic research interests and it was quickly agreed at the first meeting in April 1964 that China was a priority. The meeting approved the creation of "a subcommittee of government China specialists representing the government foreign area research community".[28] The new subcommittee was made up of a range of people from different government departments. Fenton Babcock represented the Central Intelligence Agency. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was represented by Robert Barendsen. Charles Hutchinson of the US Air Force represented the armed forces. The numbers were made up of Thomas Lough and Colonel Kent Parrot of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Kenneth Roberts Jr of the Office of the Secretary of Defense dealing with international security affairs and Joseph Sullivan of the US Information Agency.[29]

Amongst the tasks assigned the new subcommittee by FAR was to "prepare a tentative list of government research needs on Communist China".[30] The Subcommittee held its first meeting in May 1964 where it was agreed to draw up a list of external research topics which would reflect the needs and interests of all the FAR Co-ordination Group agencies engaged in research in China.[31] Whiting had told the April meeting that the government should be prepared to sponsor academic research on China to the benefit of government. As he told the meeting:

> What I am suggesting is that external research focus on researchable areas of inquiry and avoid those areas where our governmental strengths are most evident ... I would like to suggest

> that government-sponsored research avoid contracts for those areas that we do best.[32]

Whiting had had personal experience of engaging in research sponsored by US government agencies. *China Crosses the Yalu* had been written as part of a research programme undertaken by the RAND Corporation for the US Air Force.[33] He did not believe that such sponsored research was anything but appropriate and indeed the Subcommittee wanted to avoid any suggestion that they were trying to affect the research topics being undertaken by academics in the China field. As the minutes of the July 1964 subcommittee meeting stated, the list of topics:

> will represent long-term research needs as seen by government, but which are not likely to be undertaken by government. The private researcher would be free either to take up some of these topics or to reject them and go his own way. The list will be a broad guideline and not a document which could be construed as dictation either to the private community or to government agencies.[34]

Preparing the list of topics was an exhausting process that was not completed until April 1965. As the subcommittee reported:

> In a pioneer effort to determine external research needs on an interagency basis, this survey entailed much more than a poll or compilation of suggestions. A list of suggested topics was but the first step in a continuing series of individual contacts, Subcommittee discussions, refining and redrafting. Past research experiences, the existing literature, on-going and planned research

> within government, the known resources of the private research community, and advances in research methodology had all to be taken into account.[35]

Nevertheless, the subcommittee was satisfied that they had been exhaustive and thorough in their approach: "The statement which emerged is thus a unique document in that for the first time government research specialists have acted in concert to reach agreement on research needs of vital concern to all of government".[36]

The Subcommittee identified four main areas that they hoped researchers would investigate: a detailed study of ethnic groups within China especially in the border areas; an evaluation of educational and scientific materials published in China; a compilation of handbooks on the foreign relations and economic policies of the CCP government and an analysis of the development of science and technology in the PRC.[37] As well as these four main areas the Subcommittee identified fifteen other areas that it was hoped academic researchers might explore.[38] In conclusion the Subcommittee made it clear in their report that they hoped to see a general increase in the amount of research conducted into the People's Republic of China.[39]

Relations between governments and academics has a long and detailed history but when it comes down to identifying specific areas of research then it often brings into question the motives of both groups. On this occasion, it is clear that the US Government required an improvement of its understanding of events on the China mainland and the actions and opinions of the communist government that ruled there.

As Hilsman had made clear in December 1963 the CCP was probably established there over the longer term. The Subcommittee was clear that this was not an attempt to dictate to the academic profession or to pervert their integrity or their choices for academic enquiry. Researchers were at liberty whether or not they wished to engage in research of interest to government. It would have been hypocritical of academics like Fairbank to express their frustration at their lack of influence on the US Government and then when an opportunity arose to influence it to spurn it as an unwarranted infringement on academic freedom. In reality the US Government through the FAR China Subcommittee approached this subject in an ethical fashion. In fact critics of the relationship have tended not to focus on the governmental end of the relationship. All accept that governments need specialist information on nations, which they deal with, that is not obtainable internally within the formal administrative structure.

It is the activities of the academics and in particular the role of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China (JCCC) that has come under scrutiny from amongst others the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS) and has been subject to criticism. In March 1968, at the annual conference of the AAS in Philadelphia, a fringe meeting was convened by the Vietnam Caucus to discuss the affects of the war on the Asia studies field.[40] The Caucus had been barred from holding the meeting under the AAS name due to the organisation's deep-rooted antipathy to taking any form of political stance.[41] The University of Pennsylvania in separate facilities arranged the meeting so that no connection could be made between this meeting and the annual

conference.[42] Nevertheless, it was clear that of the approximately six hundred whom attended the meeting almost all were AAS members. Out of the meeting grew a new academic organisation the CCAS organised primarily by postgraduate students from Harvard. Within ten months the new organisation could boast four hundred members and six hundred were subscribing to its journal, the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (BCAS)*.[43] As well as a hostile approach to the Vietnam War and to US policy towards Asia since World War II, members of the CCAS attacked the Asia studies scholars for complicity in the formation of US policy towards the region.[44] They also criticised the role of the JCCC and a fierce debate raged in the BCAS about its role. The scholars were able to produce evidence that those involved in the JCCC had attempted to influence the relationship between academics and government and possibly to exclude academics who were not in tune politically with the pervading ethos of the organisation.[45]

The Joint Committee on Contemporary China grew out of a meeting in June 1959 at Gould House between academics, State Department officials and representatives from the Ford Foundation and RAND Corporation.[46] The CCAS was especially critical of a report compiled by the JCCC entitled "Scholarly Communication with Mainland China" which was an assessment of seven individuals who had recently visited China and included speculation about their political sympathies. This report, according to the CCAS, had been compiled without the knowledge of those who were being written about. The results were made available to several governmental organisations. To the CCAS, this represented an

attempt to pervert the relationship between the academic discipline and the US government.[47]

Equally disturbing was the attitude of George Taylor who was the first Chairman of the JCCC. In a letter dated July 5, 1961, Taylor wrote that: "It is very important for the Government to know that it can turn to a responsible group representing the interests of American scholars for some indication of how they feel".[48] He went on to state that: "I think that a process of political education has gone on in the Committee which I trust is deep enough to prevent ill-considered political statements being made by American scholars who are interested in getting into China".[49] Along with Taylor's known sympathies with the conservative impulse in the China academic discourse, these comments suggest possible censorship and may even have led to attempts to exclude academics whose political perspective was not palatable to the JCCC.

The criticisms of the JCCC were not helped by that organisation's refusal to release information about its activities. For example, it refused to reveal the contents of the 1960 report. In 1970 after John King Fairbank intervened with a request for them to open its files, it still resolutely refused to do so on the grounds that they contained sensitive material. Instead George Taylor wrote an official history of the organisation.[50] In a letter to the BCAS, Ezra Vogel, an academic deeply involved with the JCCC, defended its integrity by saying that it had refused to release its files on the grounds that they contained confidential evaluations of researchers. Vogel went on to state that the range of authors that the JCCC sponsored showed that it was more open than the

CCAS was suggesting. Finally, he stated that the JCCC had only ever held one meeting with the FAR (Foreign Area Research) of the State Department.[51]

To assess the validity of the criticisms made by the CCAS it is best to reflect on each in turn. In the summer-autumn 1971 edition of the BCAS, four charges were laid against the JCCC, which can be condensed, into three areas.[52] Firstly, that the leading figures within the JCCC had "long been orientated to concerns of governmental policy rather than academic development".[53] It is difficult to say how accurate this allegation is. For example, did the academics involved in the JCCC see a clash between the two? And if so did they consciously or subconsciously hinder academic development in the wider interests of the US government or their perception of what that interest was? Given the relationship between the government and the JCCC it is most likely that academics like Taylor did not see a clash. However, it is disturbing that the JCCC was not prepared to release its files, which allowed speculation to arise.

Secondly, the CCAS accused the JCCC of having close relations with government agencies "whose interests were primarily and profoundly political".[54] This undoubtedly was true but it would be anticipated that scholars of contemporary China would lend their expertise to governmental agencies. Problems would only arise if such association started to curtail the freedom of the academic's fields of enquiries or of the discipline as a whole. To protect the discipline from developing unsatisfactory liaisons with government required a culture of openness and academic discourse, which of course had not been present in the

China discipline in the 1950s because of the excesses of the McCarthy era.

The final allegation made was that the JCCC did not act in a spirit of openness and accountability and there seems to be little doubt that this was accurate. The compilation of reports on academics and other individuals without their knowledge or allowing them access to their files is at best suspect and at worst corrupting. The background to the JCCC was one of reacting against McCarthyism and the sensitive nature of Sino-American relations. Nevertheless, there should be certain principles of academic freedom and accountability which should be adhered to and it would appear that the JCCC did not meet them. That being said, at time the criticisms put forward by the CCAS appear excessive. It would be unnatural for government and academia not to co-operate in areas where their interests converge and for government to encourage, even with financial inducements, academic enquiry in specific areas. Where potential dangers emerge is when such relationships affect academic freedom or when academics or government officials exclude opinions with which they do not agree. There is a thin line between the two and it seems likely that the JCCC crossed that line. Ultimately the truth can only be verified with access to their files. Although the accusations of the CCAS are largely substantiated, this should not detract from the obvious improvement that took place between these China scholars and the US Government. It should be emphasised that this was a positive development for these academics, the government, and the general state of Sino-American relations.

In conclusion, it is clear that relations between academics working on China and the US government improved in the early 1960s. This was due primarily to the change in administration and by the work of men like Chester Bowles and James Thomson. The beginning of a change in public opinion assisted them and allowed China policy to become a subject of debate. This was undoubtedly helped by Roger Hilsman's December 1963 speech. By 1966, men like A. Doak Barnett and John King Fairbank were confident enough to parade their opposition to China policy before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations chaired by Lyndon Johnson's fierce critic William Fulbright.

(iii) Public Opinion.

It has already been shown that public opinion was a powerful influence on US policy towards Communist China. For example, it was a crucial factor in ensuring that Kennedy was resistant to changing policy during his time in the White House. It was the single factor that ensured that the more liberal China academics remained silent. Any change in public opinion would obviously have repercussions for the policy itself and would reinforce the position of those seeking to change policy. Therefore, identifying the public mood in the early sixties is crucial not only to understand how US policy towards China developed; but also to assess the policy followed by Johnson and even to speculate on the policy Kennedy might have adopted had he lived.[55]

Much light can be thrown on the nuances of contemporary public opinion by analysing a study of US public opinion towards China that was

published in 1966. Written by A.T. Steele, a journalist who had been based in China between 1931 and 1949, the study was part of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) series "The United States and China in World Affairs" that had been set up in 1962 under sponsorship from the Ford Foundation. The series, under the direction of academic Robert Blum, aimed to "encourage more active and better informed public consideration of one of the most important areas of U.S. foreign policy".[56] The CFR rightly identified the influence of public opinion on this sensitive area and Steele set about a long process of interviewing two hundred prominent American politicians, business executives, Congressmen, Government Officials, Trade Union leaders, Newspaper editors, Doctors, Lawyers and academics.[57] The findings formed the basis of the book. It should be noted that Steele's study was carried out amongst the Americans with the greatest understanding of the issues surrounding China policy, and although indicative of public opinion, was not necessarily reflective of it especially in the amount of knowledge about the subject.

Steele, who clearly believed that policy should be changed, discovered that a consensus existed amongst these groups for a review of policy:

> It seems apparent from our findings that the American public is becoming increasingly favorable to a re-examination of our China policy but that the legislative and executive branches of the government are lagging somewhat in their response to the public mood.[58]

As a result of his interviews, Steele identified two basic positions: "fundamentalist" which meant supporting the existing policy and "accommodationist" which meant coming to terms with the existence of the People's Republic of China.[59] He quickly pinpointed the problem that Kennedy faced. Many leading Americans accepted the rationale for a change, but believed that because of the Chinese attitude, it was not worthwhile causing domestic outrage by trying to unilaterally change policy.[60]

Steele identified some other interesting trends. Firstly, he noted a clear geographical divergence between views on Sino-American relations between the West Coast, especially San Francisco, and the rest of the United States.[61] Amongst the West Coast organisations that supported change were the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the World Trade Association of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, the International Longshoremen's Union, the California Federation of Young Democrats and the Committee for a Review of our China Policy which was based in Oregon.[62] The reason for this was that the West Coast, and especially San Francisco, had a long history of dealings with China. The local business community contained many members with experience from before 1949 of trading with the mainland that did not see the communist government, as a permanent obstacle to re-establishing those ties.[63] One businessman interviewed by Steele who had actually lived in China but at the time of the interview was a prominent trader based on the West Coast puts this view best:

> We are being naive about China ... We are beating our heads

> against a wall. In this matter the West Coast is more realistic than the rest of the country. We don't see why we should sit next to Canada and watch them sell wheat to Communist China, while we do nothing. We are handcuffed. We can do nothing until we educate the United States government. There are plenty of people around who know the situation and could be of help. But they are Old China Hands. The thinking in Washington is that businessmen of this type cannot be helpful because they have ulterior motives.[64]

Steele also discovered more support for changing policy towards the PRC in the major cities on the East Coast and put that down to a more cosmopolitan outlook and the fact that in places like New York, a greater emphasis on international trade existed.[65]

Secondly, he found academics the most flexible in their views. Politicians were more pliable in private whilst publicly retaining their hard-line support for the existing policy.[66] He found politicians who were Democrats notably more tractable on the issue than their Republican counterparts.[67] In fact, Steele regarded the emergence of a commitment to influence policy on behalf of the academic community "the most significant indicator of the shifting emphasis in public opinion".[68] Regarding pressure groups, he noted the effectiveness of organisations like the Committee of One Million who continued to organise letter writing campaigns to prominent politicians warning them of the possible electoral implications of any public commitment to recognising the People's Republic of China.[69] For example, Senator Thomas Kuchel of California

estimated that ten per cent of the sixty thousand letters he received in an average week could be termed as fright mail aimed at influencing his political views.[70] Steele spent less time on overall US public opinion preferring to look at the views of those who he perceived as opinion formers.[71] Although he did make use of the results of a Survey Research Center (SRC) study carried out on general public opinion on US policy towards China.[72] From that, he suggested that public opinion was not opposed to a review of policy. He also identified a general lack of knowledge. In the conclusion to his report, he set out his findings powerfully in the context of his own views:

> One of the reasonable assumptions to be drawn from this survey is that American public opinion would, on the whole, welcome a public appraisal, in Congress and among the people, of our China policy. We cannot afford to treat any aspect of that policy as sacrosanct for public discussion. All alternatives need to be exhaustively examined ... True, complicated foreign policy questions are not usually resolved by public debate. But debate does, on occasion, produce fresh thinking and new perspectives, both of which should be helpful to our policy-makers in the search for feasible alternatives in what seems, at present, to be a hopeless impasse.[73]

The most powerful assessment of general public opinion of the man and woman on the street in the United States was carried out by the Survey Research Center (SRC) based at the University of Michigan in 1964. Again the report was prepared for the Council on Foreign

Relations.[74] The conclusions were that the US public had very little understanding or interest in US policy towards the region but that their opinions were clearly more flexible than US leaders gave them credit for.[75] For example, more than one in four interviewed were unaware that China had a communist government, whilst about a third of Americans questioned did not know that a second government existed in Taiwan which laid claim to the Chinese mainland.[76] Regarding policy, the survey showed that ordinary Americans cared little for the fate of the Nationalist Chinese; opposed any attack on the Chinese mainland and would support presidential initiatives aimed at easing relations between the US and the PRC.[77] The one bright spot for the hard-line supporters of Jiang was that the US public still opposed allowing the PRC into the United Nations as the Chinese representative.[78] However by 1966, an extensive survey carried out by Lou Harris showed that the majority of those interviewed favoured a series of unilateral US steps to ease tension. These included the US diplomatic recognition of the PRC; admission of the PRC into the UN; the negotiation of an atomic test-ban treaty with the Chinese and allowing Americans who wanted to go the opportunity of visiting the country.[79] As Lou Harris stated in summing up his findings: "The American people generally believe every effort should be made to begin a dialogue between this country and Red China to avert war".[80] All of this indicated that the public mood was now in favour of opening up relations with China giving academics and political leaders room for manoeuvre.

The trend towards greater contact with China was aided by the decline

in influence of the China Lobby that had done so much to stifle debate and to protect Jiang's position within the United States.[81] By the mid 1960s most of their main supporters like Senator William Knowland, Walter Robertson and Patrick Hurley had either died, retired or had been discredited. Anyone associated with the excesses of McCarthyism was liable to be shunned by younger politicians who linked support for Jiang with support for McCarthy. After McCarthy had been discredited in 1954, politicians felt able to discard his extreme views whilst still remaining firmly anticommunist. The public had also lost interest in the cause of the nationalist Chinese and welcomed debate on China policy. As a government official told the *Washington Post* the Committee of One Million was now "a term rather than a reality".[82]

In conclusion, general public opinion began to move away from supporting the hard-line policy of total isolation towards one that acknowledged the existence of the PRC and its right to be included within the United Nations. However, the general public remained uninterested and ignorant of the nuances of this policy and still looked to the White House for leadership on this matter.

(iv) The Business Community.

Evidence of the precise attitude of the US business community towards Sino-American relations has been relatively unexplored. Steele, in his seminal book, argued that there was some support amongst business for a reappraisal of relations and also that it was concentrated on the West Coast especially around San Francisco. Evidence from other sources

seems to support this view. It also shows that support was growing amongst the business community for initiatives towards the PRC, reflecting the growing breakdown of barriers towards US reconciliation with the Chinese. This support naturally focused on arguments for a relaxation of restrictions on US trade with the PRC. For the business community political aspects were secondary, though amongst those who supported a relaxation of trading restrictions, the argument was put forward that this could be a useful first step to a better Sino-American relationship. A final point needs to be made. Some crude Marxist analysis of business-government relations in capitalist countries portrays the government as pawns of big business. These assessments ignore the complexity of the relationship and the essentially heterogeneous nature of business in any large capitalist economy. It is clear that substantial sections of the business community remained resolutely opposed to reviewing or changing US policy towards the Chinese mainland.

The most concrete example of business support for a change in approach came in a report produced by a Committee of the World Trade Association (WTA), (an autonomous body linked to the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce), on the possibilities of trade with mainland China. The report produced by the Committee concluded that the current US policy of "double isolation" was "untenable".[83] The report went on to state that: "Changes within mainland China, within the Communist world, and within our own free world are occurring with ever-increasing speed and far-reaching import".[84] The changes referred to included a clear

improvement in trade between the PRC and the outside world, brought on partly because of the Sino-Soviet split and the longer term effects of the Chinese famine that had caused such death and destruction in the early 1960s. The report considered especially the improvement in trading relations between the PRC and the countries of Western Europe and suggested that similar trade between the US and the PRC could be "profitable".[85] The report was categorical in its conclusions: "Until we ourselves are in direct dialogue with our major protagonist, we shall find ourselves on a dark and deserted stage from which there is no exit".[86] The Committee endorsed the report unanimously. Next it went to the WTA which endorsed its findings by a hundred and seventy votes to thirty.[87] However, the directors of the San Francisco Area Chamber of Commerce refused to endorse it on two occasions showing that they were not prepared to support such controversial conclusions.[88] The contents of the report were circulated amongst members of Congress showing that some elements of the business community did support a change in policy.[89]

This trend towards challenging the existing tenets of policy continued in April 1965 at a US Chamber of Commerce conference in Washington attended by approximately a thousand delegates. The conference agreed a resolution calling on the government to explore ways "to more effectively open channels of communication with the people of China".[90] Finally, the business community became more vocal in the mid and late 1960s in calling for a new US policy towards the Mainland. This suggested that the traditional policy of isolation never had unanimous

support and that once the climate changed then it became open to strong criticism.[91]

The business community, like the public, academics and government officials, allowed voices to be heard calling for review and change. For businessmen it was imperative the US took advantage in the increase in Chinese trade with the non-communist world. US businessmen, particularly those on the West Coast, were determined that this outside trade would not bypass the US. Again, business leaders looked towards the Presidency for leadership but a clear impetus had been established which meant that the climate of the 1950s had changed in a way that was conducive to review. Like public opinion in general the business community was divided but becoming increasingly flexible on the issue of Sino-American relations.

(v) US Policy Towards the Soviet Union.

So far three domestic influences on policy have been considered. However, there were other factors that need to be taken into account. The first of these is the US relationship with the Soviet Union. Clearly policy towards the People's Republic of China would be affected by attitudes towards its giant neighbour and ideological soul mate.

Kennedy had come to office accusing Eisenhower of allowing the USSR to gain a lead in the arms race and to secure political advantages, particularly in the developing nations such as Vietnam. Kennedy was determined to redress this imbalance.[92] He quickly discovered that any missile gap between the superpowers was weighted in favour of the

US.[93] Moreover, he found himself locked in major confrontations with the Soviets firstly on Berlin and then more dangerously over Cuba.[94] In October 1962, the President to his horror found that the Soviets had been placing missiles on Cuba, a mere ninety miles from the coast of Florida. A fierce head to head took place, which led to the Soviets withdrawing the missiles at Kennedy's insistence after he had stated that the US would regard any attack from Cuba, as an attack by the Soviets on the US.[95] Ironically, the Cuban missile crisis led to an improvement in relations between the two powers, which led to the Test Ban Treaty of August 1963. Both had realised the limitations of a hostile confrontation. The lesson was learned that nuclear confrontation was unacceptable to both sides and this would form the basis for an understanding.[96] Biographers have emphasised the centrality of the crisis to Kennedy and his determination to pursue a more cautious policy towards the Soviets.[97]

To his advisers and indeed the public at large, Kennedy's handling of the missile crisis was portrayed as a great triumph for his diplomacy and crisis management. In particular, Roger Hilsman used this interpretation of Soviet policy as a model for how policy towards the PRC should develop.[98] On the one hand, policy could be tough when US strategic interests were being challenged whilst on the other the US could be flexible when it was in its interests to improve relations with the Chinese. This parallel would be made repeatedly by Hilsman and others to justify their attempts to alter policy towards the PRC.[99] It could be argued that the principal influence of the Soviet Union on US China policy was that it provided a model to follow.

A secondary factor was the importance of the Sino-Soviet split. By the mid-1960s it was clear that the split was fundamental and might even lead to a military showdown between the two communist giants. To the United States this split clearly presented an opportunity to pursue US interests against both of them and to extract advantages from both. The US government was aware of this from a very early point in the proceedings but it would not become a central plank of policy until Nixon was in office and Henry Kissinger was his National Security Adviser. Under Kennedy and initially under Johnson, the predominant view was that the Chinese were the more aggressive and unreasonable and that a factor in the Sino-Soviet split was a Soviet desire to peacefully coexist with the western world. This simplistic reading of the split dominated US official thinking from about 1962 until 1966, which cited examples such as Lin Biao's famous statement of 1965, which emphasised Chinese support for wars of national liberation like the one being fought in Vietnam. However, less commented upon was the fact that Lin Biao went onto state that Chinese involvement would not go beyond moral support. In 1963, the US through Averell Harriman had made some tentative approaches to the Soviets regarding the Chinese nuclear capability. Khrushchev had shown little interest in any co-operation with the US in such a sensitive area and for that reason amongst others the US decided to let the matter drop. By 1965, as in so much else, policy towards both China and the USSR was deeply influenced by the US commitment to protecting its client government in South Vietnam. Vietnam was the key factor that prevented Johnson and his advisers fully taking advantage of

the Sino-Soviet split.

In short, US relations with the Soviet Union affected China policy in two key areas. First, to provide a model policy for the US to follow towards China; and second, the Sino-Soviet split created a new range of opportunities for the US to pursue once it was ready to do so.

(vi) Vietnam.

Immediately on taking office Kennedy had emphasised the importance of wars of national liberation in developing areas in Africa and Asia. The civil war in Vietnam was a classic case of such a war. To those around Kennedy it represented a test case of whether the US was able to defend client governments against communist insurgents backed by the Chinese and Soviets.[100] In reality, the situation in Vietnam was altogether more complicated than Kennedy's advisors supposed. For a start, the US ally in the South had very little credibility or support amongst the general population. Alternatively, the communists were Vietnamese whose appeal to their compatriots was primarily nationalistic.[101] This imbalance meant that the US was faced with a stark choice by the early 1960s, which was either to deepen their commitment to the country or to accept a communist take-over of Vietnam. The latter option was always the more unpalatable due to a range of factors such as public opinion and general cold war doctrines.[102] Therefore, Kennedy chose to send increasing numbers of military advisers to Vietnam. In March 1965 Johnson began the mass carpet bombing of the North; and later in 1965 large quantities of US troops began to enter Vietnam in order to defend

the South.[103] By the end of 1965 an undeclared state of war existed between the US and North Vietnamese and their allies in the South - the Vietcong.

Events in Vietnam would influence China policy in a number of ways. Firstly, US leaders including both Kennedy and Johnson viewed China as the key international supporter of the North Vietnamese. The war was seen as a test case to measure Chinese support for communist movements on its borders and the extent of its influence in Southeast Asia.[104] As Lyndon Johnson would state in a seminal speech in April 1965 at Johns Hopkins University: "Over this war - and all Asia - is another reality in the deepening shadow of Communist China. The contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes".[105] Related to this "wider pattern" was the "domino theory" which asserted that if Vietnam was to fall to the communists then an irresistible momentum would be created leading to other countries around Vietnam like Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia being similarly affected.[106] Thus the conflict in Vietnam took on far greater importance in international eyes than its scale merited. Initially, it also deterred members of the Johnson Administration from reviewing and reforming China policy.

China also effected the military strategy adopted by the US. The fear of provoking a Chinese intervention, coupled with a desire not to provoke domestic American opposition, meant that Johnson and his advisers waged a war by stealth often doing the minimum to maintain the position of the South Vietnamese.[107] The full-scale assault that might have been

able to alter the military balance of the war was never attempted partly because of the fear of Chinese reaction. The lesson of Korea, most ably enunciated by Allen Whiting, was that the Chinese would intervene militarily when its strategic interests were threatened. It was this factor that would later lead some historians and other conservative commentators to say that the war in Vietnam was a failure from US perspectives because Johnson never allowed the military to prosecute the war to its full potential.[108] Ultimately, the importance of China in the Vietnam imbroglio created a greater need for communication and negotiation between the US and the PRC. This was a key factor in Nixon's decision to seek a dialogue.

The final manner in which Vietnam influenced US China policy was the debilitating affect that the war began to have on the Johnson Administration by 1966. The effects intensified during 1967 and eventually destroyed the Johnson presidency.[109] It became clear that the US was failing to achieve its minimum objectives for Vietnam and the war increasingly sapped morale and public support. The war began to dominate the Administration and to take up an increasing portion of the time of the President.[110] Other areas of foreign policy such as China were downgraded; reviews were postponed until the war took a turn for the better; and policy changes were unrewarded because of the ill affects of the war. Alternatively, countries like China and North Vietnam would be less interested in negotiating with what by 1968 was palpably a lame-duck president. Domestic observers were often horrified at the damage that the war was doing both in policy and political terms.[111] In

conclusion, it can be argued that Vietnam prevented Johnson giving more serious consideration to changing foreign policy in 1966 when the public mood had shifted.

(vii) The People's Republic of China.

In the normal state of diplomatic relations the concerns, actions and viewpoints of the country with which the host nation is dealing with should be of paramount concern. However, Sino-American relations did not come into the category of normal diplomatic relations. Between 1955 and 1967 the only contact between the two nations was the one hundred and thirty ambassadorial meetings that took place in Geneva and Warsaw. These meetings were ultimately unproductive.[112] On the American side, as has been argued, political leaders were unprepared to take the lead in making the moves that might advance the relationship between the two nations. The Chinese had their own reasons for not wanting to alter their hostile attitude towards the USA. In particular, they resented the US commitment to Taiwan and the historic role of the US as the paragon of Western imperialism. It is for these reasons that events in China and the viewpoints of the Communist leaders were always peripheral to the US policy makers of the time. This included both those who advocated a policy of total isolation and those who argued for a form of containment. China policy had been subjected to violent domestic debate and the lack of contact between the two nations meant that each power's attitudes towards the other developed in a vacuum. For historians, examining US China policy in the 1960s, it is difficult to uncover the nuances of US

policy because much of the political intelligence provided by organisations like the CIA remains classified. Furthermore, a large proportion of the specific information that policy makers acted upon is unavailable. For example, the information that convinced Johnson and his advisers that China considered nuclear weapons as defensive and thus were unlikely to use them is not now available. However, comments and actions by contemporaries indicate that it did exist and it is referred to.[113] It is clear from the sources however that policy makers were vague about events in China and often generalised. The Chinese historian He Di is closest to the mark when he concludes that Sino-American relations in the Twentieth Century are characterised by misunderstanding and a lack of knowledge about one another.[114]

Nevertheless, developments within China itself did affect the perceptions of US policy makers even if they did not fully understand them. It is worth trying to assess what Chinese policy was towards the United States during the late 1950s and the 1960s to measure the accuracy with which the policy makers approached events and trends. Between 1949, when Mao and his colleagues in the Chinese Communist Party took full control of the country, and 1959 the new Chinese government could boast a range of achievements. The CCP consolidated its control over the vast interior of China and launched a programme of economic development that had some creditable results.[115] In foreign affairs, China had established itself as a leading member of the communist bloc. It had achieved the basic aim in Korea of defending its border and had ensured that a government sympathetic to

Beijing would control North Korea. At the Geneva Conference (1954) and Bandung Conference (1955), China had played a leading role and by the late 1950s China was taking the first steps towards becoming a nuclear power.[116] However, in other areas tensions were emerging. The relationship with the Soviet Union was deteriorating, splits were emerging within the leadership of the CCP, and economic problems were also escalating.[117] To the watching world, including the Americans, there was nothing that might distinguish the CCP from other leading Communist governments and certainly nothing to support Eisenhower's policy of total isolation of the Chinese compared to their working relationship with the Soviet Union. It is hard not to agree with historian Edwin Moise when he writes that: "Up to 1957, China's position in both domestic and international affairs seemed to fall within the normal limits of communist behaviour".[118]

In February 1958, the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China launched the Great Leap Forward of the Chinese economy. This involved attempts at huge increases in production of steel and coal that often involved the setting up of small steel furnaces all over the country. Ordinary Chinese were organised into communes, which were given individual targets of production.[119] The results of the Great Leap Forward were disastrous, with approximately seventeen million peasants dying of starvation.[120] Much of the steel produced was unfit for industrial use and peasants were diverted from farm duties for what was ultimately a wasteful exercise.[121] These disasters combined with bad harvests, and the withdrawal of Soviet aid led to an abandonment of

the initiative. In September 1959 at the Lushan Conference the policies behind the Leap were quietly abandoned and by late 1960 the Great Leap Forward had been completely set aside.[122]

The Great Leap Forward brought to the surface the simmering differences within the CCP leadership and the dissatisfaction with Mao's leadership. In December 1958, Mao was forced out as State Chairman. By 1960, a group of moderates who coalesced around the leadership of the Chief of State Liu Shaoqi, CCP Secretary General Deng Xiaoping, and to a lesser extent Premier Zhou En-lai, emerged to assume control of the party and state apparatus. These moderates began to have an effect on both the domestic and foreign policies of the PRC.

In January 1962, a new policy of "Three Privates and one Guarantee" was introduced. The peasants were given permission to cultivate individual plots of land, operate private handicraft enterprises and were allowed to sell the products on the free market and to keep the profits. The guarantee was that they had to fulfil an agricultural production quota set by the government.[123] In foreign policy, the moderates launched a policy of "Three Reconciliations and One Reduction". The reconciliations were to be with imperialists, reactionaries and revisionists and the reduction was to be in Chinese aid to foreign national liberation movements.[124] The aim of this policy was clearly to improve relations with both the western world and the Soviet Union. This policy clearly suggested to the West and to the US that it was possible to improve Sino-American relations. The moderates never however deviated from Mao's insistence on the importance of Taiwan and that would remain the

fundamental block to any reconciliation between the People's Republic of China and the United States. The policy achieved its greatest breakthrough when France, under General De Gaulle, recognised the PRC.[125]

It is remarkable, given the extent of these changes, how little they filtered through into American thinking. Detailed discussions of the differences within the leadership never took place. Both those who believed in total isolation and those who advocated an improvement in Sino-American relations based on containment were unmoved by events on the mainland.[126] Chester Bowles argued that the starvation in China presented an opportunity for America to improve its relationship with the Mainland but his efforts were to go unrecognised.[127] Also, James Thomson and others in their writing began to acknowledge that a more moderate leadership might emerge in China after the death of Mao.[128] It is probable that they meant Liu Shaoqi, but he was never specifically named. Chinese moderate policies helped to bolster their position but they never used events in China to change policy radically, partly because of the issue of Taiwan.

Within China itself, Mao watched these events with horror. He regarded the policies pursued by Liu as likely to bring about the onset of a capitalist economy and reconciliation with the Soviet Union. He also believed that these policies would lead to an end to the revolutionary feeling, which he considered essential to the survival of communism within China. He also resented being sidelined.[129] To reverse these trends, Mao began to build a base of support in order to attack Liu and

his allies. In September 1962, he set up a Socialist Education Movement, which emphasised the ongoing class struggle and he instructed officials and intellectuals to go to the countryside to learn skills from the peasantry.[130] By 1965, Mao was ready to begin the process that led to the Cultural Revolution. This process involved the removal of Liu, who had once been Mao's chosen successor, and an onset of revolutionary fervour.[131]

(viii) China's Policy Towards the United States.

Despite the intense ideological differences between the US and the PRC, the Chinese Communists adopted a pragmatic approach to relations with the US Government.[132] Although ideologically closer to the Soviet Union, Mao did not trust Stalin and hoped to balance the relationship with the Soviets with a reasonable association with Washington. Mao's first attempt at this was during World War II when clear approaches were made to the Americans. In mid-1942 Zhou En-lai held talks with the second secretary of the US embassy in China, John Paton Davies.[133] In July 1944 this dialogue led to the US sending an observer mission to the Communist base in Yenan.[134] In 1945, according to Barbara Tuchman, the communists were even prepared to accept a coalition government in China as a means of garnering American aid.[135] Ultimately, these plans came to nothing and the Nationalists and Communists were thrown back into civil war.

When the CCP succeeded in taking over China, they considered the USA, as Jiang's main backer to represent the greatest external threat to

the Chinese Revolution and their new government. Mao argued that although US propaganda was aimed primarily at the Soviet Union, its military might would be used to repress national revolutionary movements elsewhere.[136] The fear of US military engagement would undoubtedly be a factor in Mao's reaction to events in Korea in 1950 and influence his decision to intervene. It also played a part in the decision of the CCP to "lean to one side" and forge an alliance with the Soviet Union. Mao feared that the US might intervene in the Chinese Civil War and believed that its support for Taiwan represented an attempt to undermine the sovereignty of the new government and support a defeated rival. In the longer term, Mao believed that the Americans would try to undermine Chinese development. This fear was one of the major factors in explaining early Chinese Communist foreign policy.[137]

Other factors in that early foreign policy included a desire to re-establish China as a regional or world power. Mao and the Communists shared the national humiliation that the Chinese had suffered as part of the unequal treaties and the inability of previous Chinese governments to defend its national interests. Mao was determined to redress that imbalance and that again was a factor in China's intervention in Korea.[138] Mao believed that China represented a unique example of a non-European example of a proletarian revolution that could inspire the peoples of the world especially peasant societies elsewhere in Asia.[139] A final factor was of course the ideological affinity with the Soviet Union and the fact that the Soviets were the one power prepared to establish good relations with the PRC.[140]

In the mid-1950s the Chinese Communist leadership tried again to improve relations with the USA. This was despite the attempts by the Eisenhower Administration to encircle China by setting up SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) and having US military bases in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Burma and Thailand.[141] In particular, the Chinese leadership was enraged by the US defence treaty signed with the Republic of China in December 1954, which they saw as a direct attempt to undermine the sovereignty of the PRC.[142] Nevertheless, at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, attended by twenty-nine African and Asian countries, Zhou was quick to affirm the Chinese desire to deal with the Americans. On April 23, the PRC released a statement saying that:

> The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want a war with the United States of America. The Chinese government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area.[143]

It is worth pointing out that this statement is very similar to the one sent to Richard Nixon a generation later.[144] It was this positive approach that led to the commencement of the ambassadorial talks that continued into the 1960s. A number of historians have suggested that between 1955 and 1957 the Communist leadership genuinely hoped for an improvement in Sino-American relations and that included them being prepared to renounce the use of force as a means to retrieving Taiwan, a concession

they later made to Nixon.[145] The fault that there was no improvement at this time lay primarily with the Americans.

It was at the Bandung Conference that the Chinese Communists laid out their five principles of peaceful coexistence. They were a mutual respect for each other's territory and sovereignty. A mutual agreement not to engage in aggression against one another. Agreement not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. An acceptance of the need for equality in relationships based on mutual benefit and a commitment to general peaceful coexistence.[146] These five principles formed the basis of Chinese foreign policy in the years after 1955 and helped reassure countries on China's periphery like India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, Laos and Cambodia that China did not seek to dominate them or undermine their non-communist governments. These principles, which were extremely vague and harder to define when dealing with specific situations nevertheless, defined a Chinese desire to improve relations with the outside world including the United States.[147]

However, by 1957 the Chinese Communist leaders were becoming disillusioned with the talks with the US. They believed that the US wanted to institute a policy of "Two Chinas" based on the policies that the Americans had adopted towards Germany, Korea and Vietnam.[148] The Chinese historian He Di has argued that the Chinese leaders launched the shelling of the offshore islands from Taiwan, Quemoy and Matsu, as a means of sabotaging what they believed was a two Chinas policy on the part of the United States.[149] The shelling would signal to the outside world China's continuing determination to reunite Taiwan with the

mainland. Furthermore, after the crisis, Mao decided that the islands were better left in Jiang's possession because it prevented a clear geographical division being created between Taiwan and the mainland.[150] Mao was also reported to prefer Jiang remaining ruler on Taiwan to a potentially more liberal leader who might follow the US agenda of creating two Chinas.[151] On October 6, 1958, Mao set out his position in a radio address entitled "Message to Our Taiwan Compatriots:

> There is but one China in the world, there are not two Chinas. On this point, we concur with each other. Americans are using their techniques to try to force upon us a two China policy. All the Chinese people, including you and our overseas Chinese compatriots, will absolutely not let this materialize.[152]

This assessment of US intentions was of course accurate and was certainly the solution to the Taiwan impasse supported by men like Chester Bowles.[153] The lesson from this was that the policy was fine on the drawing boards in Washington but suffered form the fact that neither China nor Taiwan was prepared to accept it. Before the goal of an improved Sino-American relationship could be reached this approach would have to be changed.

The Offshore Islands crisis of 1958 also led to a Chinese appraisal of policy towards the United States. Before the crisis Mao had believed since the 1940s that the USA was determined to destroy the PRC through a three pronged attack on it via Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam. Mao had seen the war in Korea as part of that wider strategy. However, Mao now decided that the US was essentially defensive not wanting a

wider war but merely trying to isolate China.[154] In the autumn of 1958, Mao took this new assessment to a CCP Central Committee Politburo meeting convened to discuss the state of Sino-American relations and the failure of the talks between the two countries. A new policy was decided upon based on concentrating on one issue: Taiwan.[155] In future, in all talks with the United States, the issue of Taiwan would be central to any potential improvement in relations between the two. This accorded to Mao's desire to reunite the country as well as Chinese desire to establish itself as a great power. This policy would remain constant throughout the 1960s.

The retirement of Eisenhower led to Chinese hopes that his successor might be more moderate but Mao, Zhou and other leaders quickly came to the view that Kennedy was another hard-liner who was potentially even more hostile than his predecessor.[156] The rhetoric and intervention in Vietnam concluded the Chinese, was evidence of Kennedy's inability to seek compromise or break out of the stalemate of the 1950s.

The growing conflict in Vietnam clearly contributed to this assessment. Gabriel Kolko in his seminal book on the war in Vietnam identifies a number of divisions within the Chinese leadership about foreign affairs including Indochina.[157] He argues that all the leaders feared a complete North Vietnamese victory, which they saw as potentially extending Soviet influence in the region.[158] Both at the Geneva Conference in 1954 and in their contribution to the 1962 Laos Treaty the Chinese were prepared to act independently of the North Vietnamese. Even in the early 1960s the Chinese continued to advocate a negotiated settlement that would

keep both the US and the Soviet Union from becoming too powerful in the region.[159] In fact it was only after the creation of a US military command MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) in February 1962 that the Chinese became more aggressive in support of the North. Even then the Chinese was careful in the manner in which support was offered to the North.[160] Privately, the Chinese sent tens of thousands of personnel to help the North but publicly they continued to call for the Vietnamese Communists to win the war by themselves.[161] The US, fearing an escalation of the war, also chose to keep the extent of the Chinese support for the North Vietnamese quiet.[162]

Nevertheless, Taiwan rather than Vietnam remained the key obstacle to an improvement in Sino-American relations. A *People's Daily Observer* article of March 29, 1966 concluded that:

> So long as the U.S. Government does not change its hostile policy toward China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan straits the normalization of Sino-American relations is entirely out of the question and so is the solution of such a concrete question as the exchange of visits between personnel of the two countries.[163]

In private, the Chinese leaders were equally adamant about the importance of Taiwan. The author Han Su Yin, who was later to write a biography of Zhou En-lai, remembered meeting him in 1966 just before she was leaving for a conference in the United States at the University of Chicago on Sino-American relations. Zhou told Han:

> Please tell the Americans that we have never been against a

> United States presence in the Pacific. That is a fact that we have to live with. But Taiwan is part of China, it cannot become an occupied protectorate under the United States. Nor can there be two Chinas. Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and we are in total agreement on this point.[164]

This commitment to Taiwan was not just based on geo-politics. According to Edgar Snow in his *Life* article of July 1971, Mao saw integrating Taiwan into the mainland as his "last national goal of unification".[165] It was clear to all neutral observers that until compromise could be reached on this issue an improvement in Sino-American relations was impossible.

In conclusion, Chinese policy towards the United States was based primarily on one issue, Taiwan. Until the US was prepared to engage with the Chinese view that the island was part of China then there was very little opportunity for the initiatives and overall policy being advocated by men like Thomson being realised. Moreover, until that time it was impossible to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split or the Chinese hesitancy in supporting the North Vietnamese. Dean Rusk understood the importance of Taiwan but did not believe that an improvement in Sino-American relations was worth the sacrifice that might have to be made in that area.[166]

A related problem for these more liberal thinkers was the Chinese hostility towards the concept of two Chinas. The CCP leaders in Beijing viewed that policy with horror and if an improvement in Sino-American relations was to be affected than abandoning the concept of two Chinas

would be required. By 1966 as these academics prepared to publicly challenge the Johnson Administration over China policy, the issue of the US commitment to Taiwan would be one of the issues that would come more and more into focus.

(ix) Conclusions.

In this chapter a range of influences on US China policy have been identified as has the shift that was taking place in all of them. This shift was clearly helping to create a climate conducive for reassessment and change in Sino-American relations. Public opinion, the business community and the more liberal academics were moving steadily in support of a more flexible policy. In foreign policy terms the improvement in Soviet-US relations and the Sino-Soviet split helped to create opportunities for the US to improve relations with the PRC and to use that improvement as leverage in world politics. All of these changes required presidential leadership and up until 1966 it was clear that Kennedy and especially Lyndon Johnson were not prepared to provide that leadership. The war in Vietnam debilitated policy making within the Administration. However the potential clash between the two created an even greater need for improved relations. Finally, the Chinese themselves were ready to improve relations with the US but only on the basis of an agreement being reached about the status of Taiwan. The overall trend was towards a change in policy. At the very least it shows that the climate that greeted Nixon on this issue when he took office in 1969 was very different to the one that greeted Kennedy in 1961 or Hilsman as he made his speech in

1963. By 1966, it can be argued that the situation both in the US and outside was ready for the US to change policy.

A final area needs to be looked at which is the relative weight that should be given to the influence of these factors on policy. International relations theorists have often looked for determining factors on policy making. However, the conclusion of this chapter is that a range of factors converged to help undermine the existing US policy. Moreover, each trend towards changing policy helped reinforce other factors. For example, liberal academics were more prepared to state publicly their desire for a change in policy because of the more tolerant public mood and they in turn by their pronouncements would influence public opinion. Also, the more co-operative stance of the Chinese leadership helped increase trade with the western world which in turn influenced American businessmen who began to call for a change in policy. In short, all of these factors were cogs on a wheel pushing the US towards a change in policy towards the PRC.

THE EVOLVING CONSENSUS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. CHINA POLICY BETWEEN 1959 AND 1972 AND THE DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON IT

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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE COMING OF AGE: 1966-1968.

(i) Introduction.

In the years leading up to 1966, academics, government officials and others who advocated a change in US China policy had been cautious in the way that they expressed their views. The strength of the China Lobby and the lack of opportunities for change had, if not silenced them, impeded the extent to which they were prepared to speak out. By 1966 those barriers had been removed. It was clear that public opinion had shifted and a change had begun to take place amongst the opinion formers who had previously been unprepared to speak out. During 1965 and 1966, academics and others joined organisations committed to changing US China policy; appeared at a series of Congressional hearings into US policy and advocated change. Eventually with businessmen and other interested groups they created the National Committee on US-China Relations, which although formally neutral, acted as an umbrella for all those who wanted reform. This onslaught began to force the Johnson Administration to shift its ground. During 1966, leading members of the Administration made conciliatory speeches outlining their desire to seek a new relationship with the PRC. It is also clear that policy did shift towards an official stance of "Two Chinas". Furthermore, many of the academics that had long argued for change were brought into government as part of advisory panels on Asia policy that were created to attempt to take into account their views. By 1968, this shift had ensured that it was not a matter of if policy would be changed but when and whether or not it would be acceptable to the PRC.

(ii) The Academics and the Congressional Hearings.

The second half of 1965 and the opening months of 1966 clearly represented a turning point in the attitude of the foreign policy elite towards discussing China policy. Whereas fear of the China Lobby had stymied more controversial views, the change in public opinion and the growing conflict in Vietnam removed the barriers to open discussion and dissent from the traditional policy of total isolation. In 1965, a new organisation: Americans for Reappraisal of American Far Eastern Policy, involving amongst others John King Fairbank, was set up.[1] Moreover, the Council on Foreign Relations, the League of Women Voters, the Foreign Policy Association and the American Association of University Women all undertook information campaigns on China and US policy towards the PRC.[2] The largest of these studies was by the Council on Foreign Relations who spent $ 1.1 million on the production of an eight volume study of "The US and China in World Affairs".[3] The most important and controversial volume of the series was Steele's book: "The American People and China", which showed that public opinion was ready for a shift in policy whenever a president might be ready to address it.[4] In fact the majority of the authors in the study advocated a shift in China policy and the purpose of the study was to try to kick-start a debate on what the CFR members saw as a sterile and failing policy position.[5] The 1966 CFR handbook on China policy noted:

> a gradual but highly significant modification of American attitudes on the whole China question. Not only was every aspect of China

> policy being discussed in the United States with a freedom that would have been unthinkable a few years earlier. Even the substance of China policy appeared to be undergoing subtle modifications as Washington, without relaxing its opposition to Chinese expansion, sought cautiously ... (to encourage) new forms of Sino-American contact.[6]

If this was the case then the CFR itself contributed to that new climate.

It was in that new climate that both Houses of Congress in the early months of 1966 held hearings on China policy. The House of Representatives conducted its hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Clement Zablocki, a Democrat from Wisconsin, chaired these.[7] However, it was the Senate hearings in March 1966, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was to attract the publicity and star witnesses. The Committee was chaired by Senator J. William Fulbright, a Democrat from Arkansas, who was rapidly becoming a thorn in the side of the Johnson Administration due to his growing criticism of the Vietnam conflict.[8] Fulbright in a book published the same year entitled *The Arrogance of Power* expressed the view that the time had come for policy to be changed and a process of dialogue with the leaders in Beijing established.[9] The hearings were publicised and the early speakers all reflected the liberal view of US-China relations and the view held by men such as James Thomson Jr within the Administration.

The first speaker was A. Doak Barnett then the Acting Director of the East Asian Institute at Columbia University who had previously held posts

within the State Department and the CFR.[10] Barnett called on the US to

> adopt a policy of containment but not isolation, a policy that would aim on the one hand at checking military or subversive threats and pressures emanating from Peking (Beijing), but at the same time would aim at maximum contacts with and maximum involvement of the Chinese Communists in the international community.[11]

He put forward three proposals that he hoped might improve the situation: a formal acknowledgement of the regime in Beijing; an encouragement of contacts including trade in non-strategic items; and for the US to support the concept of "two Chinas" in the United Nations.[12] After Barnett's initial statement the Senators on the Committee were given the opportunity to question the witness. Amongst the issues that came up was the question of to what extent US policy towards the PRC could affect the internal development of the mainland and in particular the succession to Mao. Barnett chose his words very carefully:

> It would be reasonable to expect, I think, that the outcome of the competition between leaders and policies that is likely to occur, and the resulting balance between what one might call radicals and moderates will be definitely influenced by the perceptions that the new leaders have of the international environment as it affects China. While it may not be possible for outsiders to exert very much influence on the outcome, our hope, certainly, should be that the balance will in time shift in favor of technical bureaucrats promoting relatively moderate policies.[13]

This prescient reply was followed by questions on the Sino-Soviet split

which Barnett emphasised was "very real, very bitter, and very deep".[14] Before the end of the questions Senators Stuart Symington of Missouri and Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania had both publicly stated their support for Barnett's position.[15]

The next witness was John King Fairbank whom Fulbright introduced as the "man considered by many experts in the field to be the dean of China historians".[16] Fairbank, appearing exactly fourteen years to the day that he had appeared before the McCarran Committee, argued for a policy of "Containment and Competition".[17] Historically, he argued Mao could be identified as emerging from within a tradition of Chinese leaders going back to the emperors of previous centuries.[18] He stressed that the PRC rulers should be seen primarily as Chinese nationalists determined to overturn perceived injustices of the previous century, and communists secondly.[19] He then went on to outline his perspective on how to deal with China emerging as a superpower. The answer lay in bringing it fully into the world system and making it a bloc of a stable international order. This is precisely what Richard Nixon set out to do a couple of years later. Fairbank told the hearings:

> In the end - my whole point this morning has been that in the end if you want the Chinese Communists to stop trying to stir up the underdeveloped world as their main claim to fame, your real alternative is to get them into international contact. The most obvious place is the UN. So I think that it has a great psychological curative value for them in the long run because I think they are prestige conscious ... And consequently you have to work toward a

> complex and combined policy in which you are not giving into Peking. You are doing something constructive, you are not letting go of your alliances, you are not selling out the other countries that feel threatened by China. You have to hold up both sides. In other words, build the international order with Peking's participation. At the same time that you have a certain amount of Containment of Peking's expansionism if it occurs in these other places on this subversive revolutionary model.[20]

Another witness, Alexander Eckstein, a Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan, and a rising star amongst scholars of China who was already considered the foremost US expert on the Chinese economy, touched on the same aspects of developing relations with China:

> My convictions on this relate to the view that the United States, as a matter of national interest, is committed to the evolution of a stable international system ... The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, have a vested interest in political and economic disturbance, such as that which prevails in some African countries, because this provides a much more fertile ground for subversion.
>
> Now, to the extent that our relations with China at the present time and in the recent past and our policy of isolating China contribute to world tensions - and I think they do contribute to world tensions - they tend to aggravate instability in the world international system.[21]

In short, US interests in the opinion of both Fairbank and Eckstein were

being impeded by the refusal of the US to try to integrate the PRC into the world system. This strategic approach if successful would also give the opportunity for the US to extract itself from Vietnam as China was weaned away from supporting revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. On Vietnam, Fairbank and Barnett before him both stressed their support for the war.[22]

Eckstein also convincingly put the case for a change in trading relations between the two countries. In his testimony, he argued that the trade embargo didn't work and served no purpose other than to try to isolate the Chinese.[23] He went onto identify two specific problems with the policy. Firstly, that it separated the US from many of its allies that now had full trading relations with the PRC and secondly that it denied US business its share of the China trade, "however modest".[24] Put in such stark terms it was hard to defend the policy of total isolation.

Another fascinating subject that came up was the issue of the interaction of views amongst the academics. Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey noted the similarity between the views expressed by Barnett and Fairbank, given that the latter had a reputation of being more of a "dove". He questioned the latter on this and Fairbank's reply is worth reprinting in full:

> It proves that we have met each other for many years in conversation and learned from each other. We form a group in the country, a professional group. A country has to be guided by realism and not merely by a consensus of the so-called professional people in a certain line, and it is extremely important

that we question everything that we have to offer.[25]

These comments clearly show the extent to which these academics were talking, interacting and co-ordinating their attempts to alter policy. To prove the point made by Fairbank over the next few days: John Lindbeck (of Harvard who had also served in the State Department and as a consultant to the RAND Corporation); Benjamin Schwartz; Morton Halperin (later to serve in the NSC under Henry Kissinger); Donald Zagoria (of Columbia) and Robert Scalapino appeared before the Committee to support the views put forward by Barnett, Fairbank and Eckstein. All were keen to stress the unanimity amongst scholars on US China policy and the changes that they believed were necessary.[26]

Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island realised the trend that was developing and begun to wonder what influence these views were having on the State Department officers who had studied at some point in their careers at the East Asian Institute at Harvard. Although he raised the subject with Fairbank he tackled it more thoroughly during his allotted questions to John Lindbeck.[27]

> Senator Pell: Since the present generation of China specialists in the Department of State in general go through your institute, would you be willing to hazard an opinion as to their personal thoughts regarding our general line of policy toward China? Do they reflect your views or the administration's views?
>
> Dr Lindbeck: Well, first you are under the misapprehension that they have gone through the East Asian Research Center; most of those who have come to Harvard from the State Department and

> other government agencies I think have gone to the Center for International Affairs. We have had a number of associates of our Center among the Foreign Service officers who were at Harvard. I would say that among the very few who have been closely associated with us, there have been differences of opinion.[28]

This answer is disingenuous to say the least. Given the views held by Thomson and those associated with him in government it is clear that at the very least their views are almost identical and at most that the process of interaction outlined by Fairbank amongst academics extended to government officials. The views publicly expressed by Barnett and others was the very same as the views that men like Hilsman and Thomson had promoted in the autumn of 1963. Whereas in 1963, public opinion urged caution on those advocating change by 1966 times had changed to such an extent that academics that supported this approach could argue publicly for their preferred policy options.

As the hearings continued, support for the views expressed by Barnett and Fairbank grew. On March 21, the *New York Times* published a statement by a hundred and ninety eight academics advocating change along the lines outlined at the hearings.[29] Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, a long-time supporter of the China Lobby, decided to intervene to try to redress the imbalance against the existing policy. He arranged for Walter Judd, and Professors George Taylor and David Rowe to address the hearings.[30] Fulbright noted this development stating that: "The Senator from Iowa thought the witnesses up to now hadn't given a balanced point of view".[31] These witnesses appeared before the

Committee on March 28. In stark contrast to the McCarran hearings this time it was conservatives like Taylor and Judd who were given a hard time. Fulbright wrought the concession from Taylor and Judd that whereas the US had 600,000 troops stationed abroad the PRC had none.[32] Rowe took a far more aggressive stance claiming that academics like Barnett and Fairbank were representative "of a lunatic fringe of cowards, pacifists, appeasers, and just plain, simple Communists and pro-Communists".[33] The Committee was extremely hostile towards Rowe and was able to get him to state publicly that he supported the use of non-toxic gases and napalm in times of war.[34] In fact, it was clear that Rowe's conduct, much like Joseph McCarthy's a generation earlier, helped discredit the views which he was putting across. The combination of the reasonable viewpoint being put by the majority of speakers compared with the extremist language used by Rowe helped solidify the belief that the advocates of change were the moderates and those supporting the existing policy were the extremists.

Two final issues are worth addressing. The first is the matter of the extent to which the US was encircling the PRC. Fulbright raised the fact that it was the US who had troops active in the countries bordering the PRC rather than the Chinese Communists. Brigadier Samuel B. Griffith told the House Subcommittee on February 25, 1966:

> I think if we can put ourselves in Peking and look around as the members of the politburo do, we might see the picture they see. They see American power in Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, Taiwan and growing in South Vietnam. They see us

> as an ally of India ... I honestly believe we have to understand, or attempt to understand, that Peking has reason for apprehension.[35]

These sentiments were echoed in June 1966 by State Department Officer Chester Cooper in an address he gave to a CFR conference on China:

> The Chinese Communist regime may be exaggerating for popular consumption its view of the American military threat. But American planes are bombing within a few miles of Southwest China's borders and the Seventh Fleet is close enough and powerful enough to blow up major Chinese cities over night. Soviet missiles in Cuba produced a major crisis in the United States: Can we expect the Chinese to accept with equanimity American missiles ninety miles of their shores? We know we won't unleash our awesome power against them except in the event of the greatest provocation. But do they know it? ... Against this backdrop we can hardly expect quick or generous dividends from our newly-expressed willingness to let a few doctors or students travel to China.[36]

These radical statements show the extent to which the US was beginning to debate the whole concept of its responsibility for the hostile state of Sino-American relations. Also the issue of whether or not the US needed to begin to withdraw some of its military presence in Asia or at the very least communicate its position towards the PRC. This debate was given greater impetus by events in Vietnam. Not only were observers calling on the US to start to make small gestures to the PRC it was now also looking at how the US could genuinely reflect on how its

commitment in the region itself contributed to the poor state of Sino-American relations. Moreover, given the views of men like Fairbank and Eckstein of the need to incorporate the PRC into the world system then that need would eventually take precedence over US commitments to some of its allies in the region. That is not to say that these observers were prepared to accept Chinese or Communist take-overs of countries on its periphery but for the first time they were prepared to state publicly that alliances with these countries were not worth sacrificing a better relationship with the PRC itself.

This leads onto the second issue, which was Taiwan. As we have seen the key issue as far as the Chinese leaders in Beijing were concerned was the island occupied by Jiang and his supporters. Publicly, Barnett, Fairbank and others argued for policies that, if adopted, would lend impetus in the drift towards "Two Chinas" across the Taiwan Strait.[37] However, this policy was unsustainable given both Chinese Communist and Nationalist hostility to the concept of separating Taiwan from the mainland. Both claimed to be the legitimate rulers of all China including Taiwan. This hostility rendered useless other proposals put forward by these academics and other observers for a series of incremental measures by the US to improve Sino-American relations. As far as the Chinese Communists were concerned until the US moved on Taiwan it was impossible for Sino-American relations to improve.

During the hearings these academics tended to avoid discussing the issue of Taiwan probably due to the sensitivity of the subject. However, the new emphasis that they placed on Sino-American relations and the

importance of incorporating the PRC into the world system combined with the continuing importance of Taiwan to the Chinese created the climate for the US to begin to withdraw its commitment to the island. If this was the one issue that prevented a rapprochement between the two then it was unlikely given the other views expressed by these academics that they would advocate abandoning the changes they wanted because of disagreements over Taiwan and its status and long-term future. Furthermore, these liberal academics had never had much faith in Jiang anyway and his involvement with the China Lobby hardly made it likely that they would rally to protect him. In short, the Chinese Nationalists were beginning to become an impediment to a process of reconciliation that these academics believed necessary for US interests. The academics were still too cautious to address this issue directly during the hearings but the shift of opinion was unmistakable.

These hearings clearly set in motion a shift in Sino-American relations. The majority of observers were now prepared to challenge the existing policy shift without fear of attack from the China Lobby. Moreover, pressure was now being brought to bear on the Administration to change policy in a way inconceivable a few years before when Kennedy had been in the White House. James Thomson best describes this shift in evidence that he gave before the same Committee in June 1972. In 1966, Thomson was still in government whereas by 1972 he had returned to Harvard where he was a Lecturer in History. He recalled the affect of the hearings thus:

> these hearings in 1966 had a profound impact within the

> Government, as they apparently did through television, upon the nation as a whole. The interagency community of China worriers and China watchers in the executive branch, long frustrated in their efforts to unfreeze China policy, was very much emboldened by the testimony of the academics, by the responsiveness of the Senators, by the favorable reaction of the press, and by subsequent indication of public flexibility as revealed in opinion polls.[38]

He also believed that the hearings led to the adoption, by the Johnson Administration, of Barnett's dictum "Containment without isolation" and helped the Administration move to end restrictions on travel by American citizens to the mainland.[39] Finally, Thomson believed the hearings helped lay the foundation for the changes in policy introduced later by Nixon:

> At the very least, then a new rhetorical foundation was laid for a revised China policy, a foundation which the Nixon administration has considerably enlarged, strengthened, and began to put to good use.[40]

All round therefore the Senate hearings of March 1966 was another decisive turning point in the evolving consensus calling for a new Sino-American relationship.

Those who supported the existing policy fought back. As well as David Rowe, Congressman John Ashbrook identified Fairbank and Barnett as members of a Red China Lobby.[41] Also, within Taiwan attacks on the views of Fairbank and others intensified. Dozens of

vitriolic articles were published with exotic titles such as "Why only Half-Baked China Watchers?" and "John K. Fairbank: Twister of Chinese History".[42] These attacks however failed to find a wider US audience. The spell woven a generation earlier was not going to be repeated in the new climate of the late 1960s due mainly to the decline of the China lobby and its influence. The conservative impulse and viewpoint was in the minority and was incapable of holding back the evolving consensus of the time. Their weakness and inability to prevent the changes being advocated contributed to the shift in policy itself.

(iii) Shifts within the US Government: 1966-1968.

In response to the China hearings, Johnson asked Thomson to write a memo on China policy setting out the views being put by the academics at the hearings.[43] Presidential aide Jack Valenti also got Thomson to outline in writing his proposed alternative China policy. In his response dated March 1, 1966 Thomson argued for a three pronged approach. The prongs were military containment of China and a policy of strengthening the nations on the borders of China. Finally, Thomson argued the US should try to create a more constructive engagement with the PRC with a view to helping to "erode the Chinese totalitarian state, to influence Chinese behavior, and to combat Chinese ignorance and fear of the outside world".[44] He then went on to say that:

> The first two of these aspects have received much attention since the Korean war. They underlie our network of military alliances and our aid program; they are reflected in the Vietnam war today.

But the third aspect has been largely neglected.[45] Thomson put this down to a combination of three factors: the domestic political environment; the existence of Taiwan as a separate claimant of power on the Chinese mainland; and the actions of the CCP leadership.[46] He then stated that these domestic impediments had now been removed and the initial Chinese reaction was secondary to the need for the US to be trying to break the impasse that existed.[47] He then made a list of recommendations, which included the usual agenda of trade in non-strategic items, encouraging visitors to and from China and including the PRC in negotiations about nuclear disarmament.[48] He concluded "the pursuit of a third strategy of flexibility commends itself as a low-risk imaginative policy worthy of a strong and confident power in its dealings with the China problem".[49] Having made these initial recommendations Thomson recorded the views being expressed on Capitol Hill by Barnett, Fairbank and the others and sent them to the President. According to Thomson, Johnson was "rather surprised - and pleased that they're not all against him on Vietnam. They're talking about China as a rather separate issue, and they are sort of making good sense about it".[50]

Johnson also decided to set up an advisory panel system involving the academics in a bid to create a closer relationship between them and the Administration. According to a memo written by Valenti: "This was to be a task force which would set out objectives and guidelines on our policy toward China and Russia -- so that Presidential decisions in this arena are tied to specific goals".[51] Over the coming months this new task force

was set up and academics such as John King Fairbank that had been ostracised for their criticisms of Jiang were now listened to again. This was indicative of the decisive shift that was taking place.

The first evidence of this new attempt at communication was the Panel on China, the United Nations and United States Policy convened by the Administration on July 6, 1966.[52] Amongst those involved were Barnett, Zagoria, and Lucien Pye of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Kenneth Young and George Taylor as well as traditional government advisers such as Arthur Dean and Robert Roosa, who chaired the Panel meeting.[53]

However, the most tangible proof of these efforts was the creation in December 1966 of a China Advisory Panel (CAP) that would report to a Panel of Advisors for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs within the State Department.[54] This new body included Fairbank, Barnett, Eckstein, Pye, Scalapino and Taylor. Other members of the CAP included two former US Ambassadors Philip Sprouse and Jules Holmes.[55] The CAP would hold discussions with government officials and then filtrate what they had gathered through to the larger Panel, which included other interested parties including Walter Judd.[56]

CAP held five meetings with government officials, each of which lasted two working days. They took place in February 1967, June 1967, October 1967, April 1968 and November 1968.[57] As well as these formal meetings a pattern of regular communication was established between Alfred Jenkins, the NSC China expert, and the academics involved in the Panel meetings.[58] The first meeting in February

discussed possible policy options but the meeting was dominated by a detailed consideration of the effects of the Cultural Revolution.[59] The academics argued that the turmoil on the mainland shouldn't impede the process of reviewing China policy and making any necessary alterations.[60] To other participants and Alfred Jenkins the government official who wrote a record of the Panel meeting for government files, the events in China necessitated the government to postpone any intended policy initiatives until it became clearer as to what the future direction of the PRC was likely to be.[61] As subsequent events were to show the academics assessment was to prove the more accurate based on their belief that it was the US who should be reforming its policy to adapt to the reality of the PRC. The chaos being generated within China made it less likely that it was about to embark on any aggressive foreign policies and historically the Chinese had looked inwards rather than to imperial expansion.

The second Panel meeting held on June 5 and 6th, went into far greater detail as to what the academics wanted.[62] Firstly, the academics "reiterated its consensus that the Cultural Revolution in China should not be considered a barrier to policy initiatives on our part at this time".[63] They then went onto emphasise their support for the Johnson Administration's conduct of the war in Vietnam but again did not see that as a barrier to attempts to improving Sino-American relations. According to the official record of the meeting:

> There was a general consensus that our policy toward Communist China should consist of a firm stand in Vietnam, but also a more

> liberal stance concerning economic relationships. Fairbank feared that if the U.S. stance on trade and other relationships is unyielding, this would in time encourage the revival of Sino-Soviet ties.[64]

The Panel also considered in full the issue of Taiwan and stated: "There was general agreement that the long-range future for Taiwan is likely to be one of separate existence from the mainland and that the U.S should favor self-determination for the Taiwanese".[65]

Certain points can be made about the attitude and the recommendations put forward by the academics. Firstly, the policy options they were proposing were entirely consistent with those Thomson, Hilsman and others had been arguing for under President Kennedy and that the academics themselves had put forward at the Senate hearings. Secondly, their support for the war in Vietnam and their seeming inability to relate it in any way to Sino-American relations suggests that they did not fully adopt a regional approach. Of course, members of the Panel may have compromised and suppressed their doubts about the war in the hope of influencing the government in what to them was the more important arena of Sino-American relations. Their support for the war also suggests that the criticism aimed at them by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS) which was that they were implicated in the decision process that led to the war does have some legitimacy. As late as 1967, the cream of US academics who specialised in Asia studies and China were still supporting the war in Vietnam. Paul Evans, Fairbank's biographer, suggests that he was

tormented by events in Vietnam throughout 1966 and 1967 but only came out fully against the war in 1968.[66] By that time it was clear that the Johnson Administration had failed to put down the Vietcong: that the US was not prepared to pay the price of winning the war; and that public support was draining away. A final point was on the issue of Taiwan, these academics remained tied to the idea of "two Chinas" even though all indications coming out of the PRC showed that this policy would never be acceptable to the leadership in Beijing.

Ultimately, the Panel meetings failed to affect significantly Johnson's China policy as events in Vietnam and China itself overtook the advice being given. Later Fairbank would argue that the meetings served no useful purpose and it was clear that amongst these academics a cynicism towards Johnson had developed based on his personal style and inability to shift policy.[67] This failure shows that Vietnam had begun by 1967 to hamper any genuine attempts by the Johnson Administration to change policy. Also it shows the limitations of the influence of these academics. Their role was merely to push the flow along rather than dramatically effect the shaping of policy in the short term. They needed a President in the White House who shared their perception about China policy and was willing to pursue their agenda. That was clearly not the case with Lyndon Johnson.

In addition to this new Panel a high-level attempt was made by the Administration in 1966 to encourage Edwin Reischauer, who planned to stand down as Ambassador to Japan to return to academic life at Harvard, to take on a new role as an ambassador-at-large with special

responsibility for China.[68] Reischauer, who was well known as an advocate for the approach supported by Thomson and others, received the support in the early months of 1966 of both Bill Moyers and McGeorge Bundy. Bundy described Reischauer as "a great reinforcement and protection in which both our long-range thinking about China and our immediate Vietnamese dangers make this kind of person very important to us".[69] Reischauer was aware and appreciative of these efforts but had become disillusioned with the Johnson Administration on issues such as China and Vietnam and felt little rapport with either the President or Dean Rusk.[70] He preferred to return to Harvard where he felt he could speak out more freely rather than take a job that he described as "merely an exercise in futility".[71] Reischauer had a meeting with Johnson on July 22, 1966 to discuss China policy where according to Reischauer "he (Johnson) conducted a monologue most of the time".[72] Johnson did try to keep Reischauer within the Administration but the academic was unimpressed and felt that the President was trying to look like he wanted him to stay rather than a genuine desire to take his policy ideas into account.[73]

Reischauer's scepticism fails to take into account the genuine shift that did take place in 1966 where both Vice-President Hubert Humphrey and later Johnson himself made speeches outlining their desire to seek a new relationship with the PRC. On June 8, 1966 at West Point Humphrey told his audience that "we seek and will continue to seek to build bridges, to keep open the doors of communication, to the Communist states of Asia, and in particular Communist China".[74] On July 12, Johnson went even

further in a speech given at White Sulphur Springs on Asia policy. The President called for "cooperation and not hostility" with mainland China.[75] He also called for "the free flow of ideas and people and goods" which seems to be clearly a reference to non-strategic trade and passports for those wanting to travel to and from China.[76] Finally, the President stated his belief that peace could only come to the region "through full participation by all nations in the international community under law", which can be interpreted as the first sign that the US was preparing to relax its opposition to the PRC entering the United Nations.[77] These sentiments from a President would have been unheard of even twelve months ago but they reflected the palpable shift in opinion that had developed in 1966.

Historians have identified 1966 as a key turning point in Johnson's policy towards the PRC. Leonard Kusnitz argues, on the basis of interviews that he carried out in 1966 that Johnson came around to believing in a policy of "two Chinas" but that the opposition of Dean Rusk prevented him from taking those ideas further.[78] Gordon Chang sees a clear shift in US government attitudes towards the PRC. Johnson stopped publicly claiming that the Chinese were responsible for starting the war in Vietnam and calling the Chinese capital Peiping.[79] From the Chinese side, Chang asserts that at some point in the spring of 1966 they informed the US that China would not enter the war so long as the US didn't attack China itself or bomb north of the Red River dykes.[80]

A final intriguing aspect of this policy shift was an attempt by Johnson to try to communicate with the PRC through Romania; an attempt

repeated by Nixon in 1969.[81] Johnson told Romanian President Maurer to tell the Chinese leadership that the US hoped that the PRC could play a peaceful role in Asian development.[82] Arriving in Bucharest on June 23, 1966 Zhou had declared that: "Romania has successfully fought pressure from outside and she has been striving to find useful norms for cooperation between friendly countries".[83] This statement seemed to suggest that the Chinese were prepared to treat the Romanians as a go-between in relations it might want with the outside world. Although the Chinese were still insisting that US commitment to Taiwan made any reconciliation impossible. However, in a *People's Daily* article of March 31, it was US military presence around the island that most upset the Chinese:

> So long as US Govt does not change its hostile policy toward China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan strait, the normalization of Sino-American relations is entirely out of the question and so is solution of such a concrete question as exchange of visits between personnel of the two countries.[84]

This wording and the emphasis on the US military presence would provide the solution to the Taiwan issue for Richard Nixon but remained unacceptable in 1966 to the Johnson Administration.[85]

Another factor contributing to the shift was the attitude of the Defense Department, military chiefs and the CIA. In 1966, the Defense Department began to advocate a policy of "two Chinas" as offering a more constructive approach that would aid US strategic interests.[86] In

September 1966, Jenkins recorded a discussion with Morton Halperin now employed by the Defense Department who told him that a memo advocating "two Chinas" had been approved within the Department without any opposition. Halperin wrote that:

> McNamara commissioned his staff to find some way of getting DOD (Department of Defense) into Chirep (China and the United Nations) policy deliberations. The reasoning was that our present stand damages our relations with friends, and that particularly in the case of Japan such damage has defense implications.[87]

Military chiefs stationed in the region echoed this view. For example, in March, the US Chiefs of Mission throughout East Asia called on the Administration to "mitigate the impression of inflexibility and rigidity in our approach to China".[88] In particular they called for the lifting of the trade embargo on non-strategic items and greater cultural contacts between the two.[89]

CIA reports bolstered this shift. In June 1966, a CIA report entitled "Economic Benefits to Communist China of a Removal of US Trade Controls" argued that the selling of US machinery would make little practical difference to the operation of the Chinese economy.[90] A CIA cable dated September 19, 1966 poured scorn on the idea that the PRC might at this time want war with the United States over Vietnam or anyone else:

> It seems quite inconsistent that Mao Tse-tung would be thinking of taking his country into a war with the United States at the same time that he is carrying out an internal struggle against his own

> party and attempting to force the country into new and greater production.[91]

That being said the cable did suggest that the US should remain sensitive to Chinese troop movements towards the area bordering North Vietnam.[92] All of this reinforced the argument for a change in China policy.

Within the lower levels of the US Government the most important development was the interagency study carried out under the direction of Joseph Yager.[93] Set up in the autumn of 1965 by August 1966 it had prepared a series of recommendations including the creation of a permanent Interagency Committee to provide a forum for discussions between the relevant departments on China policy.[94] These included the Departments of State and Defense. The study's initial report made some small policy suggestions on trade and visitors to China which although supporting the ideas suggested by Thomson and others was noticeably more cautious.[95] Thomson, in one of his last memos before his return to Harvard was critical of that caution:

> To the casual observer, it may seem that the mountain has labored and brought forth a mouse. Yet, I anticipate resistance at the top of the Department even to these minimal steps.[96]

This quote indicates Thomson's growing despair as well as the continuing resistance that he perceived Dean Rusk provided against any potential changes to policy.[97] It was at the third meeting of the new Interagency China Country Committee that overall policy was discussed in depth.

Yager's study formed the backdrop of the talks.[98] The first two meetings had concerned themselves solely with organisational matters.[99] The "tentatively approved" recommendations were policy directions rather than specific steps but they were based on greater flexibility that reflected a desire to seek "eventual reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies".[100] The central recommendation of the Committee was that a balance needed to be found between supporting allies in Asia and on the other hand placing limitations on the degree to which the US was prepared to intervene in the region.[101] In November 1966, the China Working Group recommended the removal of the last of the remaining travel restrictions.[102] Yager's study, which has yet to be released in its entirety, will clearly shed light on the views of members of the Johnson Administration on China policy. However, its concrete proposals suggest a tentative commitment to changing policy that may either have reflected a cautious stance or a messy compromise between two opposing factions.

Even after all the shifts of 1966 practical policy towards the PRC actually changed very little. In April 1967, the Administration stated that it might allow pharmaceuticals to be shipped to the PRC and in May 1968 Chinese journalists were invited to cover the upcoming US Presidential elections.[103]

Observers like James Thomson and historians like Leonard Kusnitz have emphasised the dual affects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the war in Vietnam.[104] The combination of the two stymied any genuine chances of Johnson changing policy. The issue of trade continued to be

discussed within the Administration and according to Thomson, Johnson, at the time planning to stand for re-election, hoped to have a summit with the Chinese Communist leadership during the election year.[105] This was not to be the case and ultimately the careful groundwork laid by Hilsman and Thomson under Kennedy was never to find fruition under his successor.

Nevertheless, the shift had taken place and it was clear that whoever succeeded Johnson would have a unique opportunity to adopt a policy of his choice unimpeded by the domestic restraints that had been so critical in the thinking of John Kennedy. *The Wall Street Journal* aptly caught the new mood in an article on November 14, 1967, which Alfred Jenkins picked up on and sent to Walt Rostow as part of a Memo entitled "After Mao". Of US policy the article stated:

> The present attempt to isolate mainland China, after all, makes no sense as a permanent policy. Eventually logic will compel the U.S. to offer diplomatic relations, a measure of trade and other steps advocated by those who want better relations with China. The relevant argument is over when and how.[106]

It then went onto argue that Mao's successors were likely to want to concentrate on internal economic development rather than foreign revolution. The article suggested that, "it would be in the U.S. interest to encourage such a regime" and that once such a shift in the PRC became clear then the US should start to change its policy along the lines suggested by the academics.[107] Jenkins declared that the article was identical to his thinking.[108] By 1967 the question was really one of

"when rather than if" and it can be argued that the activities of the academics like Fairbank and their allies in government like Thomson was crucial in creating that climate. It was ironic that just as they were about to see the real fruits of their lobbying in this area they decided to withdraw from public life.

This failure to change policy even after the decline of the China Lobby and the shift in public opinion were crucial factors in the decision by Edwin Reischauer and James Thomson to leave the government in the summer of 1966.[109] Back at Harvard, Reischauer wrote *Beyond Vietnam*, which was an update of his views on Asia policy.[110] He left the Administration utterly disillusioned especially over the failure to reform China policy.[111] In one of his last cables as Ambassador to Japan, he set out his views in language that could leave nobody under any illusion about the extent of his disenchantment:

> Nothing stands more firmly in the way of a Chinese readiness to seek a rapprochement with the world than their resentment of what they regard to be the callous pretence on the part of the world's greatest power that China does not exist or that, if it does exist, it is so depraved or so unstable or so inconsequential that it should be barred from world society.[112]

On Taiwan he wrote that, "we should not allow the peculiarities of one small country to continue to determine the position of the world's greatest power year after year".[113] This memo which over-emphasised the feelings of the Chinese clearly showed the frustration felt by liberals like Reischauer.

Thomson was more circumspect about his reasons for leaving government. He felt in need of developing an alternative career in academia and he had developed a good working relationship with McGeorge Bundy and when Bundy left the Administration.[114] However, he was deeply disillusioned by events and his inability to affect the conduct of policy:

> The moments of euphoria -- when one broke through the travel ban after four and a half years of trying; when one got the President finally to say some gracious words toward Peking; when one heard the President give a conciliatory speech about the future of the Mekong and North Vietnam -- such moments of euphoria were very few and far between, and they could not balance out the deepening sense of horror over escalation and killing with no end in sight, movement down a track which seemed a suicide track.[115]

This reply given in an oral history interview he gave for the Kennedy Library prompted a question about why he didn't speak out against the war sooner.[116] Thomson's reply throws light on the whole relationship between the US government and the policy academics who at times work for it and at other times in conjunction with it:

> One has a sense of constraints -- respect for one's colleagues who are left in, a sort of loyalty to the good guys inside, as well as to the presidency, and I'm sure also some sense of fear. You want to be invited back. You don't want to break the code. You therefore want to be careful.[117]

Thomson comprehensively broke the code in May 1967 when he

published a comic parody of a National Security Council meeting under Walt Rostow in the magazine *Atlantic.*[118] Rostow communicated to Thomson, via academic Richard Neustadt, that as a result of the article Thomson would never work in government again.[119] A month later Thomson went even further when he wrote a letter to the *New York Times* outlining his opposition to the war in Vietnam.[120] For both Reischauer and Thomson there seemed little reason to remain inside an Administration that they felt no longer represented the values and aspirations that had brought them into government in 1961. It is clear that their early hopes of having a decisive impact on policy had given way to despair about their lack of influence and the failings of the strategy that was being pursued.

(iv) The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

The final element in the shift in domestic pressures on US China policy was the formation of the National Committee on US-China Relations. Conceived in the autumn of 1965, it came into official being in June 1966.[121] The Committee's proposed research programme included organising a series of conferences; launching a public discussion programme and setting up working parties to look into issues such as China and the United Nations; China's economic relations with the outside world and the Sino-Soviet split.[122] It was formed with the express purpose of facilitating a debate on China policy. As it declared in its statement of purpose:

> The National Committee on United States China Relations believes

> that we urgently need a public discussion of our current China policy: the basic issues, present problems, and possible alternatives. Such a discussion is essential in terms of our national interest and the peace and security of the world.[123]

The Committee stated that it would take no policy position, "but are hopeful that out of a national dialogue on the subject there will emerge a consensus as to whether any modifications in our existing policies are desirable".[124]

In its initial press release the Committee set out its prospective programme thus:

> the purpose of the Committee will be able to serve as a national resource center to provide the means through which the current public discussion on U.S. China policy can be maintained at the highest level of sophistication ... A market survey to determine the scope of trade possibilities with China is also planned.[125]

Its programme showed the wide ranging remit that the organisation intended to have and the likely affects that this would have on government policy. Other activities that the Committee were intended to be involved in was formal exchanges between the US and the PRC; polling studies on attitudes in the US towards China and various elements of US policy towards the PRC and the publication of a regular newsletter.[126]

This wide-ranging remit was also evidenced in the membership of the Committee. Its organising group included from academia A. Doak Barnett and Robert Scalapino who became one of its co-chairmen.[127]

The world of business was represented by amongst others: Allan Sproul who was a director of Wells Fargo Bank, Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Corporation of San Francisco; Daniel Koshland who was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Levi Strauss Company based in San Francisco and Jack Gomperts who was the former Chairman of the World Trade Association of San Francisco who had been involved in the controversial report that had been circulated the year before.[128] Finally, the organizing Committee included other interested parties such as Carl Stover who was the Executive Director of the National Institute of Public Affairs; Anna Lord Strauss, who was the former President of the League of Women Voters of the US, and Cecil Thomas who was the Associate Peace Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee.[129] Its overall membership also included representatives from academia, business and policy centres that acted as vehicles for advice to government.[130] For example other academics involved included Fairbank and Eckstein and in total included seven who had appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1966.[131]

The Committee received an almost immediate endorsement from Vice-President Hubert Humphrey and Senator Edward Kennedy and by 1967 according to Paul Evans: "having secured substantial foundation funding, it operated as the country's largest information clearing house and as an active forum for promoting public discussion".[132]

In analysis, it needs to be emphasised that despite its protestations of neutrality the National Committee was biased towards changing policy. Its membership was made up of almost exclusively those who advocated

the sorts of changes outlined at the Senate hearings by men like Barnett and Fairbank. In fact, it showed a formal joining together of all those who advocated change from academia, business and other interested organisations. It is worth noting that the business involvement was mainly from the West Coast proving Steele's thesis that the West Coast and San Francisco was the fulcrum of support for change.[133] Furthermore, even if the organisation were genuinely neutral in its approach to US policy then its activities would ultimately undermine a policy of total isolation. After all promoting cultural exchanges, studies into policy alternatives and public discussion programmes would erode the basis of support - a declining support as has been argued - from the existing policy. The membership of the Committee who regarded the policy of total isolation as fundamentally flawed believed that the more the policy was discussed the more it would come into disrepute. A final point is that the formation of the National Committee was the most systematic evidence of the decline of the "China Lobby". The funding and support available to the new Committee dwarfed that for the Committee of a Million.

The existence of the National Committee affected the debate on China policy within government, bolstering the position of those who wanted change. This influence was apparent when the Committee sponsored a meeting between President Johnson and a group of China experts.[134] The experts were Reischauer, Scalapino, Eckstein, Lucien Pye, Barnett and George Taylor.[135] With the exception of Taylor all were known advocates of a change in policy. Also present, representing the

Committee, were Carl Stover and Cecil Thomas (who was its Executive Director). With Johnson were Walt Rostow and Alfred Jenkins.[136] The experts outlined potential policy options and lobbied hard for the appointment of a policy adviser with a specific remit for China policy.[137] Johnson accepted that policy had failed but blamed the Chinese who were "interested in discussing nothing except Taiwan".[138] Eckstein emphasised the change that the National Committee represented:

> He (Eckstein) said that he detected a changing mood in the country; in the business community, in labor circles, in civic groups and in churches. He said the Committee represented by this group constituted an answer to the rigidities represented in the Committee of One Million. The time has come to engage in more open discussions.[139]

Johnson concluded the meeting by thanking the Group for their input and asking them to send a memo to him outlining their policy recommendations and making a recommendation as to who could be appointed as an expert on the PRC.[140]

In response to the Johnson meeting with the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations two replies came back from the academics involved. On February 12, all but Taylor supported a series of small steps including greater communication with the PRC. Their memo recommended that the US repudiates Jiang's claims to the mainland and allows the PRC to enter the UN under the same terms as other countries.[141] The memo suggested taking these steps incrementally to maximise their affect on Beijing and show the PRC leadership that the US

was not engaged in a mere propaganda exercise.[142] The memo supported the creation of a position of ambassador-at-large but declined to name an individual for the role.[143] Two days later George Taylor wrote a dissenting memo distancing himself from the position being taken by the others and stating that: "Reconciliation is the wrong word for the ultimate objectives of the United States".[144]

Johnson asked his National Security Adviser Walt Rostow and Secretary of State Dean Rusk to write papers on China policy for him.[145] Assessing the scholar's recommendations, Rostow commented that: "The specific steps proposed ... are not new, having been under intensive study at one time or another within the government".[146] Moreover, these recommendations are "regarded by most of the China specialists within government as having merit, provided appropriate timing in their application is followed".[147] The conclusion of the piece commented that the suggestions were constructive but that they could not be implemented at the time because of the attitude of the regime in Beijing and the uncertainties caused by the Cultural Revolution.[148] The one positive aspect of Rostow's recommendations was that the President, if possible, should emphasise America's desire for eventual reconciliation.[149] There was no mention within the memo of Taiwan and its importance to the Chinese.

Of even greater interest was a memo from Dean Rusk, who seems to have been given leave by the President to say what he believed.[150] Rusk recommended some very limited changes on travel and the sale of

food to the Chinese but beyond that opposed any changes:

> For immediate purposes, I believe we can take only very limited steps, since our firm posture in Asia generally remains crucial and any significant "concessions" to Communist China would be seriously misunderstood in key quarters, not to mention the Congress.[151]

This statement suggests that Rusk remained highly sceptical about the volatility of public opinion and was not prepared to believe that the majority was open to possible changes in policy. For somebody who had served as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in the Truman Administration this was an understandable caution but nevertheless it showed an inability to adapt to the new public mood of 1968. He also showed inflexibility towards the Chinese believing that they would only respond to a "firm posture".

Rusk then went on to assert that as a consequence of the conflict with the Soviet Union, the PRC might seek to improve its relations with the US. In his opinion, the US should be prepared to welcome this development and make it clear that it was open to a new China policy. However, he proposed no significant steps on the part of the US that could facilitate such a change.[152]

The final area of note is Rusk's attitude towards the issue of Taiwan. Rusk was categorical as to what he saw as the outcome of the struggle between the PRC and ROC:

> (We deal with) Peking and Taipei as if they were separate states. This is a direction toward which our policies have been taking us

for 15 years and it is probably in our interest to work gradually toward at least a tacit acknowledgement of this reality by both.[153]

Rusk did not believe that an improvement in Sino-American relations could take place until the leadership in Beijing accepted the idea of separate states.[154] This statement clearly shows that Rusk believed in "Two Chinas" and that the protection of Taiwan was central to his opposition to changing China policy. For Rusk, Taiwan was an issue from which the US could not be seen to compromise. From what we know about the Chinese position this was the single issue from which they were not prepared to retreat. Rusk either failed to grasp or refused to accept the legitimacy of the Chinese belief that Taiwan was an issue of national sovereignty not an issue to be negotiated.

From this certain points can be made about Rusk's position. James Thomson has emphasised that Rusk was the single factor that prevented China policy being changed during the Kennedy and Johnson Administration.[155] In fact, he described Rusk as an "absolute zealot" on China policy.[156] However, this memo showed that he was more flexible although he remained convinced that domestic public opinion would not accept a change in policy towards the PRC and that until the Chinese changed their stance on Taiwan the US should not alter its policy. Warren Cohen's view that Rusk was always more flexible but that he took his lead from two hard-line Presidents is patently false. As has been discussed Kennedy was more adaptable than Rusk on this issue and in 1968 Johnson was toying with changing policy, as a result of the domestic shift. Yet Rusk still only recommended the most minor steps.

Rusk, was not a zealot on China policy but he was less flexible than those around him and acted as a drag on efforts to change policy. He was not the single factor that prevented policy being changed under Kennedy and Johnson but he was a major factor. A more flexible Secretary of State may have led to a more thorough change in policy after 1964. One can only ponder what would have happened had for example Averell Harriman or Clark Clifford been Secretary of State between 1964 and 1968. That is not to downplay other factors that impeded the currents trying to change policy such as the Cultural revolution, the war in Vietnam and the continuing uncertainty surrounding public opinion.

Another factor that put China policy on the agenda of the President in February 1968 was an incident on or around February 10, when an American HA-IF was shot down by a MIG near Hainan.[157] Johnson ordered a study of violations of Chinese airspace and this must have increased his concern about his inability to communicate directly with the leadership in Beijing.[158] Ultimately little changed in February 1968. The war in Vietnam, including the Tet Offensive, preoccupied the President and events in China itself gave little ground for hope that the leaders in Beijing might change their stance. The academics that had met with the President sensed this sterility and Reischauer for one was dismissive of the meeting:

> We sat together around the Cabinet table in the White House, and I could see that he was trying to win understanding from the academic community. Nothing came of this meeting except an

> embarrassing incident in which Johnson mistook his own White House adviser on East Asian affairs (Alfred Jenkins) for a member of the visiting group. It showed how disgracefully little the poor man was consulted.[159]

This was a little harsh. Johnson did review policy in February 1968 but the advice he received showed how his key advisers remained wedded to the view that the arguments for the existing policy outweighed the arguments for the approach recommended by Reischauer and others.

(v) Conclusions.

The period between 1966 and 1968 in the wider context of the evolving consensus was the key moment when the balance of forces that argued for change in US policy became the majority view. The Senate hearings and the formation and activities of the National Committee on US-China Relations reflected a change in public opinion and mood that had begun in the early 1960s. This mood was also reflected in parts of the US Government. The Defense Department began to seek to change existing policy and within the NSC and State Department continued arguments were put forward for a more progressive approach. However, at the higher levels of the US government, beyond a change in tone and a desire to seek reconciliation with the PRC evidenced in speeches given by Johnson and Humphrey, policy remained firmly wedded to total isolation. When questioned, officials blamed that on the Beijing leadership that refused to accept the concept of Taiwan as a separate state. Other factors like the war in Vietnam and the Cultural Revolution

reinforced this caution, as did continuing fear about a domestic backlash against any changes. Ultimately though the Johnson Administration was gripped with a sterile approach and an unwillingness to change. By 1968, it was not hostile to the views of men like Reischauer, Fairbank and Barnett. It was simply unwilling to make the moves they advocated. Perhaps, this was understandable caution in an election year or just exhaustion from the trials and tribulations that it had endured. When Johnson announced on March 31, 1968 that he would not seek re-election it became clear that the issues raised by the Senate hearings and National Committee would be dealt with by a new man.[160]

The academics sensed that the next president might make the required changes and given their liberal instincts they rallied firstly to the banner of Robert Kennedy and then after his assassination in June 1968, to the campaign of vice-president Hubert Humphrey.[161] Instead the 1968 Presidential Election would be won by Richard Nixon, a man with a chequered history on China policy, and one with an abiding fascination with foreign policy as well as a deep rooted dislike of policy academics.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE GRAND OPENING

(i) Introduction.

The final period that will be looked at is the actual opening to China itself. Amongst the issues that need to be considered is the role of Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. To what extent were their policies and outlook towards the People's Republic of China affected by the domestic factors and individuals that we have looked at? To do that requires not only a study of Nixon's policy of rapprochement with Beijing but the continuing evolving consensus that was developing towards China policy.

(ii) Richard Nixon.

Richard Nixon first entered politics in 1946 when he was elected as a Congressman for his home state of California. He quickly earned a reputation as a conservative who attacked Democrats for their supposed softness towards Communism. In 1950 he became Senator for California on the same platform.[1] Despite this conservative background however, he was always careful to maintain a distance between himself and the formalised China Lobby. Although his 1950 campaign fund included contributions from the Lobby, Nixon was never a mere mouthpiece for their views in the way that his senate colleague from California William Knowland was perceived to be.[2] Moreover, Nixon was careful not to attack the liberal internationalist wing of the Republican Party. Consequently, although seen as coming from the conservative wing of the party, he was able to maintain good relations with the liberal wing that

dominated the party on the East Coast. This careful balancing act was, perhaps, crucial to Nixon's selection as Eisenhower's vice-presidential candidate in 1952.[3]

Once in office, in 1953, Nixon went on a tour of the Far East, visiting nineteen countries including Japan, South Korea and South Vietnam.[4] Publicly, he returned blaming the People's Republic of China for all the problems that the US and its allies were experiencing in Asia. "If China had not gone Communist," he declared, "we would not have had a war in Korea ... there would now be no war in Indochina, and there would be no war in Malaya".[5] Privately, his conclusions were very different. In a report to Eisenhower on his visit and his views on Asia policy, Nixon condemned the influence of McCarthy on the State Department and the discrediting of Foreign Service workers and professionals: "No one wants to make a career in a discredited service".[6] In particular, he attacked the role of Scott McLeod who at the time was administrator of the State Department's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and was charged with identifying potential security risks in the service. McLeod had been appointed at the behest of McCarthy.[7] Nixon condemned the move: "he (McLeod) is a stooge of McCarthy working in the State Department; he knows nothing, about the foreign service and he has never visited a single diplomatic post outside the United States".[8]

Privately, Nixon was also subtler in his views on the People's Republic of China. For example, on August 4, 1954, the National Security Council discussed a document NSC 5429.[9] During the discussions, General Matthew Ridgway, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed

the view that the US should not be trying to destroy the CCP as that would only create a void for the Soviet Union to move into. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed with this perspective although Eisenhower did not. Nixon then expressed his opinion. He felt that the US should adopt a policy of what he termed as "tough coexistence" towards the PRC and "an area of action in between war and appeasement".[10] This should be done "on the basis that in the long run Soviet Russia and

Communist China can and must split apart".[11] Ultimately, Eisenhower got his way and the NSC adopted a policy statement that committed the US to "reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking war".[12] This meeting, and Nixon's contribution to it shows that as early as 1953 he was dissatisfied with the policy of total isolation. It also showed that Nixon was subtler than contemporary observers might have expected and his public hostility towards the PRC was not the same view he held in private.

The same year, according to journalist Henry Brandon, Nixon went even further when in a meeting with a number of correspondents, he spoke of gradually ending the isolation of the PRC by progressively reopening trade relations and cultural exchanges between the two nations.[13] Once again, this is evidence of Nixon's flexibility that he kept hidden from public view.

In April 1960 as he prepared to run for the Presidency, Nixon is rumoured to have attempted to obtain a visa to travel to the PRC.[14] According to George Dixon, a newspaper columnist close to him, Nixon

saw electoral advantages in a visit to the mainland even then. "If he can achieve a "breakthrough" into the forbidden country that holds one-fourth of the earth's people" wrote Dixon "his "image" will be so gigantic he'll overshadow any stay-at-home Democratic opponent".[15] Eisenhower mocked the suggestion at the time and British embassy reports labelled Dixon a "buffoon" and "not intended to be taken seriously".[16] Nevertheless, later writers like Seymour Hersh are convinced of the accuracy of the report.[17] They point out that Nixon's 1959 visit to Moscow and the subsequent positive publicity showed him the potential benefits of visits to communist countries. It is certainly true that on a number of occasions later Nixon would talk of a general personal desire to visit the PRC.[18] Furthermore, during the 1960 election he promised to tour communist countries if elected.[19]

However, as the Election Day neared Nixon reverted to his more traditional hostile view of the Communist Chinese. During one of the famous televised debates with Kennedy he enunciated his public position on the PRC: "They don't want just Quemoy and Matsu. They don't want just Formosa. They want the world".[20]

After the election where Nixon went down to one of the narrowest defeats in presidential history, he met with Kennedy and amongst the issues they discussed was China policy.[21] Kennedy told him that although he opposed recognising China he had heard some good arguments for adopting a strategy of "Two Chinas" over the issue of who should sit in the United Nations.[22] Nixon left the new president in no

doubt that he would oppose any attempts to move towards accommodating the Chinese leadership in Beijing.[23]

Once out of office, Nixon busied himself with working as a lawyer dealing with international trade law.[24] Nixon used this work as a means to travelling around the world and meeting as many world leaders as possible. Also, he used this period to develop his ideas on foreign policy and to indulge himself in his love of international affairs.[25] Unlike Lyndon Johnson, who was primarily interested in domestic policy, he imbibed foreign policy and the workings of the world system.

In 1963, in Europe, Nixon met French President Charles De Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who both argued that the US should change its policy towards the PRC.[26] Also that year he visited Japan where he met with the Ambassador Edwin Reischauer who was a known advocate of change. At this time, he would regularly travel to Japan as part of his work for Pepsi-Cola, who were one of his clients and whose chairman Donald Kendall was a close friend.[27] Reischauer recalled their meetings thus:

> I had always looked on Nixon with abhorrence, but in the flesh he was much larger, better looking, and more pleasantly spoken than one would gather from television. In calls later made on me at my office, he would speak forcefully of the desirability of recognising Peking, sounding for all the world like John Fairbank. I had felt that the American public had been ready for this for some years, and when as President he finally did do it, I was in no way surprised.[28]

In 1965, he tried again without success to get a visa to visit the PRC.

This time it was part of his legal work when one of his clients, John Shaheen, wanted him to go with the Premier of the Canadian Province of Newfoundland, Mike Pearson. The State Department vetoed the suggestion.[29] Nixon did all of this whilst publicly declaring that the war in Vietnam was a "confrontation - not fundamentally between Vietnam and the Vietcong or between the United States and the Vietcong - but between the United States and Communist China".[30]

By 1967, Nixon had decided to seek the Presidency for a second time. He decided that the time was right to announce publicly his belief in the need for a change of policy. In April, whilst in India as part of another tour of Asia he met with the Ambassador Chester Bowles. Bowles reported the meeting to Secretary of State Dean Rusk remarking particularly on his attitude towards the PRC:

> On several occasions he almost suggested that good relations with China were more important than good relations with the Soviet Union. I disagreed with him strongly on this point, pointing out that the door to Moscow was ajar while the door to Peking was locked and bolted. I suspect he picked these ideas up in Hong Kong.[31]

However, it is his article in *Foreign Affairs*, the elite journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, where Nixon forcefully set out his views on China policy. In the article entitled "Asia After Vietnam" he left no ambiguity in the need for a change in China policy:

> Any American policy toward Asia ... must come urgently to grips with the reality of China ... Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to

> nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation. But we could go disastrously wrong if, in pursuing this long-range goal, we failed in the short range to read the lessons of history.
>
> The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change. The way to do this is to persuade China that it must change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems.[32]

It is clear that central to his thinking was the need for communication with the PRC and the need to develop a constructive policy that incorporated the Chinese Communists within a world system, whereby they become less of a threat to the United States and its allies and satellites. This view not only accepted the perspective of men like Fairbank but also emphasised the need for change in terms of global stability, which was a key concern of Nixon and was evidenced by his pursuit of foreign policy once in the White House.

During the election year itself, Nixon repeatedly stressed his desire to seek a better relationship with the PRC. After his nomination by the Republican Party as its candidate he stated that: "We must not forget China. We must always seek opportunities to talk with her, as with the USSR ... We must not only watch for changes. We must seek to make

changes".[33] After his victory in November, he told his transition team that one of his ambitions as President would be to recognise the PRC.[34]

As President-elect his most important act was to appoint Henry Kissinger as his National Security Adviser. Kissinger was a Harvard based academic who had worked as a consultant to the Governor of New York Nelson Rockefeller, who was the leading figure of the liberal wing in the Republican Party.[35] Once in office, Nixon would quickly sideline the role of the State Department and rely on his own instincts and knowledge as well as the advice of Kissinger.

Unlike Nixon, Kissinger came to office with very little focus on China policy. In his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* he had included a chapter on "Sino-Soviet Strategic Thought", but it was very much a standard expression of the view that the Chinese were the more extreme of the two super-powers.[36] In 1958, he met with Adenauer who told him that he believed that a break between the two Communist superpowers was almost inevitable. Kissinger admitted later that at the time he did not believe the West German Chancellor.[37] The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons also horrified him. Initially once the Sino-Soviet split became apparent Kissinger sympathised far more with the Soviets.[38] Nevertheless, by 1968 he had come to see the possibilities of the US developing good relations with both the USSR and China. In a speech drafted for Rockefeller and given by him in July, Kissinger wrote:

> We will have to learn to deal imaginatively with several competing centers of communist power ... I would begin a dialogue with

> Communist China. In a subtle triangle of relations between Washington, Peking and Moscow, we improve the possibilities of accommodations with each as we increase our options toward both.[39]

Despite this, his knowledge and interests were always focused more on Europe and general international relations theory. Although, Kissinger knew many of the academics like Reischauer, with special interests in East Asia, he never belonged or involved himself overtly in their discussions.[40]

Concluding therefore, Nixon came to office with a substantial knowledge and interest in international policy particularly towards Asia. Moreover, Nixon maintained a dual perspective on policy towards the PRC. Publicly, he continued to portray himself as a Cold War warrior and only in 1967, as the public mood was changing, did he begin to soften his stance. However, privately he was always more flexible and believed in a policy of containment. Nixon was quite happy to ride the storm of anti-PRC thinking whilst not agreeing with its nostrums and at the same time take advantage of any change in the domestic environment. In short, he was primarily an opportunistic politician who saw the Communist powers as akin to other nations in one's ability to develop agreements and understanding with them based on mutual interest. This marked him out from many of his most recent predecessors who emphasised the revolutionary nature of the Communist states. This opportunism, cynicism as well as belief in negotiation would become apparent once Nixon was in the White House.

(iii) 1969: A Year of Opportunity.

Once in the White House, Nixon quickly turned his attention to China policy. As he later noted in a State Department Bulletin published in March 1972: "I entered office convinced that a new policy toward the People's Republic of China was an essential component of a new American foreign policy".[41] In January 1969 he told Lt General Vernon Walters that he was determined to seek an opening to China. To that effect on February 1, he sent an unsigned Memorandum to Kissinger stating that: "I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this administration is exploring possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese ... This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into public print from this direction".[42]

This quotation summed up Nixon's obsession with secrecy. On taking office, he organised the foreign policy making structure to enhance the role of the National Security Council and sideline the State Department. To do this Nixon created a system whereby Kissinger, who became a key player, would write Memos on various policy areas outlining a range of options. These were known as NSSMs (National Security Study Memoranda) and reflected the President's belief that the State Department had failed to provide Lyndon Johnson with all the options open to him on issues such as the war in Vietnam. Once Nixon had read the Memo and had made his decisions they would be reproduced in what was known as a NSDM (National Security Decision Memoranda). For both men, this system had the added advantage that it made sure the

decision making process was more secret, was kept out of the public eye and was less open to scrutiny. It was in this climate, for example, that the secret bombing of Cambodia was begun.[43]

On February 5, 1969, Nixon began to request NSSMs on China. NSSM 14 dealt with China policy in general.[44] The key option proposed was the idea of "Two Chinas", which according to journalist Tad Szulc in his monumental study of Nixon's foreign policy *The Illusion of Peace*, was couched in general terms of preserving relations with Taiwan whilst simultaneously developing relations with the PRC.[45] On March 28, the President and his National Security Adviser requested a second NSSM dealing specifically with trade with Communist China.[46] On May 15, the NSC Senior Review Group met to discuss trade with Communist China and it was agreed to begin to relax the embargo.[47] It was also agreed that this relaxation would take place in a series of incremental steps in much the same way that men like Thomson and Barnett had been arguing for over a number of years.[48] The steps were agreed with the assistance of Elliot Richardson who was Undersecretary of State.[49] The first steps were announced on July 21, and included ending the travel ban to the mainland and allowed all subsequent tourists to buy up to one hundred dollars worth of goods and bring them back to the United States.[50]

As well as these early formal steps, Nixon began to signal to the Chinese through a number of intermediaries that he was seeking to change policy. In March 1969, the subject was raised in a meeting

between the President and the French President, Charles De Gaulle. Nixon asked the French to relay a message to the Chinese via the new French Ambassador to Beijing, Etienne Manac'h, that he wanted a dialogue with the CCP leadership and that he was determined to withdraw US troops from Vietnam.[51] This message was relayed to the Chinese leadership in May.[52]

In August, whilst on a world tour, Nixon let it be known to the Pakistani President Yahya Khan and Romanian President Ceaucescu that he wanted to improve relations with the PRC.[53] He knew that both nations had cordial relations with the leadership in Beijing. In Bucharest at a formal dinner at the toast, he outlined his viewpoint very clearly using almost identical words to that used by Zhou En-lai three years earlier as regards the Romanians:

> Your country pursues a policy of communication and contact with all nations. You have actively sought the reduction of international tensions. My country shares those objectives ... As I told you today in our meetings, we seek, normal relations with all countries regardless of their domestic systems. We stand ready to reciprocate the efforts of any country that seeks normal relations with us. We are flexible about the methods by which peace is to be sought and built. We seek value neither in the exchange of polemic nor in false euphoria. We seek the substance of détente, not its mere atmosphere.[54]

Therefore by August 1969, Nixon had let it be known through three separate intermediaries that he sought to improve relations with the PRC.

Ultimately, Pakistan became the key purveyor of messages between the two, but the President or his National Security Adviser did not know this at this point.

The main issue that kept a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China in the mind of the President was the growing conflict between the Soviet Union and China that in 1969 broke out into armed conflict.[55] During the year it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union was planning air attacks on Chinese nuclear facilities. Moreover, in March 1969 a series of minor conflicts broke out on the Sino-Soviet border in the disputed areas such as on an island in the Ussuri River between the Northeast Chinese province of Heilungkiang in Manchuria and the maritime province in the Soviet Far East.[56] The battles on the island that the Soviets called Damansky and the Chinese called Chenpao resulted in heavy casualties. In May, the Soviets moved aircraft from Eastern Europe to Outer Mongolia where they were within striking distance of the Chinese nuclear facilities at Lanchow and the number of Soviet infantry divisions on the border was increased.[57] All of this was taking place whilst Soviet nuclear missiles were being installed near to the Manchurian border and aimed at the Chinese.[58] These Soviet moves culminated with approaches to the US about what its likely response to a Soviet attack on China would be. These contacts initially involved Soviet military attaches in Tokyo and Canberra but after little initial success on August 18, a Soviet embassy official raised the subject with a State Department specialist on Soviet affairs.[59]

Nixon and Kissinger were both aware of the growing conflict and the

possibility of some form of war between the two erstwhile allies. For example, the EC-121 US spy aircraft shot down by the North Koreans in April was on a mission to monitor troop movements by both powers on the Sino-Soviet border.[60] As the situation escalated on August 14, a NSC meeting was held to discuss the split. It was at this meeting that Nixon expressed his view that he believed the Soviet Union to be the more aggressive of the two powers.[61] This was in marked contrast to the thinking of the Democratic Administrations that had preceded Nixon and the thinking of individuals such as Kennedy, Rusk and even Kissinger. After the August 18 approach, Kissinger convened an emergency meeting of WSAG (Washington Special Actions Group; which had been created by Nixon to deal with emergency situations). The meeting that took place at San Clemente involved members of the NSC and Allen Whiting, the author of *China Crosses the Yalu*. Whiting stressed the defensive nature of the Chinese leadership and also emphasised that the Soviets were the more aggressive power. Whiting also stated that he believed that the Soviets might launch a premeditated strike on the Chinese nuclear facilities at any time.[62] The Kale brothers in their book on Kissinger have noted the influence of Whiting on Kissinger's thinking. Kissinger began to view the Chinese as a traditional nation state rather than a revolutionary one and concluded that it was vital to create a link between Washington and Beijing. According to the Kalbs:

> To Whiting, this represented an historic opportunity. America, appreciating China's dilemma, could reach across the Pacific in

> friendship for the first time in twenty years; and China, reeling from the Cultural Revolution and alarmed by the Soviet border build-up, might very well welcome the gesture. A chance for a radical realignment of Pacific powers snapped into focus - for Kissinger, for the very first time.[63]

Of a more immediate nature, Kissinger ordered a NSSM on the Sino-Soviet split. NSSM 63 that was prepared by November emphasised the opportunities for the US presented by the split. Furthermore, at Nixon's behest, the US began to make it clear that wherever possible that the US would not side with the Soviets in the conflict or support military action against the Chinese. For example, on September 5, Elliot Richardson at a meeting of the American Political Science Association used his speech to state that the US did not support the Soviet position.[64] Finally, Nixon and Kissinger agreed that it was imperative that a direct approach be made to the Chinese.[65]

On September 9, Walter Stoessel Jr, the US Ambassador to Poland, was instructed by Nixon and Kissinger to seek a meeting with the Chinese diplomatic representation.[66] Stoessel was unable to make contact until December when he had to chase down a flight of stairs after the Chinese Charge d'Affaires Lei Yang with a message requesting talks.[67] The approach led to two meetings between Stoessel and Lei Yang held on January 20, and February 20, 1970. At these meetings three main issues were discussed: Taiwan, Vietnam and the possibility of a US emissary visiting Beijing.[68] It was at the second meeting that Stoessel outlined what was Nixon's official position on the US military

presence on Taiwan: "It is my Government's intention to reduce those military facilities which we now have on Taiwan as tensions in the area diminish".[69] In other words, a link was created between a settlement of the war in Vietnam and the US military presence on Taiwan. It built on the concepts announced in the Nixon Doctrine of August 1969 that emphasised that the US expected its allies to provide its own defence.[70] Moreover, the first indication was made to the Chinese that the Nixon Administration was more flexible on the issue of Taiwan than its predecessors.

This new US position was bolstered by other US actions. On October 10, 1969, Kissinger told the Pakistani Air Marshal Sher Ali Khan that the US was going to remove two permanently stationed US destroyers from the Taiwan Straits. When Kissinger made a report to the President about this move, Nixon wrote at the bottom of the report: "K(issinger) - also open trade possibilities".[71] In November, the US, in an agreement with the Japanese Government, returned Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty.[72] On December 19, the US announced another package of measures that would improve trading relations between the US and PRC including lifting the ceiling on the value of Chinese goods that Americans could bring into the United States.[73] It was about this time according to Kissinger's memoirs that the Chinese signalled their willingness for negotiation and their preference for the use of Pakistan over Romania as an intermediary.[74]

These early talks would be cut off by the Chinese in May 1970 in protest at the US invasion of Cambodia but by then it was clear that a

process of dialogue had been established and contact was able to be re-established later in 1970.[75]

(iv) 1969: External Factors.

The attempts by the Nixon Administration to seek a new relationship with the People's Republic of China were affected by other foreign policy considerations.

The first of these was the Sino-Soviet split and the affect that began to have on the attitude of the Chinese leadership in Beijing. In 1966, China launched its Cultural Revolution. Chinese society was turned upside down as Mao Zedong encouraged his shock troops known as the Red Guards to break up society and attack the CCP itself.[76] As well as the enormous human costs, the Revolution led to a breakdown in China's foreign relations as even former allies were appalled at the actions of the Chinese.[77] By 1968, it seemed that the Soviets were moving towards as attack on China. In August, they launched an assault on Czechoslovakia to break up the regime of Alexander Dubcek who sought to build a different type of communist society.[78] The invasion grew out of the Brezhnev Doctrine enunciated by the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in May 1968. The Doctrine declared that the Soviets had the right to intervene, militarily if necessary, in the affairs of other communist states.[79] Not surprisingly, the Chinese quickly understood that this Doctrine had potentially serious consequences for themselves. Evidence emerging from Chinese archival documents demonstrates that the leadership in Beijing were deeply affected by the invasion and feared that

the Soviets were becoming more aggressive and expansionist.[80]

To meet this growing threat, the Chinese leadership began to think of improving relations with the US. As pro-Communist Chinese writer Arnold Xiangze Jiang has written:

> Soviet hegemonism became the most dangerous threat to China's security and to world peace. To resist this hostile expansionism, it was necessary to enlist all available forces, including the United States.[81]

In November 1968, after Nixon's election and aware of his more moderate stance, the Chinese quickly agreed to reopen their ambassadorial talks with the US. Later the Chinese cancelled these meetings but they were indicative of a new desire to seek an improvement in relations with China's former archenemy.[82] Moreover, in January 1969, Mao Zedong instructed the *People's Daily* to publish Nixon's inaugural address where he announced that the US would seek to improve relations with all countries.[83] Most spectacular of all, Marshal Chen Yi, a former foreign minister, wrote a report for Mao setting out the rationale for an improvement in Sino-American relations and suggesting that the Chinese should encourage a high-level emissary to visit Beijing on behalf of the new Administration.[84] Furthermore, Chen Yi recommended that the Chinese should soften their stance on Taiwan stating that it could be an issue for discussion rather than a precondition to any substantive talks.[85] This was the approach adopted by the Chinese in the talks held in early 1970. There can be little doubt that the increasing tension between the Soviet Union and the PRC increased the

desire of the Chinese leadership to seek to improve relations with the United States.

The bloody and seemingly intractable conflict in Vietnam also undoubtedly influenced policy towards the People's Republic of China and elsewhere by the Administration. Nixon knew when taking office that his key task was to try to end the US involvement. He took office still hoping to maintain South Vietnam as a non-communist state separate from the North. He saw this as essential to maintaining US credibility in other arenas as well as pleasing his conservative constituency at home.[86] During the election campaign, Nixon claimed that he had a secret plan to end the war whilst avoiding explaining what it was.[87] Once in office he developed a multi-pronged strategy that he hoped would simultaneously meet the key US objective of protecting South Vietnam whilst allowing the US to withdraw its troops which he saw as the crux of the problem.[88]

This strategy had five elements. First, a threat and escalation strategy to try to convince the North Vietnamese that the US was prepared to risk war to meet its objectives. Part of this element was the bombing of Cambodia and specific threats made to the North Vietnamese. Second, was an attempt to use improved relations with the Soviets and Chinese as a means of exerting pressure on the North Vietnamese to make concessions. Third, was a programme of reducing the number of US troops in Vietnam so that by 1972 and the presidential election there would be no US ground troops involved. To cover the loss occasioned by this process the Administration termed "Vietnamization" the US increased

its concentration on the use of air power against North Vietnam. The fourth element was altering the situation on the ground in South Vietnam. This included forcing the South Vietnamese leader Thieu to begin to introduce land reform as well as initiating the Phoenix Program which was an attempt to destroy the Vietcong in the South by a programme of assassination. The final element was to ensure that the US public supported its policies. This included the ending of conscripts going to Vietnam from the US and a far more aggressive stance towards opponents of the war. With this wide ranging strategy Nixon hoped to maintain South Vietnam as a US ally as well as ensuring that his re-election chances in 1972 were not harmed by the war.[89]

Elements of this strategy directly affected Nixon's policy towards China. The reduction of US troops in Asia would help improve relations with the Chinese and the possibility that the Chinese might use their influence on the North Vietnamese or at least not oppose the US attacking the North Vietnamese increased Nixon's desire to seek a better relationship with the PRC. In short, Nixon saw the Chinese as helping to provide a solution to the Vietnam war in a way alien to his predecessors who had seen the CCP as part of the problem that had led to the need for a US intervention. On the domestic front, the change in rhetoric about the Communist Chinese would act as a cover to convince the American public that the US could withdraw troops from Indochina without any major consequences for the overall pursuit its strategic interests.

A new policy towards the PRC helped Nixon and Kissinger adopt a new approach to its allies in Western Europe and especially Japan. By

1969, it was becoming clear that Japan was emerging as an economic competitor to the United States at the same time that the strains of the war in Vietnam and other American Cold War commitments were beginning to have an adverse affect on the US economy. In particular, inflationary pressures were growing and the dollar, which anchored the Bretton Woods global economic system, was coming under increasing pressure. These new pressures, in the view of Nixon and his advisers, required the Japanese and the Western Europeans to take on greater responsibility in ensuring the stability of the international capitalist system.[90] Regarding Japan, Nixon also had domestic political considerations to take into account. During 1968, as part of his so-called "Southern Strategy", (Nixon's attempt to win the conservative south for the Republican Party), he had promised the cotton producers in South Carolina and elsewhere that he would do something about the cheap Japanese textile products flooding the American market.[91] When the Japanese Government made it clear that it was unwilling or unable to force its cotton companies to stop targeting the US market, Nixon became extremely angry.[92] Later, when he developed the opening to China, the Japanese were kept firmly in the dark and in August 1971, he announced the so-called "Nixon Shocks" where he ended the automatic convertibility of gold into dollars and a change in the exchange rate value of the dollar. Again these announcements took place without the Japanese being informed.[93]

The strains that began to develop in the relationship between the US and its cold war allies convinced Nixon and Kissinger that the world was

becoming multi-polar instead of bi-polar between the US and the Soviet Union. These opinions found legitimacy in a speech given by Nixon in Kansas on July 6, 1971 just as Kissinger was arriving in Beijing.[94] Once again, this development reinforced the President's belief in the possibilities presented by an opening to China. In short, international factors now converged to reinforce Nixon's inclinations and the evolving domestic consensus that made an opening almost inevitable.

(v) 1969: The Evolving Consensus.

As well as these external factors, the domestic environment in 1969 was conducive to the moves that Nixon was making. By early 1969, the National Committee on US-China Relations was in full swing and on March 20 and 21 they held a National Convocation in New York to discuss the state of Sino-American relations.[95] Amongst those who attended were Senators Edward Kennedy and Jacob Javits, Reischauer, Barnett, Whiting, Fairbank, Halperin, Chester Cooper, James Thomson and Alexander Eckstein.[96] The event was partly funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Ford Foundation.[97] In total about two thousand attended the event.[98] The Chairman of the Convocation Edwin Reischauer and the new Chairman of the Committee A. Doak Barnett had hoped to get the new Secretary of State to attend the event. They believed that it would provide an opportunity for the new Administration to make an early indication of its approach towards policy towards Asia. Despite a formal approach in January by the Committee, Nixon and Kissinger declined to send a government speaker.[99] The vast majority of

speakers supported the view that a moderate opening to China should take place.[100] In fact, that view was now so prevalent that a concerned Fairbank and Thomson sent a letter to Barnett requesting a greater diversity of opinions.[101] Fairbank had reached the view that the academic China watchers had become "too homogenized".[102] Barnett refused on the grounds that he asserted left wing academics in particular had nothing constructive to add.[103] The most important features of the convocation were the speeches by the two senators, especially that of Edward Kennedy, who was seen by many as the most likely Democratic candidate for the Presidency in 1972.[104]

Javits, a Senator from New York, who was a close ally of Nelson Rockefeller and a specialist in international monetary policy, addressed the damage done by the McCarthy years to the academic profession:

> The Nixon Administration has a great opportunity to bury the lingering pall of McCarthyism that continues subtly to inhibit thought and debate in this country concerning China. The United States paid a heavy price during the McCarthy period in the destruction of many of our most perceptive China experts. It was not only a period of grave damage to our national stock of intellectual resources and experience, which has seriously affected the clarity and accuracy of our perception of events in Asia.[105]

Javits also predicted that the Sino-Soviet split would give the US the opportunity to gain leverage with both nations and to help find a solution to the imbroglio in Vietnam.[106]

However, it was Edward Kennedy's wide-ranging speech that

signalled the final shift of opinion over China policy. Kennedy began by addressing the issue of Chinese isolation from the world community and the US policy that helped maintain it. "However valid that policy may have seemed for the cold war of the 1950s, it is demonstrably false in the 1960s, and must not be carried into the 1970s".[107] He then went onto argue that the PRC must be brought into the world community as a matter of urgency.[108] He then considered the original decisions that led to the hostile relationship between the two. He was careful to blame the climate of the times but it was clear that he was criticising the decisions nevertheless. For example, he was critical of the decision by President Truman to place the 7th fleet in the Taiwan Straits. [109] More intriguing was his reflections on the war in Korea:

> With hindsight, most experts agree that China's action in Korea was an essentially defensive response, launched to prevent the establishment of a hostile government on its border. At the time, however, the issue was far less clear.[110]

This statement clearly illustrates the importance of Allen Whiting's book *China Crosses the Yalu* and how it had now begun to affect the debate over China policy. Later in the speech, Kennedy returned to the issue of Chinese actions describing them as "extremely cautious" and portraying actions such as the war with India in 1962 as a "carefully limited engagement".[111] Kennedy then compared this caution to the military containment of the PRC by the US and emphasised the effect of this policy on the Chinese.[112] Kennedy's views indicated that major figures within the US now accepted that the US Administration's of the

1950s and 1960s bore some responsibility for the poor relationship with the PRC. In 1963, it would have been unheard of to suggest that the US was answerable for Chinese hostility towards it. In 1966, there were hints of such a view but by 1969 it was being expressing by serious politicians with presidential aspirations. This shift was partly due to the debilitating affects of the war in Vietnam but also reflected the evolving consensus that took place on US China policy during the 1960s that reached its apogee in 1969.

Kennedy next considered other more orthodox tenets of US thinking on China. He mocked the idea of Jiang and the Nationalists being considered the government of the Chinese mainland as "palpably absurd ... It is as though the island of Cuba were to claim sovereignty over the entire continent of North America".[113] He also categorically rejected any suggestion that the CCP were in any danger of losing power or Jiang of returning to power on the mainland.[114] He then addressed the argument that the Chinese government was repressive condemning any repression but pointing out that the US recognised other governments that were repressive including the Chinese Nationalists.[115] More specifically, he argued that the US failed to understand the reasons for the Chinese Revolution:

> We have ignored the historical conditions that evoked it and the social and economic gains it produced. We have ignored the fact that the Nationalists also engaged in repressive measures and deprivations of freedom, not only during their tenure on the mainland but also on Taiwan.[116]

This viewpoint that the Chinese Revolution might have brought benefits to the mainland was rare within America, even amongst intellectual opinion, and only even then readily expressed by elements of the New Left that peopled organisations such as the CCAS (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars).[117] He concluded his general analysis by emphasising that the Sino-Soviet split created an opportunity for both the United States and the People's Republic of China to seek a better relationship with each other.[118] He stated that he believed a more tempered US position would bolster the influence of the moderate elements within the Chinese leadership.[119]

He then set out his alternative policies towards the PRC. These included accepting the existence of the PRC and opening a US consular office, a relaxation of trade and travel restrictions; a resumption of the Warsaw talks and an invitation to discuss arms control.[120] However, Kennedy's most innovative thinking was on the issue of Taiwan. He stated that he believed that the US should retain diplomatic relations with the Nationalists and guarantee them from a military attack.[121] Having said that, he then went on to argue that the issue of Taiwan was up for negotiation given that "our own government regards the status of the island as undefined, even though we maintain diplomatic relations with the Nationalists".[122] Kennedy's preferred solution was a negotiated settlement between the CCP and the Nationalists facilitated by the United States:

> To help elicit Peking's interest in negotiations, we should withdraw our token American military presence from Taiwan. This

> demilitarization of Taiwan could take place at no cost to our treaty commitments or security of the island. Yet it would help to make clear to Peking our desire for the Communists, the Nationalists, and the Taiwanese to reach a negotiated solution on the status of the island.[123]

On the issue of the United Nations, Kennedy called for the PRC to be allowed to enter both the Security Council and General Assembly but also foresaw some form of continued representation for the government on Taiwan although even that he suggested could be open to negotiation.[124]

Concluding his speech, Kennedy laid out his own commitment to a drastic change of policy:

> We will have to be patient, Peking's initial reaction to serious initiatives on our part will probably be a blunt refusal. But, by laying the groundwork now for an improved relationship in the 1970s and beyond, we will be offering the present and future leaders in Peking a clear and attractive alternative to the existing impasse in our relations.[125]

This speech, like Hilsman's in December 1963, represented a decisive turning point in US policy towards the People's Republic of China. The fear of speaking out on this issue had now evaporated and it is fascinating to watch the development of views during the course of the 1960s. By 1969, the one issue that even three years earlier men like Thomson and Barnett had been unprepared to address - Taiwan - was now firmly on the agenda. For example, later in the Convocation as a

discussion took place amongst the participants about the future direction of policy. John Kennedy's former Speechwriter Theodore Sorenson, posed the following question to the arch conservative William Rusher, who was one of the few participants prepared to support the existing policy: "In his closing remark he stated that the United States should not embrace the tottering regime of an ageing megalomaniac. Did he have in mind Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Tse-tung?"[126]

Another characteristic about Kennedy's speech is that it debunks the myth that only a conservative figure like Richard Nixon could open dialogue and change policy towards the People's Republic of China.[127] By 1969, major political figures throughout the political spectrum were prepared to call for and support change in the policy. In fact, it can be argued that whoever had been elected to the White House in 1968 would have faced almost irresistible pressures to change policy. These pressures included the international dynamics outlined earlier as well as a growing domestic consensus that was now firmly in the majority. Nixon's ability lay in identifying this groundswell and making use of it for his own purposes.

A third aspect is that all of this shows that domestic determinants were crucial in giving Nixon the ability to make the changes that he sought. The President knew that with Edward Kennedy calling for a wide ranging change in policy he was unlikely to be outflanked or attacked by his most dangerous political opponents when he did announce a change in policy.

A final point concerns the importance of individual speeches in the development of policy towards China. The development of the language

used in the speeches reflects the tortuous road taken by the US in the post-war era in policy towards the People's Republic of China. The evolving consensus can be traced through the words of Dulles in 1957, Hilsman in 1963 through to Kennedy in 1969. It can be argued that Kennedy's speech, as much as Richard Nixon's election to the Presidency indicated that by 1969 the policy of total isolation of the People's Republic of China was doomed.

Reaction to the speech was almost universally positive. James Thomson immediately endorsed his proposals and praised Kennedy's "inventiveness".[128] The *Far Eastern Economic Review* was amongst the press that endorsed the Senator's ideas.[129] Of the participants at the Convocation only George Taylor condemned what he had said calling the speech "highly irresponsible and uninformed".[130]

From that point on the majority of China academics were quite open in their support for wide ranging changes in policy. The inhibition of early years had now dissipated. For example, in the summer of 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held further hearings on US policy towards the PRC.[131] The views expressed by the witnesses, many of whom had testified in the earlier hearings, was noticeably more radical that those expressed in March 1966. Allen Whiting described by Fulbright as "our chief Chinawatcher" called for the PRC to be the sole representative of China in the United Nations.[132] James Thomson went further and argued the case for throwing the Nationalists or allowing them to be thrown out.[133] He went on in his testimony to state that a policy of "Two Chinas" was unworkable due to the fact that neither side accepted

it. The priority regarding the UN was seating the PRC and "that will probably require Taiwan's ouster".[134] Thomson then went on to attack the policy of containment in the sixties:

> I am dismissing containment as of no consequence. Not only as of no consequence, but as ill-advised, counterproductive, pushing Chinese into a sense of threat, a sense of fear ... pushing all parties away from the vital learning processes. And here I would really stress emphatically that we have a lot to learn from the Chinese, as they do from us. There are some extraordinary experiments taking place there, on terms of how a society is organized, as well as breakthroughs in science, technology and the like.[135]

These statements show the extent to which the ground had shifted and is indicative of the influence of the thinking of the New Left on elements of the policy establishment. The gut anti-communism of an earlier generation was being replaced with an interest in the operation of communist societies. Moreover, these views illustrate the debilitating affect the war in Vietnam had on many Americans, calling into question their belief in the motives of US foreign policy in the post-war era.

The China academics also retained some contact with the government during the years of the Nixon Administration despite his reputation as a conservative. After Kissinger's appointment he had a discussion with A. Doak Barnett at the Council on Foreign Relations and asked for the names of five specialists who could advise the new President on the issues surrounding US policy towards East Asia.[136] Kissinger also

suggested that Barnett in conjunction with others prepare a five or six page memorandum on what they considered the most pressing issues facing the new Administration in their relations with East Asia.[137] Barnett wrote back recommending himself, Reischauer, Eckstein, Chalmers Johnson (who was the Director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California at Berkeley) and George Packard (who had worked in the Japanese Embassy under Reischauer but was now working as the Washington Correspondent of the *Philadelphia Bulletin*).[138] Barnett promised to produce the suggested Memo but in the meantime sent Kissinger a copy of a briefing paper that he and a number of other academics had prepared for Hubert Humphrey.[139]

The paper was written by amongst others Fairbank, Reischauer and Pye as well as Barnett. It included the usual policy recommendations on China policy such as relaxing trade and travel restrictions, involving the PRC in arms control negotiations and moving towards a policy of "Two Chinas" in the United Nations.[140] A more interesting development was that the academics recommended sending a high level diplomatic emissary to Beijing to negotiate with the Chinese leadership.[141] Another fascinating aspect of the paper was its emphasis on the economic development of Southeast Asia. It argued that if China was brought into the international political community then it could be expected to play a peaceful regional role.[142] By the late 1960s, it was becoming clear that Japan was beginning to recover economically and was starting to play a role in promoting economic development in the countries of Southeast Asia. This was the role that men like Dean Acheson had foreseen for

them a generation earlier and was welcomed by the United States.[143] On the war in Vietnam, the academics recommended "a negotiated political settlement of that conflict".[144]

Henry Kissinger set up a meeting between a group of five specialists and the President for April 24, 1969.[145] The five specialists chosen were Barnett, Reischauer, Pye, Henry Rosovsky, (an economist based at Harvard whose specialism was China) and George Taylor, who Kissinger described in the memo of introduction to Nixon as: "Generally regarded as a responsible exponent of modern conservatism in U.S. China policy".[146] In the letters of introduction to the academics, all of whom were addressed by their first names except Taylor who was addressed as Professor Taylor, Kissinger noted that: "I hope that we will get into far-reaching discussions of Vietnam and Japan as well as of China policy".[147] After the meeting, Barnett wrote to the President to express his appreciation:

> As I said during the course of our discussion, I believe not only that the problem of working towards a new relationship with China is of the greatest importance in any long run view of our national policy problems, but that your administration has an unusual opportunity to take new initiatives, particularly now in the trade field, moving in that direction, which I believe would obtain wide American and international support and might begin to lay the groundwork for actual changes in U.S.-China relations in the future.[148]

At the very least, this meeting shows that Nixon was aware of the academic thinking on China policy and the initiatives that they argued

were necessary to move it forward. Therefore, it is not unsurprising that many were eventually introduced.

After the April meeting there was little direct contact between the Administration and these academics. In August 1969, Whiting was involved in discussions about the Sino-Soviet split but from that date onwards Nixon and Kissinger decided to cut out all external influences on their China policy. This was partly because they considered that for the new policy to work it should be secret but also, both hoped to maximise the personal credit that they believed would be available to those who were seen as being responsible for the opening to China.[149] In August 1971, a Republican Congressman from California John Rousselot wrote asking the Administration whether or not the China opening had been influenced by academics like Fairbank, Thomson, Reischauer and Barnett. Clark MacGregor, who was the Presidential Counsel for Congressional Relations replied saying that: "I think your question can be answered unequivocally in the negative".[150] This as we have seen was wholly untrue. It is not to deny Nixon's and Kissinger's contribution to note that they were building on a domestic environment that others had built and that the China opening would have taken place in the early 1970s whoever had succeeded Lyndon Johnson in the White House.

(vi) The Grand Opening.

By 1970, Nixon was beginning to believe that he needed an opening to China to sustain his re-election bid. His poll ratings were falling; the midterm election results were poor and the war in Vietnam was not

coming to a speedy end as he had hoped. Furthermore, an opening to China would put pressure on the Soviets to improve relations with the US and might isolate the North Vietnamese from their neighbours and one of their key allies.[151]

In June 1970, Lt General Walters was ordered to approach a Chinese official in Paris with a view to opening a direct channel of communication between Beijing and Washington. Walters tried twice but without success.[152] Later in October, with the US leading the celebrations of the United Nations twenty-fifth anniversary, Nixon sent messages to the Chinese via the Pakistanis and Romanians. On October 25, he asked Yahya Khan to relay to the leadership in Beijing the Administration's continued commitment to an improvement in Sino-American relations.[153] It was at this meeting, according to a member of Khan's Cabinet, that Nixon made it clear that Taiwan was expendable.[154] A day later Nixon repeated the message to the Romanians.[155] It was clear that as Nixon's desire for an opening increased any remaining commitment he might have for the Nationalists evaporated. He also seemed to revel in the subterfuge and subtlety of the messages being transmitted.

A few weeks later Khan flew to Beijing where the message was relayed.[156] The Chinese leadership was now happy to take the initiative aware, of the shift that had taken place by the US over Taiwan. On October 1, 1970, veteran American writer Edgar Snow was invited to join Mao in the celebration's of China's national day.[157] On November 5, Snow met with Zhou who informed him that he wanted the US to begin to

withdraw its troops from Taiwan.[158]

On December 18, Snow held a long meeting with Mao. Mao informed him that he believed Nixon would visit China some time in 1972 and that amongst the issues to be discussed would be Taiwan. Mao also suggested to Snow that other American politicians might be invited to China as well.[159] These comments were clearly aimed at accelerating the thaw in relations and showed an understanding by Mao of Nixon's domestic political considerations.

The Chinese responded directly via the Pakistanis to the messages from the President. On December 8, a message came from Zhou: "In order to discuss the subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking".[160] Eight days later, after discussions with the President, Kissinger sent a reply again via Pakistan agreeing to come to Beijing but saying that:

> the meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions. With respect to US military presence on Taiwan, however, the policy of the United States Government is to reduce its military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region diminish.[161]

The Chinese further took the initiative when on April 6, 1971 they invited the US national table tennis team to tour the PRC.[162] In response on April 14, Nixon announced a package of measures aimed at easing trade and travel restrictions.[163] For the first time the US treated China and the

Soviets equally in trading terms. On April 27, another message arrived from the Chinese inviting an American emissary to Beijing.[164] A day later it was agreed that Henry Kissinger would be the emissary.[165]

Kissinger flew in total secrecy from Pakistan into the PRC on July 8, 1971.[166] There he held a series of meetings with Zhou. On the issue of Taiwan, Zhou made it clear that the sovereignty of the island was a matter for the Chinese themselves to sort out. It was not an international matter but a territorial one.[167] On the subject of the United Nations a secret agreement was reached. The US would publicly defend the position of the Nationalists whilst supporting the entry of the PRC: in effect, a policy of "Two Chinas". Privately, the US would stand aside and allow the Nationalists to be thrown out.[168] Regarding Vietnam, the Chinese told Kissinger that they wanted a total US military withdrawal from Indochina but did not make it a precondition to Nixon's visit.[169] Other subjects that were discussed included the Soviet Union, Nixon's multi-polar world vision, and the future US role in Asia.[170] Nixon was formally invited to visit China and it was agreed that all future discussions between the two parties would take place directly without intermediaries.[171] An exhausted but exhilarated Kissinger left Beijing on July 11 and returned to the US two days later where he flew directly to San Clemente to brief the President.[172] On July 15, Nixon in a televised address to the nation announced the opening and his intention to visit China.[173]

Kissinger flew to China for a second visit in October where the

wording of the Shanghai Communiqué was worked out. The two sides agreed that on each issue they would put forward their individual views rather than try to come up with some agreed wording.[174] This visit took place just as the issue of who would represent China in the United Nations came to a boil. In a tense vote on October 26, the UN agreed to seat the PRC and expel the Nationalists.[175] By the end of 1971 all of the outlines of the Nixon visit was in place.

On February 17, 1972 Nixon flew from Washington to Beijing for a summit that formally brought to an end the years of isolation between the US and the Chinese. Most of the subsequent events were televised live on American television as Nixon maximised the circumstances to push his image as a statesman and ensure his re-election.[176] Nixon met Mao who told him that: "I like rightists" and images of the President and his wife visiting the Great Wall of China were shown around the world.[177]

As well as the publicity, a number of agreements were reached between the two on issues such as trade, science and the exchange of technology.[178] The US agreed, within the Shanghai Communiqué, to accept the five principles that the Chinese liked to include in their agreements with all countries.[179] The rest of the Communiqué was sorted out with relative ease.[180] The key bone of contention was exactly what would be said about Taiwan. As Nixon recalled in his memoirs:

> We knew that if the Chinese made a strongly belligerent claim to Taiwan in the communiqué, I would come under murderous crossfire from any or all of the various pro-Taiwan, anti-Nixon, and

anti-PRC and interest groups at home.[181]

The Chinese contented themselves with an unequivocal statement on the island stating that "the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China" meaning that they viewed themselves as the rightful rulers of Taiwan.[182] The American section on the Communiqué that covered Taiwan was masterful in its ambiguity but showed that the US was now more flexible on the issue:

> The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is but part of China. The United States does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces as the tension in the area diminishes.[183]

This statement sufficed to keep the Chinese happy whilst not appearing to cave in on an issue that Nixon considered sensitive to many of his strongest supporters. Secretary of State William Rogers was said to be unhappy with the wording and Nixon's archconservative speechwriter Patrick Buchanan threatened to resign but beyond that, most people accepted without question the new position.[184]

On February 27, Nixon toasted the Chinese leadership saying: "This was the week that changed the world" and two days later Nixon and his entourage returned to Washington to a triumphant welcome.[185] The visit

had been a public relations triumph and Nixon was able to use it as the basis for launching his re-election campaign that culminated in November with him winning one of the largest victories in American presidential history. Moreover on Vietnam and the USSR the visit to Beijing gave the Administration greater leverage to exact concessions which led ultimately to the SALT agreement and to an ending of the Vietnam war in January 1973 that in the short term guaranteed the independence of South Vietnam.[186] It also played to Nixon's idea of himself as a great statesman making a unique contribution to history. For the Chinese, they managed to weaken dramatically the relationship between the Nationalists and its main patron. Also, they reduced the US presence in Asia whilst removing any American threat to the PRC itself.[187]

(vii) Conclusions.

Historians and other commentators have generally praised the opening to China and the role-played in it by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Walter Isaacson in his biography of Kissinger has written that:

> the creation of a strategic tie to communist China was probably the most significant and prudent American foreign policy initiative since the launching of the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO.[188]

Nixon, not too surprisingly, is also fulsome in his praise for the initiative and his role in it:

> The biggest success, historically, and Clare Luce is my witness on this, was China. Clare said, "You know, in history books a hundred years from now, a thousand years from now, there will be one line

on your administration - "He went to China".[189]

This view is rose tinted and ignores the magnitude and significance of the Watergate scandal. Nevertheless, the importance of the opening to China can and should not be downplayed. It ended a policy of total isolation towards the PRC that was clearly no longer serving American interests. It gave shape to the ideas of triangular diplomacy that both Nixon and Kissinger and indeed many other American academics and politicians believed in. It incorporated the PRC into an American led world system and marginalised the influence of the Soviet Union in the region. Finally, it led to the development of trading relations between the two erstwhile enemies.[190]

The Chinese also benefited from their new relationship with the US. The alliance further isolated the Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan from the international community. It greatly reduced the possibility of a Soviet attack. There was also a reduction in the amount of US troops stationed in the region.[191] For example, at the height of the Vietnam War the US had had ten thousand troops stationed on Taiwan. By 1977, when Nixon's successor Gerald Ford left office, that figure had been reduced to a thousand.[192] In light of all of this it is therefore not surprising that both sides saw the mutual benefits of reconciliation.

Nevertheless, the visit of Richard Nixon to the People's Republic of China in February 1972 represented not only the culmination of the policies that he had adopted since taking office in January 1969 but also represented the culmination of a long process of changing domestic circumstances around China policy.

That is not to denigrate Nixon's personal contribution. Unlike his predecessor he believed that policy should be changed and that changing it was a priority. Moreover, he saw the Chinese representing part of the solution to the war in Vietnam rather than part of the problem. Nixon was patient in his pursuit of an opening to China and put his formidable knowledge of international affairs to good use to try to build a new world system. He believed this would serve the interests of the United States in the more complex world of the late 1960s and early 1970s. That being said many of these policies were devoid of moral factors. The Nixon Administration's record on issues like the fall of Allende in Chile, the "tilt" towards Pakistan in 1971 during the India-Pakistan war and the bombing campaigns in Indochina are all stains on the overall record of the Administration.[193]

The key factor to note is that Nixon merely carried out a policy change towards the PRC that by 1969 had overwhelming support from the political elite and general support from the US public who were now ready to accept the existence of the CCP. The opening included risks from domestic political opponents but not the risks that one might at first glance foresee. The opening to China was not the achievement of Nixon alone, even less so that of Henry Kissinger. It also belonged to the substantial group of academics and government officials who throughout the 1960s had challenged the prevailing ethos and had set an agenda that by 1969 swept away a policy that was clearly not based on reality.

The shifts in international affairs played a significant role. The growing Sino-Soviet split; the need for the US to extricate itself from the costly war

in Indochina and the growing independence of former US allies in Western Europe and Japan all necessitated a change of approach from the US. Most importantly of all the Chinese themselves were more ready than any time since 1945 to come to terms with the United States primarily due to the threat emanating from the Soviet Union. Any new approach from any President in the early 1970s, it could be suggested, would have included coming to terms with the PRC as an independent entity with a legitimate worldview.

Finally, it is worth noting again the continued evolving consensus that continued to grow over China policy in 1969. Men like Thomson, Reischauer, Fairbank and Barnett continued to push for change. They did have connections with the Nixon Administration and undoubtedly influenced it. Also their public stance continued to create an environment in which Nixon's new policy would be welcomed. It is also worth mentioning the role of Edward Kennedy who in March 1969 made a wide-ranging speech on China policy that indicated that the policies of the 1960s had no credibility left in the Democratic Party. If Nixon had not sought an opening to China then it is probable that the Democratic candidate for the White House in 1972 would have used his timidity on China policy against him.

In short, the grand opening to China had many authors of which Nixon was only one.

CONCLUSION:

The purpose of this thesis has been to identify the process that allowed policy towards the People's Republic of China to be changed so dramatically. China policy was chosen because of the controversy that overshadowed it and the major shift that was required to move between the policy of total isolation pursued in the fifties, and to a lesser extent in the sixties, and the rapprochement adopted under the Nixon Administration. Many of the pressures outlined contributed to US policy towards other countries in this period and before and after. But in few areas and periods does the controversy exist that shadowed US China policy between 1949 and 1972.

To understand the influences on policy requires an understanding of what the policy actually was and how it adapted under time and what forces and influences forced it to change. This thesis has argued that, in practice, the policy was always more fluid than traditional viewpoints have allowed for. Truman and Acheson did not expect to isolate totally the new CCP regime for a generation. Eisenhower and Dulles occasionally gave consideration to adopting a more conciliatory stance. Of more significance, Kennedy was far more flexible in his approach towards China and in 1963, before his death, began to create a climate within the government that might allow him to change policy should the circumstances permit it. Kennedy's successor Lyndon Johnson was less flexible and by 1966 when he too began to consider changing China policy his administration had become bogged down in Vietnam. It was therefore left to Richard Nixon to bring to fruition the changes that by

1969 were being widely advocated.

Among the starkest influences on policy that we have identified is public opinion and academics. The single factor that made John F. Kennedy decide not to pursue any dramatic changes towards China policy was his understanding of the hostility of the general public to the PRC. However, during the course of the 1960s that hostility began to wane as the war in Vietnam sapped the morale of the United States and the old nostrums of the China Lobby had less and less credibility. Leonard Kusnitz in his book *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* concludes that public opinion was the single most important factor that influenced China policy.[1] This thesis accepts his point but it argues that public opinion is one factor that interacts with other elements that produce the final policy. That is not to downplay it but other factors help push policy and public opinion as we have seen. The speeches given by men like Hilsman in 1963 and Edward Kennedy in 1969 do not just test the public mood but also influence it.

It is therefore vital to identify these other factors. Much has been made in this thesis of the role of academics. The majority of academics working on China did not believe in or accept the policy of total isolation. Instead they hoped to bring about a gradual change and reconciliation between the country of their birth and the one of their studies. In the 1950s they were cowed into silence by the McCarthyite purges. However, in the 1960s they were able to use their influence to affect policy. This was done in a number of ways. Firstly, by the interaction between US universities and the government. It has been traditional for

academics and their students to work in the US government in departments like State and Defense. They bring with them their knowledge and expertise and their political background. Thus James Thomson was a postgraduate student at Harvard, where he studied under Edwin Reischauer and John King Fairbank. This thesis shows the fundamental influence that Thomson had on the China policy of the early 1960s especially the Hilsman speech of December 1963. Also, Reischauer spent over five years between 1961 and 1966 as US Ambassador to Japan. In return, many government officers have studied at places like Harvard where they encounter the views of the academics based there. Finally, of course, both groups (and as we have seen they are not autonomous) attend conferences, advise and consult one another and keep in regular contact.

Academics also influence the public policy debate by their work. Allen Whiting, in the 1960s both government official and academic published a major work on the Korean War, *China Crosses the Yalu.* It emphasised and seemed to prove that the government in Beijing was one that was cautious and had entered the Korean War because it felt threatened by the US marching up towards the Yalu.[2] The implicit assumption in Whiting's work was that the same government could be worked with in the sixties. It is also worth noting the effect of the public pronouncements of the China academics, who in March 1966, went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to lambast the China policy pursued by Lyndon Johnson. It is certainly not accidental that the Administration then began to reflect on policy. Academics like Fairbank did not merely reflect

and respond to public opinion but they helped shape it thus proving the complex process at work here.

A third factor worth noting and expounding upon is the role of ideas. Paul Evans captures the role of the academic in expounding ideas and its affect on policy very well in his biography of Fairbank when he writes that:

> The extent of his (Fairbank's) influence on policy and public thinking is difficult to estimate, but it has probably been no less than that of any other academic of his generation. More important perhaps are the lessons his career offers on, first, the most effective role for scholars in policy discussion and, second, the tension between political realism in international affairs and the area specialist's penchant for cultural differences.[3]

These academics, especially Fairbank, had a deep-rooted belief in the benevolence of the US and its capacity to do good in the world. They believed that communication between the US and the countries of the world, especially China, could lessen tension. It is not accidental that after the opening to China, these academics through their work on the National Committee on US-China Relations concentrated their considerable energies on helping to foster cultural exchanges between the Chinese mainland and the United States.[4] The Liberal Internationalists John Fairbank, Edwin Reischauer, James Thomson and Chester Bowles believed in the power of communication, dialogue and interaction that would lessen the hostility in international relations. If that could be achieved in Sino-American relations, where the two nations had been violently hostile to one another and had two very different political

systems, than surely it could be achieved anywhere. James Thomson, writing later, talks about this interaction and its significance thus:

> a process that has brought more Americans and Asians in touch with each other and with each other's cultures in this decade (the 1960s) than ever before. The transformations recorded in these data, particularly the data of economic and cultural ties, may well be of far greater long-term significance to the region and the relationship than the more visible political and military confrontations.[5]

Related to this was the question of knowledge. The more that could be known about other societies and the more that they might know about the US would benefit both and lessen the risk of confrontation. To men like Fairbank, who believed this, a policy of total isolation was anathema no matter what the political justifications for it might be. A further element is the significance of economic and trading ties. Traditional liberal thinking has emphasised those countries that trade with one another were less likely to go to war. Richard Nixon, who was a more cynical figure than men like Fairbank, clearly believed in the value of trade as cement to lock into place the new geopolitical world order that he wanted to construct.[6] In short, certain liberal ideas influenced the thinking of men as diverse as Chester Bowles, John King Fairbank and Richard Nixon and affected their policy towards the People's Republic of China. At the end of the day, a policy of total isolation jarred with these ideals and ultimately was to be opposed and when possible reformed.

The fourth factor to be considered is the role of individual politicians.

The approach of specific figures that have been discussed did affect the conduct and development of policy towards the People's Republic of China. John Kennedy's cautious flexibility allowed policy to be reflected upon whilst his wariness of public opinion ensured that he never took the risk of running ahead of the public mood. Lyndon Johnson's lack of knowledge of foreign affairs and the debilitating affect of Vietnam impeded any genuine hopes that he had of improving Sino-American relations. Furthermore, the role of Dean Rusk was to hinder any changes in policy those men like Thomson hoped to introduce. Rusk's intransigence was understandable given his experience as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under Harry Truman but his refusal to consider any change in the US support for Jiang ensured that there would be no change on policy towards the PRC whilst he was Secretary of State. Finally, Nixon's cynical opportunism, secretiveness, and flexibility on China policy not only helped policy to be changed but also affected the manner in which it was changed.

A final element is the role of Non-Governmental Organisations.[7] On one side the China Lobby and groups like The Committee of One Million helped shape and sustain the policy of total isolation for a generation. However, on the other side were the funds provided by organisations like the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Council on Foreign Relations. They provided the ballast for the growth of China studies as an academic discipline and helped move spokesmen like A. Doak Barnett and John Fairbank to the forefront of their discipline where they were able to influence public opinion.

In conclusion what emerges is a heady brew of influences that push and affect the development of policy. Some reinforce others and interact with international developments to shape policy. However, it is the main argument of this thesis that the major determinant in the change of policy was the views and activities of a group of China academics that in the 1960s both within and outside government successfully challenged and discredited the policy of total isolation. This thesis also believes that on balance the contribution made by these academics was a positive one that redressed the damage done to the academic profession and the development of policy and freedom of expression by the McCarthyite purges. Historiography has tended to focus on the roles of individual politicians, usually Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, at the expense of explaining the consensus that made their policies accepted and necessary. It is hoped that this thesis has begun to correct that imbalance. It is also hoped that this thesis can contribute to any academic understanding of the domestic influences on any area of US foreign policy and how that policy can be subjected to pressures over an extended period of time.

There are other factors that need to be considered. Most significantly would be the role of the People's Republic of China itself. In the list of influences the policies of the PRC was left out as a major factor. The argument of this thesis is that in the minds of the Americans making and influencing policy throughout this time, the Chinese were at best secondary factors and at worst passive recipients of US policy initiatives. Examples of this abound. The key factor that influenced Roger Hilsman

does not concern China, but the Soviet Union. A longer-term example of this is the length of time it takes American leaders to consider the importance of Taiwan to the Chinese. From about 1950 all Chinese statements on Sino-American relations start from the premise that Taiwan is the key bone of contention and that any policy of "Two Chinas", allowing Taiwan to develop as an independent state separate from the mainland, is utterly unacceptable to the PRC. Yet, as late as 1966, the specialists both within and outside of government publicly see "Two Chinas" as the solution to the China problem. It is Nixon's greatest achievement that he sets this policy aside.

World events clearly do affect US diplomacy. For example, US policy towards Nazi Germany was greatly affected by the actions of Hitler and his regime. Moreover, the US approach was affected by the Chinese Revolution of 1949. But the fundamental point remains. US policy towards the People's Republic of China between 1949 and 1972 was determined primarily by domestic factors. Those factors shaped the original US actions and they provided the circumstances that led to the dramatic changes carried out by the Nixon Administration.

It is vital to fit US policy towards China into its overall Asia strategy. The US had always had a regional surrogate in Asia to pursue its interests that it felt it could not do itself. Before, World War II that surrogate was Japan and after 1945 when it became clear that the Chinese Nationalists could not play a regional role, the Japanese once again emerged as America's key ally in the region. In the 1970s, the strains caused by the US involvement in Vietnam and the emergence of

Japan as an economic competitor forced the US to attempt to reintegrate China back into the overall world system. The opening, under these terms, was a success as the US was able to withdraw many of its troops from the region without any affect on its overall stability. China went in a few short years from being the fulcrum of revolution in Asia to being one of the blocks of the international system. On those terms, an opening to China in the late 1960s was also essential. Nixon understood this better than most and was able to bring about a convergence between these geopolitical considerations and the liberal ideals of men like Chester Bowles and John Fairbank.

The reconciliation between the US and the PRC reflected the power of both nations. Ultimately, the potential and real power of both nations brought them together. China's size, population and political and economic potential necessitated that the US seek a relationship with it. Once the CCP had established itself on the mainland and was clearly beginning to realise that potential then it was only a matter of time that the US would need to develop some sort of relationship with it. Alternatively, the power of the United States required the leaders in Beijing to accept its strategic interests in the region. As the years after 1972 have shown, this they were prepared to do with the obvious exception of Taiwan which the Chinese saw as a matter of sovereignty. This concept of power should not only be measured in raw political power but also cultural power. There can be little doubt that scholars were attracted to China by its size, its classical civilisation and its potential economic and political strength as well as traditional curiosity.

Concluding, it is right to emphasise the importance of the China opening in post-war US diplomatic history. However, the opening was not only the preserve of politicians like Richard Nixon but also grew out of the cultural beliefs of men like John King Fairbank and was put into force by their overt political activities and academic pursuits. These activities and pursuits converged with strategic factors, public opinion and the decisions of individual politicians to make the grand opening possible.

INTRODUCTION: FOOTNOTE.

1. Paul Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, (Oxford, 1985), p. 311.

CHAPTER ONE: FOOTNOTES:

1. The best introductory texts on Sino-American relations and the historical background are Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American Relations*, (New York, 1980) and John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*, (Cambridge, Mass, 1973). Wherry cited in Anthony Hartley, "American Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era", *The Adelphi Papers*, No 110, 1974/5, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 12n.
2. For a good introduction to FDR's China policy see Walter La Feber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750*, (New York, 1989), pp. 403 & 415.
3. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, pp. 164-5.
4. The Yenan Mission is covered well in E.J. Kahn Jr, *The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them*, (New York, 1975), Chap 5.
5. Truman cited in La Feber, *The American Age*, p. 477.
6. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, pp. 192-5; La Feber, *The American Age*, p. 477, Fairbank, *The United States and China*, pp. 256-8.
7. Acheson cited in Stanley D Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, (New York, 1976), p. 41.
8. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, pp. 201-2 & 206-7; La Feber, *The American Age*, p. 478, Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill (eds), *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol II: Since 1914*, (Lexington, Mass, 1995), pp. 359-60.

9. Sprouse cited in Leonard A. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy: 1949-1979*, (London, 1984), pp. 34-5.
10. *Ibid*, pp. 23-6; La Feber, *The American Age*, pp. 485-6, Cohen, *America's Response to China*, p 205.
11. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, pp. 194-7.
12. Ross Y. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, (New York, 1974), p. 55. Koen is easily the best and most readable account of the existence and activities of the China Lobby
13. Ascoli cited in Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p 28.
14. The Tydings Report is cited in Robert Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China*, (Oxford, 1992), p. 300.
15. Rev William Johnson is cited in Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 170.
16. *Ibid* p. 171.
17. The best short book on the Korean War is Callum MacDonald, *Korea: The War Before Vietnam*, (London, 1986). Chapter 2 deals explicitly with the decisions made by the Truman Administration in June 1950 after the North Korean attack.
18. Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation*, (New York, 1994) provides a good assessment of the interpretations of the Chinese entry into the Korean war as well as providing a new interpretation of its own. Allen Whiting most famously puts the traditional view, *China Crosses the Yalu: the Decisions to Enter the Korean War*, (New York, 1960). See MacDonald, *Korea*, Chaps 3 & 4 for an account of the Chinese entry

into the war and the US reaction to it.

19. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, pp. 56 & 63.

20. Rusk cited in Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy*, (New York, 1967), p. 295; Warren Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980) p. 63.

21. Gordon Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, (Stanford, California, 1990) has the best assessment of Eisenhower's China policy. Richard Melanson & David Mayers (Eds), *Re-evaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s*, (Chicago, 1987) also covers China policy containing two essays on Eisenhower's China policy by Norman Graebner and David Mayers. Graebner is critical of the Administration's approach whilst Mayers is more sympathetic. For details of Walter Robertson's appointment see Melanson & Mayers (eds), Graebner p. 69 & Warren I. Cohen & Akira Iriye (eds), *The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-60*, (New York, 1990), Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, p. 36.

22. For details about the Offshore Islands crisis and the US threat to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese see Melanson & Mayers (eds), *Re-evaluating Eisenhower*, Graebner pp. 75 & 78-80 *The Chicago Daily News* is cited on p. 80; La Feber, *The American Age*, p. 516, MacDonald, *Korea*, p. 190.

23. Melanson & Mayers (Eds), *Re-evaluating Eisenhower*, Graebner p 72 & Mayers p 103.

24. Dulles cited in Melanson & Mayers (Eds), *Re-evaluating Eisenhower*, Mayers p. 97.

25. Dulles cited in Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 295. Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, p 161 reports that even as Dulles was making the speech he knew from CIA reports that the CCP was well established on the Chinese Mainland and therefore could not be described as a passing phase. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, pp. 227-8 also comments on the speech.

26. Dulles cited in Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p 210.

27. Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, pp. 103-4; Cohen and Iriye (Eds), *The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960*, Tucker pp. 36 & 39-40. Eisenhower cited in Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, p. 146. For details of Eisenhower and Dulles interest in "Two Chinas" see also Cohen, *America's Response to China*, pp. 225 & 229.

28. Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, pp. 107-8.

29. Melanson & Mayers (Eds), *Re-evaluating Eisenhower*, Graebner pp. 76-7 & Mayers pp. 111-3; Cohen, *America's Response to China*, p. 227; Kenneth T. Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967*, (New York, 1968), remains the most complete account of these talks.

30. Eisenhower cited in Melanson & Mayers (eds), *Re-evaluating Eisenhower*, Mayers, pp. 92-3,

31. *Ibid*, pp 95 & 104-5.

32. For details of Ogburn's views see *ibid* pp. 91-2; Cohen & Iriye (Eds), *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960*, Tucker pp. 38-9.

33. Melanson & Mayers (eds), *Re-evaluating Eisenhower*, Mayers P 98 writes that as a consequence of public opinion and reaction to Arthur Dean's views: "Dulles went to Geneva unencumbered by any illusions about the political price to be paid for even a brief conference with (Z)hou En-lai". For details of opinion polls see Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, pp. 68-71. Akira Iriye & Warren Cohen (Eds), *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*, (1989), Cohen, pp. 44 & 48, Cohen, *America's Response to China*, pp. 43-4 & 50; Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 136.
34. Iriye & Cohen (eds), *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*, Cohen, pp. 43 & 49, Cohen, *America's Response to China*, pp. 48-9, Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, pp. 132 & 134 & Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, p. 164.
35. Cohen & Iriye (Eds), *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960*, Qing Semei, p. 135.
36. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 301.
37. Melanson & Mayers (Eds), *Re-evaluating Eisenhower*, Graebner, p. 85.
38. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, p. 83.
39. Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, pp. 164-5 & 169.
40. For general details of the racism of the administration see Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, pp. 170-3. Chang cited on p. 172.
41. Eisenhower cited in Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, p. 173.

CHAPTER TWO: FOOTNOTES:

1. Judith Coburn, "Asian Scholars and Government: The Chrysanthemum on the Sword", in Edward Friedman & Mark Selden (eds), *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations* (New York, 1971), pp. 74 & 78; James Peck, "The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers" in Friedman & Selden, *America's Asia*, p. 68; Paul Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China* (Oxford, 1985), p. 61.
2. Edwin Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America* (New York, 1986), pp. 113-4; Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 94-5.
3. Peck in Friedman & Selden, "The Roots of Rhetoric", *America's Asia*, p. 60.
4. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, pp. 114-5.
5. John King Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Cambridge, Mass, 1973), pp. 317 & 318n; John N. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics* (Seattle & London, 1974), p. 3; Ross Y. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York, 1974), p. 133.
6. Charles O. Hucker, *"The Association of Asian Studies: An Interpretive History"*, Association of Asian Studies, Occasional Papers No 1 (Seattle & London, 1973), pp. 3, 9-10, 12, 15; Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 64; Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan*

and America, pp. 116-7; Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, pp. 128-9.

7. Hucker, *The Association of Asian Studies*, p. 13.
8. *Ibid*, p. 17.
9. *Ibid*, p. 18.
10. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 152.
11. Ben Lee Martin, *Interpretations of United States Policy toward the Chinese Communists, 1944-1968: Survey and Analysis*, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University, 1968). Martin is cited in Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, p. 52; Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 116; John King Fairbank, *Chinabound: A Fifty Year Memoir* (New York, 1982), pp. 36-7; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22/5/69, Vol LXIV, No 21.
12. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, pp. 116-7.
13. Fairbank cited in Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 86-7.
14. Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 316.
15. *Ibid*, p. 320.
16. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 99-100. Fairbank cited on p. 100.
17. *Ibid*, p. 100.
18. Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 320.
19. Fairbank cited in Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 118.

20. *Ibid*, p. 124.

21. *Ibid*, p. 101; Fairbank, *Chinabound*, pp. 315 & 317-8.

22. Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 317; Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 129.

23. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, pp. 52-3; Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 367.

24. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, pp. 52-3; Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, pp. 116-7.

25. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, p. 54.

26. *The China Monthly* is cited in Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 118.

27. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, pp. 36-44; Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, pp. 122 & 135. Kohlberg is cited in Koen, p. 135.

28. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, pp. 136-7.

29. *Ibid*, p. 122.

30. *Ibid*, pp. 118-20.

31. Senator Brewster is cited in Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 121.

32. *Ibid*, p. 122; Stanley Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million* (New York, 1976), p. 31.

33. Freda Utley, *The China Story* (Chicago, 1951), p. 139. Utley is also cited in Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 120.

34. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 117.

35. *Ibid*, p. 124.

36. The Tydings Committee report is cited in Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 126.

37. *Ibid*, p. 125.

38. *Ibid*, p. 126; Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, p. 77.

39. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 139; Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, p. 87.

40. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, p. 87.

41. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, pp. 126-7.

42. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 150 & 154.

43. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, p. 85; Rowe cited in Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 147. See also Evans, pp. 136 & 142.

44. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 128 & 152-3.

45. *Ibid*, pp. 143-5; John Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 345.

46. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 152-3.

47. Isaac cited in Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 159.

48. The report of the McCarran Committee is cited in Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 129. See also Koen, pp. 129-30 & 141-4; Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, p. 144 and 144n.

49. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 129; Fairbank, *The United States and China*, p. 318.

50. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, p. 126.

51. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 184; Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, pp. 130-1; Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, pp. 120-7.

52. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 158.

53. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, pp. 134 & 154.

54. *Ibid*, p. 154.

55. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, p. 118.

56. Hucker, *The Association of Asian Studies*, p. 61 & 65.

57. *Ibid*, pp. 50-2.

58. Richard Kagan writes in the foreword to Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. XIV.

59. *Ibid*, pp. 155-9; Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, pp. 112-3; The Reece Report is cited in Koen, p. 158.

60. The Reece Report is cited in Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, p. 158.

61. *Ibid*, p. 158.

62. *Ibid*, p. 159.

63. *Ibid*, pp. 176-181; The findings are cited on p. 181.

64. Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 349.

65. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, pp. 182-3; Gordon Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford, California, 1990), p. 23.

66. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, pp. 184-9.

67. *Ibid*, pp. 189-92.

68. Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 350.

69. Archibald.T. Steele, *The American People and China: A Volume in the Series "The United States and China in World Affairs"*, (New York, Toronto & London, 1966), p. 189.

70. Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 360.

71. *Ibid*, p. 371.

72. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, p. 116; Steele, *The American People and China*, p. 190.

73. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 2 & 180-3.

74. Fairbank, *Chinabound*, pp. 376-7.

75. Hucker, *The Association of Asian Studies*, p. 19.

76. *Ibid*, pp. 16 & 25.

77. *Ibid*, p. 25.

78. *Ibid*, p. 28.

79. *Ibid*, pp. 27 & 37.

80. *Ibid*, pp. 28-9.

81. *Ibid*, p. 29.

82. *Ibid*, pp. 51-2.

83. Steele, *The American People and China*, pp. 190-1.

84. *Ibid*, pp. 190-2.

85. *Ibid*, p. 192.

86. Hucker, *The Association of Asian Studies*, pp. 43-4.

87. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern*

China, pp. 211-3 & 218; *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Studies* (Henceforth *BCAS*), Vol 5, No 1, pp. 74-5.

88. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 211-3.

89. Taylor is cited in *BCAS*, Vol 5, No 2, p. 63. Letter by Taylor dated July 5, 1961.

90. Lindbeck is cited in Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 216.

91. Fairbank is cited in *ibid*, p. 186.

92. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, p. 129.

93. *Ibid*, pp. 126-7.

94. *Ibid*, p. 327.

95. *Ibid*, p. 129.

96. *Ibid*, p. 130.

97. *Ibid*, p. 129.

98. *Ibid*, p. 130.

99. There is an excellent biography of Chester Bowles; Howard Schaffer, *Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass & London, 1993).

100. Chester Bowles, *The New Dimensions of Peace* (London, 1956), p. 121.

101. Dulles is cited in Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York, 1967), p. 295. Bowles assessment of the early years of the CCP government can be found in Chester Bowles, *The New Dimensions of*

Peace, pp. 121-4.

102. Yale University Library (Henceforth YUL), Chester Bowles Collection, Box 132, Folder:- John King Fairbank, 1954-1958, Letter Fairbank to Bowles, May 10, 1955.

103. *Ibid.*

104. *Ibid*, Letter Fairbank to Bowles, May 24, 1955, pp. 1-2.

105. Barnett cited in Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, p. 164. Further details of the conference are to be found on the same page.

106. *Ibid*, p. 164.

107. Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 136.

108. Warren Cohen in Akira Iriye & Warren Cohen, *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World* (1989), p. 49; Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, p. 163.

109. Walter La Feber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750* (New York & London, 1989), pp. 541-2.

110. Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, pp. 182-94; Warren Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980), p. 164.

111. Leonard Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy: 1949-1979* (Westport, Connecticut & London, 1984), p. 81; Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, p. 164.

112. Engle cited in Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 152.

113. *Ibid*, p. 152 & Steele, *The American People and China*, p. 211.

114. Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 152; Steele, *The American People and China*, p. 212.

115. YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 207, Folder 0084, Misc Engel-Engelman, Letter Bowles to Clair Engle, May 22 1959.

116. *Ibid*, Letter Bowles to Engle, April 28, 1960.

117. Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 152.

118. *Ibid*, p. 152.

119. Wiley cited in Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 152.

120. Report cited in Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 154.

121. United States Government, *United States Foreign Policy: Asia: Studies Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate By Conlon Associates Ltd, No. 5* (November 1st, 1959, US Government Printing Office, 1959), Section on East Asia by Robert Scalapino, p. 126.

122. *Ibid*, p. 131.

123. *Ibid*, pp. 131, 133-5 & 143.

124. *Ibid*, pp. 147-8.

125. *Ibid*, p. 146.

126. *Ibid*, p. 150.

127. *Ibid*, p. 152.

128. *Ibid*, pp. 150-1.

129. Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, pp. 154-5.

130. *Ibid*, pp. 156-7.

131. Steele, *The American People and China*, p. 213.

132. 132. James Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1972, p. 221.

133. The best general book on the Council on Foreign Relations is Robert Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1984); Coburn in Friedman & Selden (eds), *America's Asia*, p. 87.

134. Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 389, Folder - Council on Foreign Relations, Soviet-American Relations, pp. 19-20.

135. Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, pp. 175-82; A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy*, published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York, 1960), pp. 381-3 & 474-5.

136. Chester Bowles, "The "China Problem" Reconsidered", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 38 No 3, pp. 476-485.

137. *Ibid*, pp. 481 & 484-5.

138. *Ibid*, p. 485.

139. *Ibid*, p. 485.

140. Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969* (New York & London, 1971), p. 391; British comments on the article can be found in PRO FO371 148589; Other correspondence on the article can be found in John F. Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Box 14, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, The China Problem Reconsidered by Chester Bowles in *Foreign Affairs* 4/60; this correspondence includes hostile comments from the State Department.

CHAPTER THREE: FOOTNOTES:

1. Amongst the best biographies of John F. Kennedy and his Presidency are James Giglio, *The Presidency of John F. Kennedy*, (New York, 1991) and Herbert S. Parmet, *JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy*, (New York, 1983).
2. The best biography of Dean Rusk is Warren Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980).
3. Rusk is cited in Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy*, (New York, 1967), p. 295.
4. Thomas C. Reeves, *A Question of Character: The Book That Finally Exploded the Kennedy Myth*, (London, 1991), pp. 120-4.
5. Robert G. Sutter, *China-Watch: Sino-American Reconciliation*, (Baltimore and London, 1978), p. vii; Stanley D. Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, (New York, 1976), p. 181.
6. John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library (JFKL), Papers of President Kennedy, NSF Files, Countries, China, Box 21-3, Memo to the President, From Frederick Dutton to Kennedy, February 1st, 1961; JFKL, NSF Meetings & Memos, Box 320: February 3 1961, National Security Action Memo No. 3. McGeorge Bundy and Dean Rusk. Subject: Bunkering of Free World Ships under Communist Chinese Charter.
7. JFKL, Presidential Papers, NSF Files, CO Box 21-3, Memo for the President From Dean Rusk, February 17th, 1961, Subject: Exhibition of Chinese Art Treasures in the United States.

8. JFKL, Presidential Papers, NSF Files, CO Box 21-3, Memo From Ralph Dungan to JFK, March 7, 1961. This memo shows that the ROC was delighted by this offer realising its propaganda value.
9. JFKL, NSF Files, CO, China, Box 21-3, Folder: China [General], 1/20/61-2/19/61, Discussion Paper, February 4, 1961; Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 202 assesses the role of Chester Bowles in all of this.
10. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII, 1961-3*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1996, p. 81-2, Editorial Note.
11. *Ibid*, pp. 67-9, Memo Rusk to Kennedy, Washington, May 26, 1961. Subject: China and the United Nations. On p. 68 Rusk shows the cynicism of the manoeuvre when he writes that: "We believe that the U.K. could support this proposal, that the GRC could tolerate it, that it could find wide support in the General Assembly, and that the Chinese Communists would reject it".
12. Rusk is cited in *Ibid*, p. 30, Memo of Conversation, Washington, March 14, 1961. Subject: US/UK Bilateral Talks: China and Chinese Representation in the UN, pp. 28-33.
13. *Ibid*, pp. 70-2, Editorial Note.
14. *Ibid*, Memo of Conversation, Washington, July 28, 1961. Subject: Conference at White House on China Representation at United Nations and Outer Mongolia-United Nations Membership Application, pp. 99-101.
15. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 308-9.

16. FRUS, *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII*, pp. 145-160 gives ample examples of Kennedy's secret promise to Jiang to ensure that the Chinese were not allowed into the United Nations. See also JFKL, CO- China Box 22, Folder: General CIA Cables 7/61-10/61, Cable from McGeorge Bundy at the President's request to Ray Cline, pp. 1-2.
17. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 310.
18. Rusk is cited in FRUS, *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII*, p. 55, Editorial Note, pp. 54-5. The conversation with Kennedy is also referred to in Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, pp. 164-5. This conversation is part of the evidence that leads Warren Cohen to believe that Rusk was essentially a pragmatist whose hard-line views were a reflection of Kennedy's instinctive dislike of the Chinese.
19. Rusk is cited *ibid*, p. 55.
20. Leonard Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy: 1949-1979*, (London & Westport, Conn, 1984), pp. 175 & 101. A Gallup poll in September 1961 showed that 65 per cent opposed Chinese entry into the United Nations against 18 per cent who supported it.
21. Rusk is cited in FRUS, *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII*, p. 55.
22. James C. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1972, p. 222.
23. Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969*, (New York & London, 1969), pp. 393-4; Howard Schaffer, *Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War*, (Cambridge,

Massachusetts & London, England, 1993), pp. 76-7, 81 & 137-40. Chapter two of Schaffer gives an excellent account of Bowles' political philosophy.

24. Bowles cited in Schaffer, *Chester Bowles*, p. 123.

25. Bowles cited in *Ibid*, pp. 174-5. See also p. 121.

26. *Ibid*, pp. 126 & 138-40. Yale University Library (YUL), Manuscript and Archives, Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder: 542: Letter from Bowles to Adlai Stevenson of July 23, 1961 where he outlines the attempts within the Kennedy Administration to get rid of him. On p. 2 he writes that: "Most of our mutual friends believe it originated with and was masterminded by the same factions with whom we fought in the Democratic Advisory Council" and on p.5 of the same document Bowles refers to "the primary role of the Achesonians in the effort to push me out".

27. *Ibid*, p. 115; YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 159, Folder: 0659, Thomson James C. Jr, 1953-8, all correspondence which shows the relationship between the two and the encouragement given to the young Thomson by the senior Bowles.

28. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL), OH (Oral History), Interviewer Paige E. Mulhollan, interviewee J.C. Thomson Jr, Place: Kennedy Institute of Politics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Date: July 22, 1971, p. 5. Thomson is cited on p. 11.

29. Thomson is cited in *Ibid*, p. 11.

30. YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 300, Folder 536, memo from Bowles to Rusk, 17th March 1961, Subject: China and the United Nations, p. 5.

31. See for example, JFKL, Presidential Office Files, Box 28, Folder: Chester Bowles 3/24/59-7/5/61, July 1, 1961, Subject: Some Requirements of American Foreign Policy, p. 8.
32. Schaffer, *Chester Bowles*, pp. 189-92. Bowles is cited on p. 192.
33. *Ibid*, pp. 189-92.
34. Bowles is cited in Bowles, *Promises to Keep*, p. 396.
35. See for example, Schaffer, *Chester Bowles*, pp. 197-201.
36. The State Department Officer is cited in an Original draft of a *Newsweek* article that can be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 7, Chester Bowles, Dept of State, General, 1963.
37. Schaffer, *Chester Bowles*, pp. 203-5.
38. *Ibid*, p. 204.
39. *Ibid*, pp. 228-9.
40. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 37.
41. *Ibid*, p. 37. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 7, Chester Bowles, Dept of State, General, 1963.
42. YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder: 542, Letter Bowles to Stevenson, July 23, 1961.
43. Press statement cited in *Ibid* p. 6.
44. JFKL, Oral History, Chester Bowles, p. 44; Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy, 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", p. 223.
45. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy: 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", *China Quarterly*, pp. 222-3.
46. Parsons cited in Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 443,

Folder: China 7, Memo Parsons to Harriman, Feb 21, 1961, Subject: Progress on China Policy, p. 5.

47. Rice's biographical details can be found in E.J. Kahn Jr, *The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them*, (New York, 1972), p. 310.

48. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 14, Far East, 1961-6 - Communist China - S/P - 61159: US Policy Toward Communist China - 10/26/61.

49. Rice cited in *Ibid*, p. 4.

50. Rice cited in *Ibid*, p. 4-5.

51. Rice cited in *Ibid*, p. 10. See also p.6.

52. *Ibid*, pp. 12-3, The term "pliable" is used on p. 13. Rice believed that the Japanese, if faced by mainland states under communist control would feel the need to coexist with them no matter what the reaction of the United States might be to that co-existence.

53. *Ibid*, p. 25.

54. Rice is cited in *Ibid*, p. 112.

55. *Ibid*, pp. 112-3.

56. *Ibid*, p. 113.

57. *Ibid*, p. 114.

58. *Ibid*, pp. 114-5.

59. Rice is cited in *Ibid*, p. 106. He is not explicit about what he means and does not give any examples of Jiang's use of political warfare against the United States.

60. Rice cited in *Ibid*, p. 118.

61. *Ibid*, p. 61.

62. See for example *Ibid*, p. 77 & 117.

63. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", p. 225; LC, Harriman Papers, Box 438, Chester Bowles, Memo Thomson to Bowles, Dec 14, 1961, Subject: Suggestions for Deputy Assistant Secretary in FE.

64. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", pp. 225-6.

65. *Ibid*, p. 226.

66. YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 304, Folder 604, Memo Bowles to "Andy, Jim (Thomson), and Sam", Date: January 15, 1962, p. 1.

67. Thomson Jr, p. 227, "On the Making of US China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics"; JFKL, Presidential Office Files, Countries, Box 113a, File: China Security, 1962-3, February 6, 1962, Memo Bowles to Kennedy, Subject: U.S. Initiatives Regarding the China Mainland Food Crisis.

68. Bowles cited in *Ibid*, p. 1.

69. Bowles cited in *Ibid*, p. 1.

70. *Ibid*.

71. *Ibid*.

72. Bowles cited in *Ibid*, p.4.

73. For examples of Bowles and Thomson seeking support for their efforts see JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, Folder, Food for China, 1/62-2/62.

74. For an example of the Quakers' involvement in the issue see JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China,

Folder: Food for China, 1/62-2/62, Memorandum of Meeting in the Office of Mr Carl Kaysen, Date January 10, 1962. The Quakers were a well-respected religious organisation who tried to promote a peaceful outcome to the Cold War.

75. FRUS, Vol XXII, Northeast Asia, Draft Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, April 4, 1962, Subject: United States Policy on Shipments of Medicines and Food Grains to Communist China, pp. 208-11.

76. Bowles cited in JFKL, Oral Histories, Chester Bowles, p. 34; FRUS, Northeast Asia, Vol XXII, Editorial Note, p. 185 refers to Kennedy's discussions with Bowles about the latter's mission to meet with U Nu.

77. Bowles, *Promises to Keep*, pp. 402-3.

78. LC, Harriman Papers, Box 443, Folder: China 7, Harriman to Rusk, April 13, 1962, Subject: United States Policy on Shipments of Medicines and Food Grains to Communist China. FRUS, *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII*, Memo Fm Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Rusk, April 6, 1962, pp. 213-4.

79. Harriman cited in LC, Harriman Papers, Box 443, Folder: China 7, Harriman to Rusk, April 13, 1962, Subject: United States Policy on Shipments of Medicines and Food Grains to Communist China.

80. *Ibid.* Three days later Bowles recorded his support for Harriman's views see YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder 537, Memo Bowles to Rusk, April 16, 1962.

81. Harriman cited in FRUS, Northeast Asia, Vol XXII, p. 217 fn 4. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 317.

82. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 317; For Bowles's view see JFKL,

Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, Folder: Food for China, 3/62-5/62, Memo Bowles to Kennedy, May 23 1962. The same Memo can also be found in YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 297, Folder 498.

83. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 316-7; FRUS, *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII*, pp. 231-3, Draft Paper Prepared in the State Department, May 28, 1962, Subject: Food Grains for Mainland China. This paper was never discussed.

84. Peaslee cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, Folder: Food for China, 6/62-7/62.

85. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 316-7.

86. Khrushchev cited in Immanuel Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (New York, 1975), p. 812. Other details of the roots of the Sino-Soviet split can be found on p. 809.

87. *Ibid*, pp. 812-3.

88. Khrushchev cited in *Ibid*, p. 816.

89. Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, pp. 169-70.

90. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, pp. 819-20.

91. *Ibid*, p. 816.

92. Thomson cited in Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 344; Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy: 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", p. 226; JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, General 1/62-3/62, Memo Thomson to Harriman, January 2, 1962, Subject: Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting, January 2, 1962: Discussion of the Sino-Soviet and U.S. Policy.

93. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy: 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", p. 227; Judith Coburn writing in Edward Friedman & Mark Selden (Eds), *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations*, (New York, 1971), p. 86.
94. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 14, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, Sino-Soviet Conflict and US Policy, 4/30/62, 1 of 2, Memo Rostow to Rusk, April 2, 1962, Subject: US Policy Re the Sino-Soviet Split.
95. *Ibid*, p. 7.
96. *Ibid*, pp. 10 & 15.
97. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 14, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, Folder: Sino-Soviet Conflict and US Foreign Policy, 4/30/62, 15 page summary that it attached to a 77pp S/P draft paper entitled "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and US Policy", p. 7.
98. *Ibid*, pp. 8-9; Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, pp. 169-70.
99. Gordon Chang, "JFK, China and the Bomb", *Journal of American History*, 1988, pp. 1287-1309, p. 1291.
100. Bundy is cited in LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1, Folder: Chapters 10, 12-16, Chap 16, pp. 4-5.
101. Chang, "JFK, China and the Bomb", p. 1301.
102. FRUS, *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII*, Telegram Fm Embassy in Taipei (Drumright) to Harriman in Dept of State, February 28, pp. 186-7; Draft Message Fm Kennedy to Harriman, March 9, 1962, Memorandum for the Record, March 31, 1962, Subject: White House Meeting on GRC Plans, pp. 204-5; Telegram Fm CIA Station in Saigon to Director of CIA McCone for distribution to President,

Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, June 7, 1962, pp. 241-4; Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 310-5.

103. FRUS, *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII*, Memo to the Chief of CIA Station in Taipei, Cline, March 31, 1962, pp. 206-7.

104. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 318-9.

105. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 319.

106. *Ibid*, pp. 319-20.

107. *Ibid*, pp. 321-2, 324 & 327.

108. Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, p. 170.

109. For Hilsman's view see Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 338-9.

110. FRUS, *Northeast Asia, Vol XXII*, pp. XXXI & XXXIII.

CHAPTER FOUR: FOOTNOTES.

1. For the best account of the life of Harriman, see Rudy Abramson, *Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986*, (New York, 1992).
2. *Ibid*, p. 594.
3. John Lewis Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union and The United States: An Interpretive History*, (New York, 1990), p. 101.
4. Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 409, NY Files, Post Gubernatorial-China, 1955-1959.
5. Abramson, *Spanning the Century*, p. 601.
6. *Ibid*, p. 585.
7. *Ibid*, p. 611. This group also saw Vietnam as essentially a civil war and had little time for the South Vietnamese leader Diem.
8. *Ibid*, pp. 592-3.
9. *Ibid*, p. 612.
10. Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy*, (New York, 1967), p. 347.
11. McGeorge Bundy cited in FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States), 1961-1963, *Volume XXII, Northeast Asia*, (Washington, 1996), Editorial Note, p. 339.
12. John McCone cited in *Ibid*, p. 339.
13. *Ibid*, p. 339.
14. *Ibid*, pp. 339-40.
15. *Ibid*, Editorial Note, p. 341.
16. Harriman cited in *Ibid*, p. 341.

17. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, Editorial Note, pp. 370.

18. *Ibid*, pp. 370-1.

19. De Martino cited in *Ibid*, pp. 370-1. For details of attempts by Harriman to develop an understanding about a US-Soviet alliance against the Chinese regarding Chinese nuclear development, see also Gordon Chang, "JFK, China, and the Bomb, *Journal of American History*, 1988, pp. 1291, 1301, 1304-5.

20. For details about the July 31, 1963 meeting of the NSC see, FRUS, *Northeast Asia, Vol XXII*, Summary Record of the 516th of the National Security Council, Washington, July 31, 1963, pp. 371-4. For the views of the CIA see, JFKL (John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library), NSF (National Security Files), Box No 314, National Security Council Meeting 1963, No: 516, 7/31/63, Folder:- 10; Subject: CIA, SNIE 13-4-63: Possibilities of Greater Militancy By the Chinese Communists. On p. 2 the report concludes that the CCP "may become more disagreeable, and there is a possibility that they will undertake somewhat more assertive initiatives, in the hope of attaining limited but visible gains at minimum risk", but that "over the past few years, in spite of their warlike oratory, they have followed a generally cautious policy".

21. FRUS, *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII*, Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State, Warsaw, August 7, 1963, pp. 378-82. Cabot cited in footnote, No. 1, p. 378.

22. Wang cited in *Ibid*, pp. 378-9.

23. Wang cited in *Ibid*, p. 382.

24. *Ibid*, Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, November 5, 1963, pp. 404-5. The Planning Group report is cited on p. 405.

25. Bromley Smith cited in *Ibid*, p. 405n[4].

26. Abramson, *Spanning the Century*, p. 612.

27. *Ibid*, p. 612.

28. JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5(6), Folder: 1/62-6/62 - Chronological File: Letter Hilsman to JFK, 12/1/62.

29. LBJL (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library), Oral History Interview, James Thomson, July 22, 1971. Thomson cited on p. 29.

30. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 347.

31. *Ibid*, pp. 347-8.

32. Hilsman cited in *Ibid*, pp. 351-2.

33. *Ibid*, pp. 340-4.

34. Hilsman cited in JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2/25/64, Letter Hilsman to Marshall Green, July 5, 1963.

35. Green cited in JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2/25/64, Personal Telegram from Marshall Green to Roger Hilsman, July 16, 1963.

36. JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2/25/64, Letters; Hilsman to Green, August 1, 1963 & Green to Hilsman, August 8, 1963.

37. JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2/25/64, Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Undated, Subject: Proposed Changes in the Organization of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. A

covering Memo from Hilsman to William Crockett (Deputy Under Secretary for Administration) dated October 8, 1963 indicates its authorship. The same Paper can be found FRUS, *Northeast Asia, Vol XXII*, pp. 397-9. Hilsman cited on pp. 397-8. In the covering Memo, Hilsman makes the importance of the role envisaged for Marshall Green: "As you know, the installation of Marshall Green as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of FE provides they key activating factor in these moves which I have been thinking about for many months".

38. JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2/25/64, contains another paper not produced in FRUS which puts forward the argument for an Office of Regional Affairs.

39. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 348-50; FRUS, *Northeast Asia: Vol XXII*, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk, Washington, October 22, 1963 (Not Sent), pp. 403-4.

40. FRUS, *Northeast Asia, Vol XXII*, Introduction, p. VII.

41. LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1, Folder: Chaps 10, 12-16. William Bundy is cited on p. 19.

42. *Ibid*, p. 19.

43. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction; Memo: Thomson to JCT (James Claude Thomson) Files, May 6, 1964, Subject: Hilsman's China Speech of December 13, 1963, p. 1.

44. *Ibid*, Thomson cited on p. 1.

45. *Ibid*, p. 1.

46. *Ibid*, p. 2.

47. *Ibid*, p. 2; LBJL, Oral History Interview, Roger Hilsman, p. 36.

48. Kennedy cited in Stanley Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, (New York, 1976), p. 208.

49. LBJL, OH, Roger Hilsman, p. 36.

50. LBJL, OH, James Thomson, p. 38.

51. Warren Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980), pp. 171-3.

52. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo Thomson to JCT Files, May 6, 1964, Subject: Hilsman's China Speech of December 13, p. 2-3.

53. *Ibid*, p. 3; Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 353 suggested that a contingency if the Johnson Administration disowned the speech would be to tie it to the policy that Kennedy had intended to follow and the Kennedy Administration in general.

54. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo Thomson to JCT Files, May 6, 1964, Subject: Hilsman's China Speech of December 13, p. 3; Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 351, the others present at this meeting were Joseph Neubert and Abram Manell who were State Department FE Officers.

55. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo Thomson to JCT Files, May 6, 1964, Subject: Hilsman's China Speech of December 13, p. 3.

56. *Ibid*, pp. 3-4.

57. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 355.

58. *Ibid.* Hilsman cited on p. 355.

59. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo Thomson to JCT Files, May 6, 1964, Subject: Hilsman's China Speech of December 13, p. 4; LBJL, OH, Thomson, pp. 38-9; LBJL, OH, Hilsman, p. 37.

60. James C. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1972, p. 231; LBJL, OH, Thomson, pp. 38-9.

61. LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1, Folder: Chaps 10, 12-16, Chap 16, p. 13; Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, pp. 172-3 also emphasises that Rusk would have understood fully the ramifications of the speech and that he would have been broadly in agreement. Another useful and interesting document is JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Folder: Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63-12/17/63, Memo Thomson to Hilsman, December 11, 1963 which shows Thomson's genuine concern about Rusk's likely reaction to the contents of the speech. He writes that: "As this is a sensitive subject, you wanted him to know in advance that you plan to appraise the nature of the Chinese Communist leadership, power, and objectives; and that you define and explain our policy of non-recognition and trade embargo while emphasizing that we will always keep open the door to evidence of more friendly Chinese Communist behavior. You quote President

Johnson's speech to Congress ... You might add that your speech has been cleared by EUR, P, Harriman's Office (Sullivan), and Forrestal".

62. The text of the December speech can be found in the *Congressional Record* where Senator George McGovern has placed it on p. 23859. It can also be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Folder:- Speeches, 1961-6, Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence & Press, 12/13/63-12/17/63.

63. Hilsman makes this point explicitly in *To Move a Nation*, p. 351; William Bundy also notes this shift, see LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1, Folder: Chaps 10, 12-16, Chap 16, p. 13.

64. Hilsman cited in Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy: 1961-1969", p. 230.

65. Hilsman cited in *Congressional Record*, p. 23859.

66. Hilsman cited in *Ibid.*

67. Hilsman cited in *Ibid.*

68. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches 1961-6, Roger Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco Commonwealth Club, Press Reaction, Memo Thomson to Hilsman, December 19, 1963, Subject: Distribution of San Francisco Speech. The twelve Senators sent the speech were Mansfield, Humphrey, Fulbright, Gore, Church, McGovern, Hart, Clark, Kennedy, Pell, Engle and Kuchel.

69. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo Thomson to Barnett, Undated, Subject: Preliminary US Reaction to Hilsman Speech and to French Recognition of Communist China, p. 1.

70. Reischauer cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches, 1961-6, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence and Press, 12/26/63-12/31/63, Note/Internal Letter, Reischauer to Thomson, December 16, 1963.

71. Thomson cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches, 1961-6, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence and Press, 12/26/63-12/31/63, Note/Internal Letter, Thomson to Reischauer, December 31, 1963.

72. A. Doak Barnett cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence & Press, 12/18/63-12/25/63, Letter A. Doak Barnett to Thomson, December 19, 1963.

73. Latourette and Pringsheim cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches 1961-6, R. Hilsman 12/13/63, San Francisco - Correspondence & Press, 1/1/64-1/7/64, Latourette to Thomson, 5/1/64, Pringsheim to Thomson, 4/1/64.

74. John Kenneth Galbraith cited in Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 356.

75. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo Thomson to Barnett, Undated, Subject: Preliminary US Reaction to Hilsman Speech and to French Recognition of Communist China, p. 1.

76. Thomson cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 8, Folder:- Thomson-Bowles, Correspondence, 11/63-2/64, Letter Thomson to Bowles, December 13, 1963.

77. Thomson cited in *Ibid.*

78. McGovern cited in *Congressional Record*, p. 23859, a copy of which can be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence and Press, 12/18/63-12/25/63.

79. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 356.

80. Seymour Topping cited in *New York Times*, Thursday February 20, 1964, a copy of which can be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence & Press, 1/16/64-4/18/64.

81. Leonard Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy: 1949-1979*, (London, England, 1984), p. 108.

82. LBJL, OH, Roger Hilsman, pp. 37-8. Jenkins cited on p. 38.

83. Hilsman cited in *Ibid*, p. 38.

84. *Ibid*, p. 39.

85. Zhou En-lai cited from an interview he gave to Reuters on October 13, 1963, which can also be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 8, Folder:- Roger Hilsman, General, 1963-6, China Speech Material, p. 2.

86. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy: 1961-1969", p. 232.

87. Thomson puts forward this thesis most fully in his article, "On the Making of US China Policy: 1961-1969".

CHAPTER FIVE: FOOTNOTES:

1. The best introductory book on Lyndon Johnson is Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*, (London, 1976).
2. This development is explored fully in Chapter six.
3. There are a number of books on Lyndon Johnson's policies and attitude towards Vietnam. For example see Michael H. Hunt, *Lyndon Johnson's War: America's Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968*, (New York, 1996).
4. Kearns explores this well in, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*, chapter Nine.
5. This aspect of Johnson's thinking are encapsulated well in Walter La Feber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750*, (New York & London, 1989), pp. 579-81.
6. Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*, pp. 174-8 & 260-6.
7. For a blunt assessment of the sacking of Hilsman see, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Oral History, James Thomson, p. 9. Hilsman in his book, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy*, (New York, 1967), p. 535 claims that he left the Administration of his own volition.
8. Rudy Abramson, *Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986*, (New York, 1992), p. 633.
9. *Ibid,* p. 635. Chapter 24 fully records Harriman's decline and his doomed attempts to ingratiate himself with the new President.
10. William Bundy is cited in LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1,

Folder: Chaps 10, 12-16, Chap 16, p. 15.

11. Bundy cited *Ibid*, p. 15.

12. Bundy cited *Ibid*, pp. 17-18.

13. Hunt, *Lyndon Johnson's War*, p. 90 demonstrates how Johnson reacted to the incident.

14. Leonard A. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy: 1949-1979*, (Westport, Connecticut & London, 1984), p. 110.

15. For a good assessment of Kennedy's policy towards Vietnam and his reliance on counter-insurgency see, Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990*, (New York, 1991), pp. 75-88.

16. La Feber, *The American Age*, p. 579.

17. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, p. 114.

18. LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1, Chaps, 10, 12-16, Chap 16, pp. 7, 9 & 11.

19. *Ibid*, p. 7, 9 & 11.

20. Bundy cited in *Ibid*, p. 11.

21. Warren Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980), p. 219; Abramson, *Spanning the Century*, p. 532.

22. LBJL, OH, Dean Rusk, Interview three, Tape 1 of 2, p. 8.

23. Rusk cited in *Ibid*, p. 8.

24. Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, pp. 284-5.

25. John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*, (Cambridge, Mass, 1972), p. 387.

26. Thomson in LBJL, OH, Thomson, p. 48 recalls the conversation.

27. Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, p. 284.

28. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, p. 116.

29. John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Box 7, Chester Bowles, Folder, Thomson Thoughts on Bowles and State Department, 5/29/63, p. 1.

30. These Memos are to be found amongst the Thomson Papers at the JFK library.

31. The Memo from Thomson to McGeorge Bundy of October 23, 1964 can be found in JFKL, NSC Staff/McGeorge Bundy, 1964-6, Chron File, 9/64-11/64 and LBJL, National Security Files, Country File, China, Box 238, Folder, China, Memos Vol II, 9/64-2/65.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Thomson cited *Ibid*, p. 3.

34. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 13, Far East, 1961-6, General Folder: Thomson-Cooper Memoranda, 4/64-1/66, Memo for Mr (McGeorge) Bundy, Subject: 2 Weeks in Asia, 23/11/65, from Thomson, Cooper and Ropa, pp. 8-9.

35. Komer cited in LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 238, Folder: China Memos Vol II, 9/64-2/65, Memo Komer to Bundy, 23/11/64, p. 1.

36. *Ibid*, p. 1.

37. Green cited in Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 467, Folder: Hilsman, Roger, Memo Marshall Green to Harriman, 17/11/64.

38. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 16, Far East, 1961-1966, Communist China, Folder: General, 1/65-4/65, Information Memo, Lindsey Grant

through Marshall Green to William Bundy, March 18, 1965, p. 1.

39. Grant cited *Ibid*, p. 1.

40. Grant cited *Ibid*, p. 4.

41. Grant cited *Ibid*, p. 3.

42. Grant cited *Ibid*, p. 3.

43. Grant cited *Ibid*, p. 3-4. (Emphasis in original).

44. This is covered in Kevin Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New US Policy in Asia, Unpublished MA Thesis, (University of Warwick, 1993), pp. 99-100.

45. Stanley Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, (New York, 1976), Chapter Ten.

46. Green cited LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 238, Folder: China, Memos, Vol IV, 7/65-10/65, Memo Green to Cooper and Thomson, July 9, 1965.

47. Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 435, Folder: Robert Barnett, Memo Barnett to Jacobsen and a copy sent to Harriman, March 23, 1966.

48. Memo cited *Ibid*, p. 1. (Emphasis in original).

49. Memo cited *Ibid*, p. 2.

50. Memo cited *Ibid*, p. 2.

51. JFKL, Thomson Papers, NS Staff/McGeorge Bundy, 1964-1966, Chron File, 7/65-8/65, Memo McGeorge Bundy, to Johnson, August 24, 1965.

52. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 11, NS Staff/McGeorge Bundy, 1964-1966, 6/65, Chron File, Memo Thomson to Bundy, June 2, 1965.

53. LBJL, Country File, China, Box 238, Folder: China, Memos, Vol IV, 7/65-10/65, Unused Memo Thomson to Johnson, Subject: Letter to You from Dr Paul Dudley White Regarding Communist China.

54. JFKL, Thomson Papers, NS Staff/McGeorge Bundy, 1964-1966, Chron File, 7/65-8/65, Memo McGeorge Bundy to Johnson, August 24, 1965.

55. *Ibid.*

56. *Ibid.*

57. State Department cited in LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 238, Folder: China Memos, Vol IV, 7/65-10/65, Memo Berger & Schwartz to Rusk, August 27, 1965.

58. Thomson cited in LBJL, OH, James Thomson, p. 42.

59. Thomson cited in *Ibid*, p. 42.

60. LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 240, Folder: China Memos Vol VII, 9/66-11/66, Memo Alfred Jenkins to Walt Rostow, November 4, 1966.

61. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 13, Far East, 1961-66, General, Folder: Thomson-Cooper Memoranda, 4/64-1/66, Memo for Mr Bundy, Subject: 2 Weeks in Asia, Date 23/11/65, From Thomson, Cooper and Ropa.

62. Thomson cited JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 17, Far East, 1961-66, Folder: General, 7/66-8/66 & Undated, Memo Thomson to Redmon, Subject: China Talent, August 3, 1966, p. 1.

63. *Ibid*, p. 1. See also LBJL, NSF, Name File, Box 5, Folder: Jenkins, Memos (Alfred), Memo Jenkins to Rostow, September 14, 1966,

Subject: Interagency China Country Committee.

64. LBJL, OH, Thomson, p. 56.

65. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 13, Far East, 1961-66, General Folder: Thomson-Cooper, Memoranda, 4/64-1/66, Memo for McGeorge Bundy from Thomson, December 7, 1965.

CHAPTER SIX: FOOTNOTES:

1. Paul Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, (Oxford, 1985), p. 245.
2. This subject is looked at in greater depth in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
3. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 260; Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, (New York, 1996), p. 319.
4. Charles Hucker, *The Association for Asian Studies: An Interpretative History: AAS Occasional Papers No.1*, (Seattle & London, 1973).
5. *Ibid,* pp. 28-9, 82.
6. *Ibid*, p. 29.
7. An example of the growing American influence on the *China Quarterly* see the names of the editorial board starting in 1960 and then later on.
8. Schwartz is cited in John N. Thomas, *The Institution of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics*, (Seattle & London, 1974), p. 123.
9. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 266.
10. *Ibid*, p. 259.
11. Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*, (New York, 1983), p. 357.
12. *Ibid*, pp. 357-9.
13. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decisions to Enter the Korean War, (Stanford, Calif, 1960).
14. Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-*

American Confrontation, (New York, 1994), p. 2.

15. David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War*, (London, 1964).

16. Chen Jian, "Chinese Policy and the Korean War", pp. 189-205 in Lester H. Brune (Ed), *The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research*, (Westport, Conn & London, 1996), pp. 191-3.

17. *Ibid*, p. 191.

18. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, Chap 3 especially pp. 44-6.

19. *Ibid*, pp. 106-9.

20. Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Vol II: The Roaring of the Cataract*, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1990).

21. Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, Chap 1; See also Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953*, (Lawrence, Kansas, 1995).

22. Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, Chap 5.

23. My research has shown that Allen Whiting did not usually move in either the liberal or conservative circles and as his literature shows he tended towards think tanks and government work.

24. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, p. viii.

25. Judith Coburn, "Asian Scholars and Government: The Chrysantheum on the Sword", pp. 67 - 107 in Edward Friedman & Mark Selden (eds), *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations*, (New York, 1971), p. 95; Michael H. Hunt, *Lyndon Johnson's War: America's Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968*, (New York, 1996), p. 104; Walter La Feber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750*, (New York & London,

1989), pp. 579-580.

26. Chen Jian in Brune (Ed), *The Korean War*, pp. 196-9.

27. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, Chap 1.

28. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, National Security Files, Country File - China, Box 238, Folder: China, Memos Vol III, 4-65-6/65, Memo Thomas Hughes (State Department, INR) to McGeorge Bundy, May 18, 1965 & Memo Nagle (Chairman, FAR) to Members of the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group (FAR), May 5, 1965, Subject: Statement of the Position of the FAR China Subcommittee on External Research Priorities.

29. *Ibid*, Memo Nagle to members of FAR, p. 2.

30. *Ibid*, p. 1.

31. *Ibid*, p. 1.

32. Whiting cited in *ibid*, p. 1.

33. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, p. x.

34. *Ibid*, pp. 1-2.

35. *Ibid*, p. 2.

36. LBJL, NSF Files, Country File - China, Box 238, Folder: China, Memos Vol III, 4/65-6/65, Memo Hughes to McGeorge Bundy, May 18, 1965.

37. LBJL, NSF Files, Country File - China, Box 238, Folder: China, Memos Vol III, 4/65-6/65, Document: "Statement of the Position of the FAR China Subcommittee on External Research Priorities". Date: April, 1965.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*

40. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 267.

41. Hucker, *The Association for Asian Studies*, p. 77.

42. *Ibid*, p. 78.

43. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 268 & 316-7.

44. *Ibid*, p. 270; See also articles by James Peck, "The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers", pp. 40-66 & Judith Coburn, "Asian Scholars and Government: The Chrysantheum on the Sword" which are both located in Friedman & Selden (eds), *America's Asia; Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 22, 1969 has a long article on the disputes within the profession written by Dick Wilson which is a good introduction to the areas of controversy. Finally, the CCAS journal *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* had regular features on the activities of the JCCC. See for example the Summer-Autumn edition of 1971.

45. *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol 5, No 1, (July 1973), p. 75.

46. *Ibid*, p. 75; *New York Times*, James Reston, "New China Hands"; Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 211-213.

47. *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol 5 No 1, (July 1973), p. 76 & Vol 5 No 2, (October, 1973), pp. 62-3.

48. George Taylor cited in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, October 1973, Vol 5 No 2, p. 63.

49. Taylor cited in *ibid*, p. 63.

50. *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol 5, No 1, (July, 1973), pp. 74 & 76.

51. *Ibid*, pp. 74-5.

52. *Ibid*, p. 75.

53. The BCAS charges are cited in *ibid*, p. 75.

54. BCAS cited in *ibid*, p. 75.

55. Leonard A. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979*, (Westport, Conn & London, 1984) focuses on the issue of the influence of public opinion on America's China policy.

56. CFR cited in A. T. Steele, *The American People and China: A Volume in the "The United States and China in World Affairs" series*, CFR, (New York, Toronto & London, 1966), p. XV. Also noted is a grant from the Ford Foundation, which made the study possible and is described as "generous".

57. For details of the methodology adopted by Steele see *ibid*, pp. 2-3.

58. Steele cited *ibid*, p. 1.

59. *Ibid*, pp. 78-9.

60. *Ibid*, p. 210.

61. *Ibid*, p. 80.

62. *Ibid*, p. 84.

63. *Ibid*, p. 75.

64. Cited in *ibid*, p. 85.

65. *Ibid*, p. 87.

66. *Ibid*, p. 80.

67. *Ibid*, p. 80.

68. Steele cited *ibid*, p. 80.

69. *Ibid*, pp. 122-3.

70. *Ibid*, pp. 129-130.

71. *Ibid*, p. 2.

72. *The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Toward China, A Report Prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations*, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, (New York, 1964).

73. Steele, *The American People and China*, pp. 244-5 & 247.

74. The government's view of *The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Toward China*, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, can be found in John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Box 16, Far East, 1961-1966 Communist China, Folder, "The American Public's View of US Policy Toward China" - Council on Foreign Relations, 12/15/64, Thomson concludes that the study "takes no stand, expressed or implied, on American policy".

75. *China Quarterly*, 1964, No 22 pp. 207-8, has a good review of the SRC study by Harold Kahn who finds its conclusions "at once sobering and encouraging". The general ignorance of the US public is mentioned on p. 208.

76. *Ibid*, p. 208.

77. *Ibid*, p. 208.

78. *Ibid*, p. 208.

79. The Lou Harris poll of 1966 can be found in LBJL, WHCF, Country

Files, Box 22, Folder, CO-50-2, PRC, 5/17/66, Memo Hayes Redmon to Bill Moyers.

80. Lou Harris cited in *ibid.* The quote is underlined in the original that seems to accept an acknowledgement that this is a legitimate reading of the statistics.

81. Stanley. D. Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, (New York, 1976), Chapter 10 charts the decline of the China Lobby in the 1960s.

82. The *Washington Post*, November 29, 1964 article is cited in Steele, *The American People and China*, p. 239.

83. Report cited in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol 47, (January 7, 1965), p. 15.

84. Report cited in *ibid*, p. 15.

85. Report cited in *ibid*, p. 15.

86. Report cited in *ibid*, p. 15.

87. *Ibid*, p. 15; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol 48, (April 8, 1965), p. 69.

88. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol 48, (April 8, 1965), p. 69.

89. *Ibid*, p. 69.

90. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol 49, (July 8, 1965), p. 85.

91. For example many business leaders joined the National Committee on US-China Relations whose work is covered in Chapter 7 of this thesis.

92. Walter La Feber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1984*, (New York, 1985), p. 212.

93. *Ibid*, p. 213.

94. There have been a number of excellent accounts of the Cuban Missile

Crisis. For a good general overview see Thomas Paterson & Dennis Merrill (eds), *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol II: Since 1914*, (Lexington, Mass & Toronto), Chap 10.

95. La Feber, *The American Age*, p. 568.

96. *Ibid*, p. 572.

97. Thomas Reeves, *A Question of Character: The Life of John F. Kennedy*, (New York & Ontario, 1991).

98. Hilsman's approach to Sino-American relations and his attempts to model US policy towards the PRC on what he perceives to be Kennedy's Soviet policy is covered in Chapter 4.

99. This theme is best summed up in Hilsman's December 1963 speech when he stated that: "We believe ... that policies of strength and firmness, accompanied by a constant readiness to negotiate -- policies long and effectively pursued with the Soviet Union -- will best promote the changes which must take place on the China mainland". JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Folder, Speeches, 1961-1966, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence and Press, 12/9/63-12/17/63, Memo Neubert to Rice, December 13, 1963.

100. Gabriel Kolko, *Vietnam: Anatomy of a War, 1940-1975*, (Toronto, 1986), pp. 111-4.

101. *Ibid*, Part One is the best overall introduction to the situation that confronted the US in Vietnam.

102. La Feber, *The American Age*, pp. 563-5 & 577-81 explores these choices briefly but identifies the salient points that led to the escalations by the US.

103. *Ibid*, pp. 563-5 & 577-81.

104. *Ibid*, p. 579.

105. *Ibid*, p. 579; Michael Hunt, *Lyndon Johnson's War*, pp. 92-4 has a good section on the Johns Hopkins speech.

106. La Feber, *The American Age*, p. 579; Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990*, (New York, 1991), pp. 29-31.

107. La Feber, *The American Age*, pp. 579-80.

108. There are a number of these conservative accounts of the Vietnam War which stress that the US political leaders were unwilling to allow the military to pursue the objective of total victory. The most famous of these Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, (New York, 1978).

109. Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*, (London, 1976), captures this well in Chaps 9-12.

110. I found that there were dozens of boxes dealing with presidential correspondence and decisions dealing with Vietnam.

111. La Feber, *The American Age*, pp. 586-9. The classic example of this lack of credibility was the decision by the South Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Thieu to sabotage the peace talks in order to wait out the Johnson Administration in the hope of getting better terms and support from Nixon. For details of this see Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, pp. 233-4.

112. Immanuel Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (New York, 1975), p. 897.

113. The issue of the Chinese development of nuclear weapons and the US reaction is covered in Chapters 4 and 5.

114. He Di is cited in Warren Cohen & Akira Iriye (Eds), *The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960*, (New York, 1990), p. 222.

115. Immanuel Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (New York & Oxford, 1995), p. 664. Chapter 26 is a good introductory overview of the early years of CCP rule in China.

116. *Ibid*, p. 664.

117. *Ibid*, p. 664.

118. Moise cited in Edwin E. Moise, *The Present and the Past: Modern China: A History*, (London & New York, 1986), p. 151.

119. *Ibid*, p. 151; Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1995), pp. 655-8.

120. Moise, *The Present and the Past*, p. 151 & 155.

121. *Ibid*, p. 151; Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1995), p. 657.

122. Moise, *The Present and the Past*, p. 155; Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1995), p. 694.

123. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1995), p. 694.

124. *Ibid*, pp. 694-5.

125. Akira Iriye & Warren Cohen (Eds), *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*, (Lexington, Kentucky, 1989), (Hosoya), p. 31.

126. I have never found individual assessments of Chinese leaders or assessments of the potential changes that might arise should Mao be replaced nor evidence of it being placed on an agenda for a meeting.

127. This is covered in Chapter 3 of the thesis.

128. A good example of this general reference to future Chinese leaders is a speech given by Roger Hilsman in San Francisco in November 1964 after he had left the State Department. In the

speech, Hilsman made a point of talking of a second echelon of Chinese leaders who would be soon coming to power and whom he was certain would see the world differently. Hilsman concluded by stating that: "As time goes on these second echelon leaders will come to power. As time goes on the Sino-Soviet dispute will also mature. I think it would be wise of the United States to continue to deal firmly with aggression. But I think it would be equally wise of the United States to lay the groundwork now that will permit flexibility later". The text of the speech can be found in Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 467, Folder, Hilsman, Roger, Text of speech by Roger Hilsman, November 1964.

129. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1995), p. 695.

130. *Ibid*, p. 695.

131. *Ibid*, pp. 695-7.

132. *Ibid*, pp. 672-3.

133. Robert G. Sutter, *China-Watch: Sino-American Reconciliation*, (Baltimore & London, 1978), p. 5 & 13.

134. *Ibid*, p. 21.

135. *Ibid*, p. 29. Barbara Tuchman's interesting assessment can be found in her article, "If Mao had come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives", *Foreign Affairs*, (October 1972).

136. Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, pp. 17-9.

137. *Ibid*, pp. 15-6.

138. *Ibid*, pp. 21-2; Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1995), pp. 660-1.

139. Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, p. 21.

140. *Ibid*, p. 23; Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1995), p. 662.

141. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1975), p. 894.

142. Sutter, *China-Watch*, pp. 42-3.

143. Zhou En-lai is cited in Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 117; Sutter, *China-Watch*, p. 67.

144. In fact, if anything, the message from Zhou in 1971 was even tougher than their statement of 1955. On December 9, 1971 a communication came from Zhou stating that: "In order to discuss, the subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking (Beijing)". See Tad Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, (New York, 1978), p. 350; Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, (London, 1979), pp. 700-1 & 703-4.

145. Sutter, *China-Watch*, p. viii; John Gittings, "The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy", in *China Quarterly*, No 39, (July, 1969), pp. 41-54, p. 51; For details of the relevant section of the Shanghai Communiqué see, Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1975), pp. 905-6; Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, p. 524.

146. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1975), p. 794.

147. As India was to discover in October 1962.

148. Cohen & Iriye (Eds), *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960*, (He Di), pp. 231-2.

149. *Ibid*, pp. 231-2 & Warren Cohen pp. 8-9.

150. *Ibid*, pp. 240-1

151. *Ibid*, p. 242.

152. Mao cited in *Ibid*, p. 242.

153. Chester Bowles, "The "China Problem" Reconsidered", in *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 476-486, April 1960, Vol 38 No 3, p. 481: "The native Formosans, the Nationalist Chinese and the world generally must be convinced that our objective is not to create a military base for the invasion of the mainland but to encourage the orderly growth of a new, independent nation".

154. Cohen & Iriye (Eds), *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960*, (He Di), pp. 236-7.

155. *Ibid*, p. 237.

156. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1975), p. 720; Han Su Yin, *Eldest Son: Zhou En-lai and the Making of Modern China, 1898-1976*, (London, 1994), pp. 291-2.

157. Kolko, *Vietnam*, p. 403.

158. *Ibid*, p. 403.

159. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1975), p. 843; Gareth Porter, *A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement*, (Bloomington & London, 1975), pp. 42-3.

160. Porter, *A Peace Denied*, pp. 42-3.

161. Moise, *The Present and the Past*, p. 190.

162. *Ibid*, p. 190. Most recent reports have put the number of Chinese military personnel in North Vietnam during the 1960s at about 320,000. (Figures from the H-Net discussion group H-Diplo, July 1999).

163. *People's Daily*, 29, March, 1966 cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers,

Box 17, Far East, 1961-1966, Communist China, Folder, General, 3/21/66-3/31/66.

164. Zhou cited in Han Su Yin, *Eldest Son*, p. 296.

165. Mao cited in Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (1975), p. 726.

166. Rusk's position on Taiwan is covered in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

CHAPTER SEVEN: FOOTNOTES:

1. Paul Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, (Oxford, 1985), p. 248.
2. *Ibid*, p. 252.
3. Robert Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy*, (New York, 1989), p. 79.
4. A. T. Steele, *The American People and China: A Volume in the Series "The United States and China in World Affairs"*, (New York, Toronto & London, 1966). The importance of the book is dealt with in detail in Chapter six of this thesis.
5. Gordon Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972*, (Stanford, California, 1990), p. 274.
6. CFR 1966 handbook cited in Leonard Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979*, (Westport, Conn & London, 1984), p. 127.
7. Stanley Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, (New York, 1976), p. 231; *United States Policy Toward Asia: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol I, Jan 25, 26, 27, & Feb 1, 2, 3, 1966, & Vol II Feb 15 & 16, March 8, 9, 10 & 16, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1966).
8. Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger*, p. 79; U.S. *Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session on U.S Policy

with Respect to Mainland China, March 8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 28 & 30, 1966, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1966); Marilyn B. Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990*, (New York, 1991), p. 205.

9. J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power*, (New York, 1966), pp. 155-6 & 198.
10. *U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, p. 1.
11. Barnett cited in *ibid*, p. 4.
12. *Ibid*, p. 4.
13. Barnett cited in *ibid*, p. 8.
14. Barnett cited in *ibid*, p. 12.
15. *Ibid*, pp. 40 & 43.
16. Fulbright cited in Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 252.
17. Fairbank cited in *ibid*, p. 252.
18. *U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, p. 98.
19. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 252.
20. Fairbank cited in *U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, p. 132.
21. Eckstein cited in *ibid*, pp. 338-9.
22. *Ibid*, pp. 70 & 134-43.
23. *Ibid*, p. 336.
24. Eckstein cited in *ibid*, pp. 336-7.

25. Fairbank cited in *ibid*, pp. 122-3.

26. *Ibid*, pp. 1 contains a list of the guest speakers, see also pp. 180, 270-1, 375 & 549; Robert G. Sutter, *The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy: 1972-1982*, (Boulder, Colorado, 1983), p. 18 notes the similarity between the majority of speakers and identifies key three demands that they were all making. Firstly, that the US should recognise the PRC government. Secondly, that it should allow trade in non-strategic items and thirdly that it should allow the PRC into the UN.

27. *U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, p. 125.

28. Pell and Lindbeck are cited in *ibid*, p. 217.

29. *Ibid*, pp. 626 & 629; Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million*, p. 234; JFKL (John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library), Thomson Papers, Box 17, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, Folder: General, 3/21/66-3/31/66.

30. *U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China*, p. 269.

31. Fulbright cited in *ibid*, p. 272.

32. *Ibid*, pp. 484-9.

33. Rowe cited in *ibid*, p. 500.

34. *Ibid*, pp. 522; 531-42.

35. Brigadier Samuel Griffith is cited in an article by Joseph Kraft in the *Washington Post*, February 25, 1966. A copy of the article can be located in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 16, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, 1/66-2/66.

36. Chester Cooper cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 17, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, "The Policy Maker and Mainland China", Council on Foreign Relations, 6/10/66, p. 14.

37. *U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, pp. 4 & 214.

38. Thomson is cited in *U.S. Relations with the PRC, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, June 24, 25, 28, 29 & July 20, 1971*, (U.S. Govt Printing Office, Washington, 1972), p. 176.

39. *Ibid*, p. 176.

40. Thomson is cited in *ibid*, p. 176.

41. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 266.

42. *Ibid*, p. 266.

43. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Oral History, James Thomson Jr, 22 July, 1971, p. 42; LBJL, National Security File, Name File, Box 8, Folder, Thomson Memos, Memo Thomson to Moyers, March 15, 1966.

44. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Box 239, Folder, China, Memos, Vol VI, 3/66-9/66, Memo Thomson to Valenti, March 1, 1966, Subject: Some Propositions on China Strategy, p. 1.

45. *Ibid*, pp. 1-2.

46. *Ibid*, p. 2.

47. *Ibid*, pp. 2-3.

48. *Ibid*, pp. 2-4.

49. *Ibid*, p. 4.

50. Thomson cited in LBJL, OH, Thomson, p. 43.

51. Valenti cited in LBJL, WHCF, Confidential File, Box 6, Folder, Co 1-3, Asia, 1966, Eyes Only Memo Valenti to Rusk, March 1, 1966.

52. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 240, Folder: China, Memos, Vol VII, 9/66-11/66, Panel on China, the United Nations and United States Policy, July 6, 1966.

53. *Ibid.*

54. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 260-1; John King Fairbank, *Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir*, (New York, 1982), p. 397.

55. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 260-1; Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 397.

56. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 260-1; Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 397.

57. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 260-1; Fairbank, *Chinabound*, p. 397.

58. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 241, Folder, China, Memos, Vol IX, 3/67-6/67, (1 of 2), Note for Rostow from Jenkins, May 23, 1967, Subject, China and Asia Panels.

59. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 240, Folder, China, Memos, Vol VIII, 12/66-3/67, Memo Jenkins to Rostow, February 3, 1967, Subject, Highlights of China Panel Meetings, February 1-2.

60. *Ibid*, p. 2.

61. *Ibid*, p. 4.

62. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 241, Folder, China Memos, Vol IX, 3/67-6/67, Memo Jenkins to Rostow, June 23, 1967, Subject, China Panel.

63. *Ibid*, p. 1.

64. *Ibid*, p. 2.

65. *Ibid*, p. 2.

66. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, pp. 264-5/

67. *Ibid*, pp. 260-1.

68. The campaign was started by Thomson and the earliest mention of it was found by me in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 13, Far East, 1961-6, General, Folder, Thomson-Cooper, Memoranda, 4/64-1/66, Memo for Bundy, January 7, 1966, Subject, The New Year in Asia, mentions that a Memo exists dated January 6, 1966 making a recommendation that Reischauer be appointed Ambassador at Large with special responsibility for China policy. Further evidence of Thomson's involvement can be found in LBJL, NSF, Name File, Box 8, Folder, Thomson Memos, Memo Thomson to McGeorge Bundy, February 4, 1966, Subject, Seventh Floor Assignment for Ambassador Reischauer?

69. McGeorge Bundy cited in LBJL, NSF, Name File, Box 8, Folder, Thomson Memos, Memo McGeorge Bundy to William Bundy, February 6, 1966. Moyers support for the appointment can be found in LBJL, WHCF, Countries (CO), Box 21, Folder: Co China (EX), Memo Moyers to LBJ, January 18, 1966.

70. Edwin. O. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, (New York, 1996), pp. 296.

71. *Ibid*, pp. 296 & 301.

72. *Ibid*, p. 300.

73. *Ibid*, p. 301.

74. Humphrey cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 11, Speeches, 1961-6, Hubert Humphrey, 6/8/66, West Point, New York.

75. Johnson cited in James C. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1972, p. 241; see also LBJL, OH, Thomson, p. 44.

76. Johnson cited in James C. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1972, p. 241.

77. Johnson cited in *ibid*, p. 241; see also Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (New York, 1975), p. 896.

78. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, p. 116.

79. Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, pp. 272-3.

80. *Ibid*, pp. 272-3.

81. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol 57, No 3, July 20, 1967; Nixon's use of the Romanians to send a message to the PRC can be found in Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, (London, 1979), p. 181.

82. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol 57, No 3, July 20, 1967.

83. Zhou En-lai cited in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol 52, June 23, 1966, p. 584.

84. *People's Daily*, March 31, 1966, p. 1. A copy of the article plus a

commentary on it can be found in LBJL, WHCF (Confidential File), Box 7, Folder: CO-50-China, Memo Thomson to Rostow, Moyers and Valenti, April 2, 1966, Subject: Peking's Response to Indications of U.S. Flexibility on China Policy.

85. Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*, (New York, 1983), p. 496.

86. Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, p. 273; LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 240, Folder: China, Memos Vol VII, 9/66-11/66, Note Jenkins to Rostow, September 1, 1966, Subject: DOD Interest in Chirep.

87. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 240, Folder: China, Memos Vol VII, 9/66-11/66, Note Jenkins to Rostow, September 1, 1966, Subject: DOD Interest in Chirep.

88. The US Chiefs of Mission in East Asia are cited in Akira Iriye & Warren Cohen (eds), *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*, (Lexington, Kentucky, 1989), p. 55.

89. *Ibid*, p. 55.

90. *Ibid*, p. 55.

91. LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 240, Folder: China, Cables, Vol VII, 9/66-11/66, CIA - Intelligence Information Cable, September 19, 1966, Subject: Mao's Strategy, p. 15.

92. *Ibid*, p. 19.

93. The origins of this study can be found in Chapter Five of this thesis.

94. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 240, Folder, China, Memos Vol VII, 9/66-11/66, Note Thomson to Rostow, August 4, 1966.

95. *Ibid.*

96. Thomson cited in *ibid.*

97. *Ibid.*

98. LBJL, NSF, Name File, Box 5, Folder, Jenkins, Memo Jenkins to Rostow, September 14, 1966, Subject: Interagency China Country Committee.

99. *Ibid.*

100. *Ibid*, p. 3.

101. *Ibid*, p. 2.

102. LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 240, Folder: China, Memos, Vol VII, 9/66-11/66, Memo Jenkins to Rostow, November 4, 1966.

103. Iriye & Cohen (Ed), *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*, p. 56; Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, p. 118.

104. Thomson, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", *China Quarterly*, p. 242; Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, p. 117.

105. Thomson, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", *China Quarterly*, p. 242.

106. *Wall Street Journal*, November 14, 1967. Jenkins picked up the article and sent a copy to Rostow which can be found in LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 242, Folder: China Memos, Vol XI. 9/67-12/67, Note Jenkins to Rostow, November 15, 1967, Subject: After Mao.

107. *Ibid.*

108. *Ibid.*

109. LBJL, OH, Thomson, pp. 55-6; Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, pp. 296 & 301.

110. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, p. 317.

111. *Ibid*, pp. 296 & 301; LBJL, WHCF (Confidential File), Box 7, Folder, CO 50-1, Formosa, Text of Cable from Ambassador Reischauer (Tokyo, 1126), August 13, 1966.

112. Reischauer cited in LBJL, WHCF (Confidential File), Box 7, Folder, CO 50-1, Formosa, Text of Cable from Ambassador Reischauer (Tokyo, 1126), p. 6.

113. Reischauer cited in *ibid*, p. 8.

114. LBJL, OH, Thomson, pp. 55-6.

115. Thomson cited in *ibid*, p. 56.

116. *Ibid*, p. 61.

117. Thomson cited in *ibid*, p. 61.

118. *Ibid*, pp. 61-2.

119. *Ibid*, p. 62.

120. *Ibid*, pp 56-60.

121. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 260; JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 17, Far East, 1961-6, Folder, General 7/66-8/66 holds a series of documents on the National Committee on US-China Relations and their work. This includes their initial press releases and a list of founder members.

122. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 17, Far East, 1961-6, Folder, General 7/66-8/66.

123. *Ibid.*

124. *Ibid.*

125. *Ibid.*

126. *Ibid.*

127. *Ibid.*

128. *Ibid.*

129. *Ibid.*

130. *Ibid.*

131. *Ibid.*

132. Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, p. 260.

133. *Ibid*, p. 260; Steele's thesis is covered in Chapter Six of this thesis.

134. LBJL, Box 2, Meeting Notes File, Folder, February 2, 1968, Meeting with China Experts.

135. *Ibid*, p. 1.

136. *Ibid*, p. 1.

137. *Ibid*, p. 2.

138. LBJ cited in *ibid*, p. 3.

139. Eckstein cited in *ibid*, pp. 3-4.

140. *Ibid*, pp. 4-5.

141. LBJL, Box 22, WHCF, Country Files Folder, CO 50-2, PRC, Memo on China Policy, From National Committee on US-China Relations to LBJ, February 12, 1968, The Memo notes that the Committee itself takes no position but all the academics apart from Taylor hold the position outlined in the Memo, pp. 1-2.

142. *Ibid*, p. 1.

143. *Ibid*, p. 3.

144. LBJL, Box 22, WHCF, Country Files Folder, CO 50-2, PRC, Letter Taylor to Rostow, February 14, 1968.

145. LBJL, Box 22, WHCF, Country Files Folder, CO 50-2, PRC, Memo Rostow to LBJ, February 22, 1968; LBJL, Box 30, NSF, Memos to the President, Folder, Vol 64, Feb 22-29, 1969 (2 of 2), Memo Rusk to LBJ, February 22, 1968, Subject, Policy toward Communist China.

146. Rostow cited in LBJL, Box 22, WHCF, Country Files Folder, CO 50-2, PRC, Memo Rostow to LBJ, February 22, 1968, p. 1.

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68. Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, pp. 123 & 204; Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, pp. 223-4; Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 686-9; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pp. 360-1.

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70. I discuss the Nixon Doctrine and its significance in my unpublished Masters. Kevin Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New US Policy in Asia, Chap 3.

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86. Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New US Policy in Asia, p. 31.

87. Karnow, *Vietnam*, p. 582.

88. Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New US Policy in Asia, Chapter 2.

89. *Ibid*, Chap 2.

90. *Ibid*, pp. 14-7.

91. *Ibid*, pp. 70-2.

92. *Ibid*, pp. 70-2.

93. *Ibid*, pp. 74-8.

94. Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, p. 413; Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p. 749. In the speech given in Kansas on July 6, 1971, Nixon stated that: "What we see as we look ahead five years, ten years, perhaps it is fifteen, but in any event, within our time, we see five great economic superpowers: the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, mainland China, and, of course, Japan".

95. A. Doak Barnett & Edwin O. Reischauer (Eds with the assistance of Lois Dougan Tretiak), *The United States and China: The Next Decade*, (New York, Washington & London, 1970) contains the transcripts from the conference.

96. Documents on the convocation can be found in National Archives II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Central File, Subject Files, [EX], Countries Category: CO 34-2, People's Republic of China (Red China), 1969-1970.

97. *Ibid.*

98. *Ibid.* Barnett & Reischauer (eds with assistance from Tretiak), *The United States and China*, p. XI claims the number who attended the Convocation was 2,500.

99. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files, [EX], Countries Category: CO 34-2, People's Republic of China (Red China), 1969-1970, Letter, National Committee on US-China Relations to Henry Kissinger, January 6, 1969.

100. This predominance is reflected in the contributions in Barnett & Reischauer (Eds with assistance from Tretiak), *The United States and China.*

101. Paul Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, (Oxford, 1985), p. 272.

102. *Ibid*, pp. 271-2.

103. *Ibid*, p. 272.

104. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol LXIV, No 16, April 17, 1969, pp. 134-5. There is a long analytical article on the convocation that

highlights the two Senators speeches by Dick Wilson.

105. Javits cited in Barnett & Reischauer (Eds with assistance from Tretiak), *The United States and China*, p. 138.

106. *Ibid*, p. 139.

107. Edward Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, p. 146.

108. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, p. 147.

109. *Ibid*, p. 148.

110. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, pp. 148-9.

111. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, p. 153.

112. *Ibid*, pp. 149-50.

113. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, p. 151.

114. *Ibid*, p. 150.

115. *Ibid*, p. 152.

116. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, p. 152.

117. A good account of the early years of the CCAS can be found in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol 21, No 2-4, 1989, pp. 112-35 by Douglas Allen. A specific reference to their attitude towards the PRC can be found on p. 115.

118. Barnett & Reischauer (Eds with assistance from Tretiak), *The United States and China*, p. 155.

119. *Ibid*, p. 155.

120. *Ibid*, pp. 155-7.

121. *Ibid*, p. 157.

122. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, p. 157.

123. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, pp. 157-8.

124. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, p. 159.

125. Kennedy cited in *Ibid*, p. 159.

126. Theodore Sorenson cited in *Ibid*, p. 224.

127. Examples of this line of thinking abound in the literature on Nixon's opening to China. James Thomson Jr writing in the February 1969 edition of Atlantic Monthly provides a curious example. He writes that a "Republican President, and preeminently this Republican President, brings to the Chinese problem some very special assets ... Who, for instance, can pin the label of "softness on Communism" on Richard M. Nixon when he makes overtures to Peking? If little else is clear about the new President, his anti-Communist credentials are impeccable. The ironic fact is that *any* Republican would have greater domestic room for manoeuvre on China policy than a Democrat, and that Mr. Nixon will have more room than most Republicans".

128. Thomson cited in Barnett & Reischauer, *The United States and China*, p. 221.

129. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol LXIV, No 14, April 3, 1969, published the speech by Kennedy in its entirety (pp. 22-6) and its editorial praised the speech and the mood of the convocation in general.

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132. *Ibid.* Fulbright is cited on p. 182 & Whiting's view is outlined on p. 191.

133. *Ibid*, pp. 180-1.

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141. *Ibid*, p. 9.

142. *Ibid*, pp. 16-7.

143. This subject is covered well in William Bordern, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery: 1945-1955*, (Madison, Wisconsin, 1984).

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paper.

145. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files, Box 4, Countries Category, [EX], CO 1-3, Asia (1969-1970), Memorandum Kissinger to Nixon, Subject: Your Meeting with East Asian Consultants, Thursday April 24, 3.30P.M.

146. *Ibid.*

147. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files, Box 4, Countries Category, [EX], CO 1-3, Asia (1969-1970), Letter Kissinger to Barnett, Pye, Reischauer, Rosovsky & Taylor, April 18, 1969.

148. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files, Box 4, Countries Category, [EX], CO 1-3, Asia (1969-1970), Letter Barnett to Nixon, May 1, 1969.

149. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 502.

150. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files, [EX], CO 34-2, 1/8/71-31/9/71, Letter Clark MacGregor to John Rousselot, August 24, 1971.

151. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 363; Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New US Policy in Asia, p. 90.

152. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p. 696.

153. *Ibid*, pp. 698-9; Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, pp. 347-8.

154. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 365; Kalbs, *Kissinger*, p. 234 reach the same conclusion. They write that: "Given Nixon's determination to start serious talks with the Chinese, it seems logical to assume that he conveyed some hint of a possible American shift on the sensitive

Taiwan issue at this time".

155. Kalbs, *Kissinger*, p. 234.

156. Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, p. 349.

157. *Ibid*, p. 350; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pp. 364-5.

158. Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, p. 349; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 365.

159. Jiang, *The United States and China*, p. 163; Kalbs, *Kissinger*, p. 235; Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, pp. 350-1; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pp. 366-7.

160. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 700-1.

161. *Ibid*, pp. 701-2.

162. Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, p. 398.

163. *Ibid*, p. 399; Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p. 712; Nixon, *RN*, p. 548.

164. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p. 714.

165. *Ibid*, p. 717.

166. *Ibid*, p. 738-42.

167. Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, p. 411.

168. *Ibid*, p. 411.

169. *Ibid*, p. 414.

170. *Ibid*, p. 413; Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, pp 232-3; Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p. 748-53; Robert D. Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy*, (New York, 1989), p. 91.

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172. *Ibid*, pp. 414-5.

173. *Ibid*, p. 415; Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 759-60.

174. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 775 & 782-3; Nixon, *RN*, pp. 555-6.

175. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 784-5; Jiang, *The United States and China*, p. 165; Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*. p. 502.

176. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 1049-50.

177. Nixon, *RN*, p. 562; Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, pp. 516-7.

178. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, p. 730.

179. *Ibid*, p. 730.

180. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 1073-80.

181. *Ibid*, pp. 1075-80; Nixon cited in Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 497.

182. Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, p. 524.

183. Assessments of the US wording can be found on Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 596; Jiang, *The United States and China*, p. 166; Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, pp. 729-30.

184. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pp. 497-9; H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House*, (New York, 1994), pp. 424-6.

185. Kalbs, *Kissinger*, p. 282.

186. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pp. 500-2; Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, pp. 731-2; Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New US Policy in Asia, p. 103.

187. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, pp. 731-2.

188. Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger*, p. 333.

189. Nixon cited in C. L. Sulzberger, *The World and Richard Nixon*, p. 186.

190. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 1087-96; Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*, pp. 202-8; Immanuel Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, pp. 731-3.

191. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, p. 731; Robert G. Sutter, *The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of US China Policy: 1972-1982*, (Boulder, Colorado, 1983), p. 20.

192. Sutter, *The China Quandary*, p. 20.

193. The moral void at the heart of Nixon's foreign policy is covered thoroughly in Hersh, *The Price of Power*.

CONCLUSION: FOOTNOTES:

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2. Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu; the Decisions to Enter the Korean War*, (New York, 1960).
3. Paul Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China*, (Oxford, 1985), pp. 338-9.
4. See for example, National Archives II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Central File, Subject Files: Countries Category: CO 34-2, People's Republic of China, 1/1/72 (2 of 3), Letter Kissinger to Eckstein, September 6, 1972.
5. Ernest May & James Thomson Jr (eds), *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey*, (Cambridge, Mass, 1972), p. 400.
6. This is one of the central arguments of my Masters Thesis. See Kevin Quigley, MA Thesis, "The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New U.S. Policy in Asia", Warwick University, November 1993, Chap 7.
7. The role of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) and their influence on US Foreign Policy is considered in an article in the latest edition of *Diplomatic History* (Summer 1999) by Akira Iriye. I have yet to see the specific article but it has generated considerable debate on the H-Net discussion group H-Diplo. H-Net is to be found on www.h-net.msu.edu.

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MISCELLANEOUS:

I have use of the information presented on the H-Net discussion list H-Diplo. This can be found at www.h-net.msu.edu

ABBREVIATIONS

AAS	Association of Asian Studies
ACLS	American Council of Learned Societies
ADA	Americans for Democratic Action
AOS	American Oriental Society
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
BCAS	Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
CAP	China Advisory Panel
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CCAS	Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
ChiCom	Chinese Communist
ChiComs	Chinese Communists
ChiRep	China and the question of their representation in the United Nations
DOD	Department of Defense
FAR	Foreign Area Research Coordination Group
FE	Far East
FEA	Far Eastern Association
FDR	Franklin Delano Roosevelt
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
IPR	Institute of Pacific Relations
JAS	Journal of Asian Studies
JCCC	Joint Committee on Contemporary China
JFK	John Fitzgerald Kennedy
LT	Lieutenant
KMT	Guomindang or Kuomintang
LBJ	Lyndon Baines Johnson
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDEA	National Defense Education Act
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
SRC	Survey Research Center
SSRC	Social Science Research Council
UCLA	University of California, Los Angeles
UN	United Nations
WSAG	Washington Special Actions Group
WTA	World Trade Association